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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the concept of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) from a Shari’a 
(Islamic law) perspective. It thereafter investigates the practice of SPVs in the Islamic 
banking industry, using Kingdom of Bahrain as a case study. The review of literature 
explores the concept of SPVs, maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law), main 
Islamic financial principles, and main Islamic financial products used in conjunction 
with SPVs. This review of literature provides the theoretical foundation and 
understanding of SPVs in Islamic banking. 
 
Arguably one of the main Islamic financial hubs globally, the research uses the 
Kingdom of Bahrain as a case study. The investigation of SPV practices uses industry 
feedback through forty-four face-to-face semi-structured interviews, and secondary 
data. The secondary data consists of annual reports (which includes financial and 
Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports), regulatory consultations, and a real-life 
executed SPV structure by an Islamic bank. A thematic analysis is used to 
qualitatively analyse interview responses, while a content analysis is used to 
qualitatively analyse the secondary data. A content analysis also led to the 
formulation of qualitative test questions that may be used to generally determine 
whether an SPV structure transaction is Shari’a compliant or not. 
 
Out of ten Islamic banks covered in this research, eight of them engage in investment 
transactions. Out of these eight Islamic banks, evidence tends to suggest that five 
Islamic banks include conventional loans within their SPV investment structures for 
genuine causes, while three Islamic banks use hiyal (legal stratagems) to engage in 
prohibited conventional activities through SPVs. This indicates that although SPVs 
may be used for genuine causes, there may be some sort of an abuse of SPVs by the 
Islamic banking industry to override Shari’a (Islamic law) requirements. 
 
Also, whether the practice was genuine or hiyal-based, evidence further tends to 
suggest that many SPV practices in the Islamic banking industry may have been 
violating at least one major Shari’a condition, which therefore negates the Shari’a 
compliance of the SPV transactions. This includes Islamic banks either: (1) indirectly 
paying for the establishment costs of the conventional SPVs, (2) managing the 
conventional SPVs, (3) negotiating conventional deals on behalf of the SPVs, (4) 
having legal control over the conventional SPVs, and/or (5) having influence over the 
conventional SPVs. According to the findings, the conditions that are being violated 
are placed by Shari’a Supervisory Boards unanimously, in one form or another.  
 
This raises a question of whether a flaw exists within the Islamic banking industry, 
where such violations were able to have continued without being spotted by 
regulators, Shari’a Supervisory Boards, and/or internal Shari’a reviewers. The 
research concludes that there seems to be a discrepancy between the Islamic banking 
theory and practice, where the theory strictly prohibits interest-based transactions, 
while the practice commonly includes interest-based transactions. The research 
further concludes that evidence suggests that due to several factors, such as the 
inability to spot violations or management pressure, a considerable number of internal 
Shari’a reviewers do not report these SPV violations. As a result, most Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards are not officially informed of the realistic practices taking place.   
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 	  
1.1 Research Background	  
 
“Following a round table discussion with the Waqf Fund involving several 
notable Shari’a scholars, it was observed that some SPVs [special purpose 
vehicles] associated with locally incorporated Islamic banks were not subject to 
Shari’a compliance review which has resulted in some SPVs [special purpose 
vehicles] to undertake activities that were not Shari’a compliant, or at least their 
activities had not been reviewed as Shari’a compliant.” (CBB, 2013) 
 
The above extract is a portion of an introductory letter of a circular issued by the 
Central Bank of Bahrain, which was circulated to chief executive officers (CEOs) of 
Islamic banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain. The terminology indicates that Shari’a 
compliance challenges exists with special purpose vehicle practices in the Islamic 
banking industry.  
 
Furthermore, in a monthly Shari’a scholar session held by the Waqf Fund1 in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, a Shari’a scholar who serves on many Shari’a Supervisory 
Boards of Islamic banks worldwide, and who therefore is exposed to Islamic banks 
financial dealings in the Kingdom of Bahrain and globally, brought attention to 
multiple manipulative special purpose vehicle practices taking place in the Islamic 
banking industry (Umar, 2013). This includes Islamic banks establishing special 
purpose vehicles in order to indirectly obtain conventional loans, in which the 
respective Shari’a scholar explained was clearly not Shari’a compliant (Umar, 2013).  
 
This raises multiple questions. How can Islamic banks, whose essence is mainly 
based on the principle of the prohibition of interest, obtain conventional loans (or 
engage in other conventional or prohibited activities) through special purpose vehicles 
without question? Who is responsible for the actions being taken? Is it the 
managements and/or the board of directors? Who is responsible to holding such 
violations to account? Is it the Shari’a Supervisory Boards, internal Shari’a 
reviewers, and/or regulator? Are there reasonable justifications to such special 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The Waqf fund was established by the Central Bank of Bahrain to promote and help the Islamic banking industry 
through various activities.	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purpose vehicle practices, and if so, what are they? Is there a sort of abuse when using 
special purpose vehicles in the Islamic banking industry? These are some of the 
questions that may rise, which this research aims to examine.   	  
1.2 Significance of the study	  
 
First, it may be important for the reader to understand the following facts that may 
indicate that the practice of special purpose vehicles may be spread across the Islamic 
banking industry:  
 
• Section 1.1 explained how the Central Bank of Bahrain, in addition to a Shari’a 
scholar who serves on numerous Shari’a Supervisory Boards worldwide 
brought attention to problems relating to special purpose vehicle practices in the 
Islamic banking industry in the Kingdom of Bahrain.  
 
• The primary data collection process in this research was conducted through 
interviewing forty-four interviewees consisting of managements, regulator, 
lawyers, and other stakeholders. Ten Islamic banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
were covered through this process, where it was revealed that all of the Islamic 
banks use special purpose vehicles in their investments. If an Islamic bank did 
not use special purpose vehicles, this meant it was an Islamic retail bank that 
does not engage in investment activities.  
 
• An analysis of secondary data, particularly annual reports of nine Islamic banks 
(selected due to them being partially the main Islamic banks in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain), revealed that special purpose vehicles are used by all of the nine 
Islamic banks. This indicates that 100% of the sample selected solely to analyse 
this issue revealed that all of the Islamic banks selected for the sample use 
special purpose vehicles in their investment structures and deals.  
 
The above three points may be considered as indications that the practice of special 
purpose vehicles may be spread across the Islamic banking industry. Also, as 
witnessed in the next section (1.3), there are indications suggesting that there may be 
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a shortage of doctoral researches pertaining to special purpose vehicles in Islamic 
banking. As such, the significance of this study may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. This research tackles a critical issue that is widely practiced in the Islamic 
banking industry.  
2. This research fills a research area gap where low numbers of research have 
been undertaken. 
3. This research may be one of the pioneering doctoral researches related to 
special purpose vehicles that use the Kingdom of Bahrain as a case study. 
4. The research addresses key issues relating to the Shari’a compliance of 
special purpose vehicles that have officially been brought to public attention 
by the Central Bank of Bahrain and Shari’a scholar who serves on numerous 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards.  
5. The research may serve as a base for future research conducted in the same 
field, or may be used for comparative purposes.  
6. The research may initiate contemplations, thoughts, or deliberations by 
managers, Shari’a managers, lawyers, and regulators for constructive and 
progressive changes to take place in the Islamic banking industry.  
 
1.3 Research Gap	  
 
The researcher could only locate a handful of research papers regarding Shari’a 
compliance and special purpose vehicles, each focusing on a specific aspect of special 
purpose vehicles in relation to one Islamic financial product (for example: sukūk, 
which may be commonly referred to as Islamic bonds), and were brief research papers 
rather than in depth dissertations. This provides an argument that this topic may be of 
significant research interest that may contribute to knowledge. This also indicates that 
there may be a shortage of research papers regarding special purpose vehicles and 
Shari’a compliance.  
 
Furthermore, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (known as AAOIFI), which is an Islamic finance infrastructure 
organization who issues Shari’a, accounting, auditing, and governance standards for 
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the global Islamic finance industry and are used by Islamic financial institutions 
worldwide (AAOIFI, 2015), issued a number of fifty-four Shari’a standards as of 
October 2016. However, a Shari’a standard regarding special purpose vehicles does 
not exist2 (AAOIFI, 2015a). This further raises the question of the affect the lack of a 
Shari’a standard regarding special purpose vehicles may have had on the Islamic 
banking industry, and may serve as another argument for the significance of this 
research topic. 	  
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives	  
 
The research aims for this study are displayed below: 
  
1. To examine the concept of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) from a Shari’a 
(Islamic law) perspective. 
 
This includes studying and examining the Shari’a (Islamic law) in relation to 
special purpose vehicles. It involves the theoretical and Islamic legislative 
aspect of special purpose vehicles. 
 
2. To investigate the practice of special purpose vehicles in the Islamic banking 
industry and its compatibility with Shari’a (Islamic law), using the Kingdom of 
Bahrain as a case study.  
 
This includes investigating the current practice of special purpose vehicles in 
the Islamic banking industry in the Kingdom of Bahrain. It involves finding out 
how Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles, the reasons for using special 
purpose vehicles, how it differs from conventional banks use of special purpose 
vehicles, how often are they used, and more. Thereafter, it aims to examine 
whether these special purpose vehicle practices are Shari’a (Islamic law) 
compliant or not, using the results of the first aim (displayed above) as a base 
for Islamic rulings.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 However, it is important to note that as of October 2016, a Shari’a standard for special purpose vehicles was 
being constructed (AAOIFI, 2015b). 
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In line with the research aims, the following objectives are developed:  
 
• To explore the Shari’a rulings on special purpose vehicles using classical 
Islamic texts.  
 
• To assess the rationale of special purpose vehicles used in the Islamic banking 
industry in managing their financial operations.  
 
• To assess the behaviours of Islamic bank managers toward special purpose 
vehicle structures.  
 
• To examine the practice and attitude of the Islamic banking industry towards 
special purpose vehicles through secondary data. 
 
• To explore the regulatory requirements of the Central Bank of Bahrain and its 
attitude towards special purpose vehicles in the Islamic banking industry. 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 	  
 
The research uses a qualitative methodology. It further uses a geographical 
jurisdiction, the Kingdom of Bahrain, as a case study. The research collects both 
primary and secondary data for empirical data analysis. The primary data collection 
method is obtained through forty-four face-to-face semi-structured interviews. The 
secondary data collection includes annual reports of Islamic banks (which includes 
financial and Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports), publicised regulatory 
consultations with the Islamic banking industry pertaining to special purpose vehicles, 
and a real-life Islamic banking executed special purpose vehicle structure transaction 
as a unit of analysis. As for the empirical data analysis methods, the research uses a 
thematic analysis to analyse the primary data, and a content analysis to analyse the 
secondary data.	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1.6 Overview of the Thesis	  
 
Chapter one is the current introductory chapter that explains the research background, 
significance of the study, research gap, research aims and objectives, an introduction 
to the research methodology, and an overall overview of the thesis. 
 
Chapter two covers the review of literature pertaining to special purpose vehicles. 
This includes definitions for special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and special purpose 
entities (SPEs) including the difference between them. It also includes the legal status 
and different legal forms of special purpose vehicles, corporate governance and 
administration of special purpose vehicles, bankruptcy benefits through the use of 
special purpose vehicles, taxation benefits with special purpose vehicles, different 
types of special purpose vehicles, and accounting treatment of special purpose 
vehicles. Lastly, it discusses the history and development of special purpose vehicles 
including its role in the 2008 global financial crises.  
 
Chapter three is the second review of literature chapter that covers two sections: (1) 
maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) and (2) Islamic financial principles. 
The first section provides definitions for maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic 
law), in addition to other words related to maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic 
law) such as maslaha (an interest/benefit) and mafsada (that which causes harm). It 
then specifically explains the maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) of māl 
(wealth). The second section explains main principles underlying the Islamic banking 
industry, including the prohibition of riba (commonly referred to as usury or interest), 
prohibition of gharar (uncertainty), the concept of hila (legal stratagems) to 
ultimately engage in prohibited activities, and the concept of dharūra (necessity) in 
Shari’a (Islamic law).  
 
Chapter four is the third and final review of literature chapter that lists and explains 
specific Islamic financial products that are, or may be, used in conjunction with 
special purpose vehicles in Islamic investment structures. These Islamic banking 
products include tawarruq (monetization), murābaha (cost-plus sale), ijāra (lease), 
mushāraka (contractual partnership), and sukūk (commonly referred to as Islamic 
bonds). The chapter includes defining these Islamic financial products with 
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explanations, explaining their Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings, and listing the different 
types of a single product, where applicable.   
 
Chapter five is the research methodology chapter. It starts by explaining the paradigm 
and epistemological stance of the researcher. This includes defining constructivism 
and critical theory. Thereafter, the chapter explains the research methodology chosen 
for the research, which is a qualitative methodology, as well as using the Kingdom of 
Bahrain as a case study. The research uses a “single/holistic” case study design. The 
research methods for data collection and empirical data analysis are also explained. 
The chapter concludes by explaining the limitations of the chosen methodology and 
methods for the research.  
 
Chapter six is the first of the two empirical chapters. It analyses the perception of 
practitioners and their practice towards special purpose vehicles in the Islamic 
banking industry. This includes an analysis of responses obtained from forty-four 
stakeholder interviewees, using a thematic analysis.  
 
Chapter seven is the second and final empirical chapter, which analyses the practice 
of special purpose vehicles in the Islamic banking industry through secondary data. 
The secondary data includes annual reports (which includes financial and Shari’a 
Supervisory Board annual reports), publicised regulatory data, and a contemporary 
special purpose vehicle structure transacted by an Islamic bank used as a unit of 
analysis.  
 
Chapter eight is the conclusion chapter. This chapter lists the contribution to 
knowledge the thesis may have provided, a summary of the research, and the main 
findings of the research. The chapter also lists the possible various types of Islamic 
banks (relating to special purpose vehicle practices) that exist in the industry. 
Potential studies are also discussed, followed by the possible limitations that may 
have existed on this research. The chapter concludes by providing overall concluding 
remarks.  
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The below figure illustrates the full outline of the thesis, and further highlights the 
position of this introductory chapter in light of the thesis: 
 
 
 Figure 1 Research Outline (Author’s Diagram) 
  
CHAPTER	  ONE	   • Introduction	  
CHAPTER	  TWO	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  1:	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  THREE	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  2:	  Maqasid	  Al-­‐Shari'a	  and	  Islamic	  Financial	  Principles	  
CHAPTER	  FOUR	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  3:	  Islamic	  Financial	  Products	  
CHAPTER	  FIVE	   • Research	  Methodology	  
CHAPTER	  SIX	   • Empirical	  No.	  1:	  Perspective	  of	  Practioners	  regarding	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  SEVEN	   • Empirical	  No.	  2:	  Practice	  and	  Behaviour	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Banking	  Industry	  towards	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  EIGHT	   • Conclusion	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2. Chapter Two: Special Purpose Vehicles  	  
The below figure highlights the position of chapter two in light of the research 
outline:	  
 
Figure 2 Chapter Two Position (Author’s Diagram) 	   	  	    
CHAPTER	  ONE	   • Introduction	  
CHAPTER	  TWO	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  1:	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  THREE	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  2:	  Maqasid	  Al-­‐Shari'a	  and	  Islamic	  Financial	  Principles	  
CHAPTER	  FOUR	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  3:	  Islamic	  Financial	  Products	  
CHAPTER	  FIVE	   • Research	  Methodology	  
CHAPTER	  SIX	   • Empirical	  No.	  1:	  Perspective	  of	  Practioners	  regarding	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  SEVEN	   • Empirical	  No.	  2:	  Practice	  and	  Behaviour	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Banking	  Industry	  towards	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  EIGHT	   • Conclusion	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2.1 Introduction	  
 
More commonly referred to as a special purpose vehicle (SPV), it is also sometimes 
referred to as a special purpose entity (SPE). A review of literature revealed that only 
a few authors referred to it in two different terms in a single text, and a minority of 
other authors differentiated between the two terms. For clarity purposes, this thesis 
will generally adopt the term special purpose vehicle (SPV).  
 
This chapter covers five main areas of special purpose vehicles. First, it focuses on 
the definitions of special purpose vehicles and special purpose entities, and thereafter 
analyses the difference between both terms. Second, it explains the legal forms of 
establishing special purpose vehicles. Third, it explains the benefits of special purpose 
vehicles with regards to bankruptcy and taxation. Fourth, it lists and explores the 
types of special purpose vehicles. Fifth, it describes the accounting standards and 
treatments for special purpose vehicles. Sixth, it provides a historical background of 
the special purpose vehicles history. 
2.2  Definitions	  	  
In order to attain a better understanding of the research topic, this section provides a 
better understanding of special purpose vehicles and special purpose entities as 
explained below: 
2.2.1 Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) Definition	  
 
Literature tends to suggest that special purpose vehicles are generally formed or 
established to attain a specific purpose (for example: a financial purpose), and may be 
legally separated from the originator. For example, Topno (2005) explains that a 
special purpose vehicle is formed for a special purpose. Its power is limited to what 
might be required to attain such a purpose and its tenor is limited, which ends once 
the objective (or purpose) has been achieved.  
 
Gorton and Souleles (2007) define a special purpose vehicle as: 
 
"a legal entity created by a firm (known as the sponsor or originator) by 
transferring assets to the SPV, to carry out some specific purpose or 
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circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions. SPVs have no purpose 
other than the transaction(s) for which they were created, and they can make no 
substantive decisions; the rules governing them are set down in advance and 
carefully circumscribe their activities. Indeed, no one works at an SPV and it 
has no physical location” (Gorton and Souleles, 2007, p. 550). 
 
Abdulla and Chee (2010) define the special purpose vehicle as a separate subsidiary 
company set up to contain investments, while Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC)3 
defined it as “an off-balance sheet vehicle (OBSV) comprised of a legal entity created 
by the sponsor or originator, typically a major investment bank or insurance company, 
to fulfill a temporary objective of a sponsoring firm” (PwC, 2011, p.5). 	  
Topno (2005) suggests that a special purpose vehicle, which embodies a financial 
contract, is originally used to isolate financial risk, and is established in order to 
finance large projects without putting the entire firm at risk.  
 
As seen in the various definitions in this section, special purpose vehicles are 
generally separate legal entities established by an originator or sponsor to attain a 
specific (financial) purpose.  
 
2.2.2 Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) Definition	  
 
Amoruso and Duchac (2014) described special purpose entities (SPEs) as “business 
entities that exist for a narrow purpose, such as securitizing a portfolio of receivables 
or financing the acquisition of a building” (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014, p. 107).  
 
According to Hartgraves and Benston (2002), special purpose entities can be defined 
as “entities created for a limited purpose, with a limited life and limited activities, and 
designed to benefit a single company. They may take the legal form of a partnership, 
corporation, trust, or joint venture” (Hartgraves and Benston, 2002, p. 246). 
Moreover, Newman (2007) mentions that a special purpose entity “is an entity formed 
for a discreet and isolated purpose, to adhere to a specific business or economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  PwC is	   a multinational professional services network, and is one of the “Big Four” auditors, along with KPMG, 
Ernst & Young, and Deloitte.	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objective; a simple premise or starting off point from which the concept builds” 
(Newman, 2007, p. 99).  
 
In addition, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)4 defined a special purpose 
entity as:  
 
“a corporation, trust, or other entity organized for a special purpose, the 
activities of which are limited to those appropriate to accomplish the purpose of 
the SPE, and the structure of which is intended to isolate the SPE from the 
credit risk of an originator or seller of exposures. SPE’s are commonly used as 
financing vehicles in which exposures are sold to a trust or similar entity in 
exchange for cash or other assets funded by debt issued by the trust” (BIS, 
2009). 
 
Another author, Rothman (2012), explains that a special purpose entity is an 
independent legal entity that can be used to mitigate disruption caused by a 
bankruptcy filing by all or some members of a corporate group. Rothman (2012) 
explains that a lender might be more inclined to provide a secured loan to an 
independent entity rather than a complex corporate group with several creditors. 
Rothman (2012) also mentions that the special purpose entity’s “corporate documents 
will generally contain restrictive provisions requiring that the SPE be limited to its 
stated purpose of holding the collateral assets, therefore restricting it from engaging in 
outside activities” (Rothman, 2012, pp. 230-231).  
 
Furthermore, Newman (2007) suggests that the idea behind a special purpose entity is 
to simply narrow the scope of risks to the assets and liabilities held by the special 
purpose entity. This is done in order for potential investors risk to be based upon what 
occurs to those assets and liabilities held solely by the special purpose entity, 
regardless of the risks of the originator (Newman, 2007, Abdulla and Chee, 2010).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is the world's oldest international financial organisation. It has 60 
member central banks, representing countries from around the world that together make up about 95% of world 
GDP. The head office is in Basel, Switzerland. 
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2.2.3 Difference Between Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and Special 
Purpose Entities (SPEs)	  
 
As witnessed in the definitions for special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and special 
purpose entities (SPEs), literature tends to suggest that there may not be much 
difference between both terms, and are sometimes used as having the same meaning. 
For example, many authors refer to special purpose vehicles (SPVs) also as being 
special purpose entities (SPEs), or vice versa (for example, please see: Amoruso and 
Duchac 2014; Rothman 2012; PwC 2011; Gorton and Souleles 2007; Hartgraves and 
Benston, 2002).  
 
Masoom (2013), however, does differentiate between special purpose vehicles (SPVs) 
and special purpose entities (SPEs), and therefore included separate definitions for 
each. He defined a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as: 
 
“an organization constructed with a limited purpose or life. Frequently, these 
Special Purpose Vehicles serve as conduits or pass through organizations or 
corporations. In relation to securitization, it means the entity which would hold 
the legal rights over the assets transferred by the originator” (Masoom, 2013, p. 
502). 
 
On the other hand, the author defines a special purpose entity (SPE) as: 
 
“a type of corporate entity or limited partnership created for a specific 
transaction or business, especially one unrelated to a company’s main business. 
An SPE may be in the form of a corporation, trust, or partnership. Special 
purpose entities have been used for several decades for asset securitization, risk 
sharing, and to take advantage of tax statutes” (Masoom, 2013, p. 502).  
 
In the above definition of special purpose entities (SPEs) mentioned by Masoom 
(2013), his listing of the legal forms of special purpose entities does not include a 
limited liability company, which is one form of special purpose entities (SPEs) as 
argued by Gorton and Souleles (2007).  
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Stewart (2005) also differentiated between special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and 
special purpose entities (SPEs). He mentions that special purpose vehicles (SPVs) are 
most likely used for a facility, account, “which has no separate legal identity” 
(Stewart, 2005, p. 23). This definition contradicts with those of other authors, who 
argue that special purpose vehicles may have a separate legal identity, such as 
Abdulla and Chee (2010). As for special purpose entities (SPEs), Stewart (2005) 
states that they are formed by an act of incorporation, articles, forming a legal 
‘persona’. 
 
To summarise and as evidenced above, special purpose vehicles (SPVs) may be 
similar to special purpose entities (SPEs), while a number of authors consider both 
terms as being identical. Regardless of all of the different special purpose vehicle 
definitions, they may ultimately narrow down to one meaning, which may be defined 
as a separately created legal entity established for a specific purpose (mainly 
financial) and to attain a specific objective. 
 
2.3  Legal Status of Special Purpose Vehicles	  
 
Legally, a special purpose vehicle can be established in the form of a corporation, 
trust, partnership, or a limited liability company (Gorton and Souleles, 2007). Special 
purpose vehicles may also be in a form described as an “Orphan SPV”, which has no 
owners (Gorton and Souleles, 2007). The differences between these legal structures of 
special purpose vehicles are explained below: 
2.3.1 Corporation 	  	  
A legal entity that is separate and distinct from its owners (Investopedia, 2015). It is 
created as an artificial person to carry on the business (Farlex 2015, Gerald and Hill, 
2015). The legal person status of the corporation gives the business perpetual life, 
therefore the deaths of stockholders or officers of the corporation do not alter the 
corporation structure (Cornell, 2015). Firms may prefer establishing a corporation due 
to its limited liabilities, since its liability for damages is limited to the assets of the 
corporation (Farlex, 2015). Therefore, the shareholders and officers of the corporation 
are protected from any personal claims, unless they commit fraud (Farlex, 2015). The 
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legal independence of a corporation prevents its shareholders to be personally liable 
for the debts of the corporation (Cornell, 2015).  
2.3.2 Trust	  	  
A trust is a legal form where a fiduciary form is created for some property (Gorton 
and Souleles, 2007). This means that there is a relationship between a sponsoring firm 
and a trustee. The trustee is the one who holds the title of the trust property, while the 
beneficiary is the person who received the benefits of the trust (Cornell 2015a, Gerald 
and Hill, 2015a). Since sponsoring firms want to benefit from certain assets without 
being the owner of the assets (for legal, regulatory, taxation, or other reasons), a trust 
legal formation of a special purpose vehicle may be a preferred legal-structure 
establishment for sponsoring firms, since they would benefit from the assets owned 
by the special purpose vehicle without legally owning them. A key difference of 
“trust” compared to other legal structures is that the trustee fully owns the special 
purpose vehicle and enables different party (for example, the initial sponsoring firm) 
to benefit from.  
2.3.3 Partnership 	  
 
A partnership is a for-profit business association of two or more persons (Cornell, 
2015b, Gerald and Hill, 2015b). In this type of special purpose vehicle, each partner 
contributes agreed-upon payments or assets for an agreed amount of shareholding or 
ownership (Gerald and Hill, 2015b). This is a normal partnership where two or more 
individuals want to conduct business together. The originators therefore incorporate a 
partnership structure to set about the agreements.  
 
This form of legal structure may be attractive to both Islamic banks and outside 
investors.  Investors may find this form of legal structure attractive because they are 
able to partner with the Islamic bank to invest in a particular investment or asset 
without the fear of the negative financial performance of the Islamic bank. As for 
Islamic banks, when their ‘placement’ team gathers funds from outside investors, it is 
not retrieved into the account of the Islamic banks; otherwise these investors would 
legally be partners with the Islamic bank as a whole and would allow outside 
investors to have shares, board seats, and have a say in the overall activities of the 
Islamic financial institution. Therefore, by establishing a special purpose vehicle 
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through a partnership structure, funds obtained from outside investors are deposited 
into the account of the newly established special purpose vehicle, creating a separate 
legal entity of a partnership between various investors. The Islamic bank may enter as 
an investor and become a shareholder (partner) in the special purpose vehicle, or 
solely act as the fund (SPV) manager. Regardless, the investors are now limited to the 
shares, board seats, and veto power (where applicable) of solely the special purpose 
vehicle.  
2.3.4 Limited Liability Company	  
 
A limited liability company is a form of partnership, in which the maximum amount a 
partner may lose or be charged in case of claims being made against the company or 
in the case of bankruptcy is limited to the amount invested by each partner (Gerald 
and Hill, 2015c). In other words, the owners of the company are legally responsible 
for its debts only to the extent of the amount of capital they invested (Gerald and Hill, 
2015c).  
 
Investors, whether Islamic banks or any other investor, may prefer this legal structure 
of special purpose vehicle incorporation because they may be able to financially 
calculate their risk of loss accurately, since any claim made against an investor is 
limited to the amounts invested.   
2.3.5 Orphan Special Purpose Vehicles	  
 
An orphan special purpose vehicle is neither owned nor controlled by the person for 
whom the special purpose vehicle is being established (Chadwick, 2007). Chadwick 
(2007) explains that: 
 
“There is usually some compelling regulatory or fiscal reason why the SPV 
should be independently owned and independently controlled: that is to say 
owned and controlled by someone who is not the sponsor or itself owned or 
controlled by the sponsor. And there will be compelling commercial reasons 
why the SPV should carry out its role in a way that fulfills the special purpose 
of the sponsor: that is to say, in a way, which the sponsor can predict with 
certainty in advance of the transaction. Those who act as directors or trustees of 
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such entities are sometimes said to be providing ‘a commercial service of 
inevitability’” (Chadwick, 2007).  
 
An orphan special purpose vehicle is not consolidated with the sponsoring firm for 
tax, accounting, or legal purposes (Gorton and Souleles, 2007). However, an orphan 
special purpose vehicle may be consolidated for some of the mentioned purposes but 
not others (Gorton and Souleles, 2007). This statement may be arguable, since 
consolidating an entity completely segregated in terms of ownership and control is 
questionable, as one of the benefits of orphan special purpose vehicles is the isolation 
of financial risk. “By structuring the SPV as an ‘orphan company’, the SPV assets 
may not be consolidated with the firm’s on-balance sheet assets and are ‘bankruptcy 
remote’ in the event of bankruptcy or a default” (PwC, 2011, p.9). 
2.4 Corporate Governance and Administration of Special Purpose 
Vehicles 	  
 
As mentioned in the section of the special purpose vehicle definitions, special purpose 
vehicles neither have a physical office nor actual employees (Topno 2005, Gorton and 
Souleles 2007). A trustee would act based on pre-specified contracts (Topno, 2005). 
This is the reason why some law and advisory firms provide independent trustees and 
other corporate governance services to financial institutions to establish and 
administer their special purpose vehicles (Wilmington, 2015). Other corporate 
governance services provided by law and advisory firms include providing 
independent directors, managers, and officers for the special purpose vehicles, or to 
hold a nominal share capital (Wilmington, 2015). Since special purpose vehicles do 
not have physical offices nor employees (Topno 2005, Gorton and Souleles 2007), 
law and advisory firms also provide the special purpose vehicle administrative 
processes (Wilmington, 2015). These administrative services include accounting and 
tax preparation, phone answering service, mail forwarding, office and conference 
facilities (Wilmington, 2015). The jurisdictions that special purpose vehicles are 
established in, depends on the needs of the parent company or sponsor. However 
special purpose vehicles are usually established in tax-free jurisdictions with low 
levels of supervision (Stewart, 2005). These jurisdictions include the Cayman Islands, 
Bahamas, Gibraltar, Turks and Caicos (Stewart, 2005), Jersey, Guernsey (Nabarro, 
2009), amongst others. 
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2.5  Main Advantages of Special Purpose Vehicles 
2.5.1 Bankruptcy Benefits of Using Special Purpose Vehicles  	  
A special purpose vehicle is also referred to as a “bankruptcy-remote entity” whose 
operations are limited to the financing and acquisition of specific assets (Topno, 
2005). The term “bankruptcy-remote entity” means that when a creditor finances a 
special purpose vehicle (for example, to acquire an asset) and the parent company 
goes bankrupt, the special purpose vehicle would still legally be obliged to pay its 
dues without being protected under bankruptcy laws. This is because legally, the 
special purpose vehicle is completely separated from the parent company (Topno, 
2005). If the creditor financed the parent company directly (without the creation of a 
special purpose vehicle), the creditor will not legally be able to reclaim its debt if the 
parent company goes bankrupt and is protected under bankruptcy laws. 
 
To illustrate this matter further and as an example, Arcapita is an Islamic investment 
company (previously licensed as an Islamic bank) based in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
(with North American headquarters in Atlanta, United States of America). Arcapita 
filed for Chapter Eleven Bankruptcy Protection in the United States of America in 
2012 after it was not able to refinance a USD 1.1 billion debt, which was due to 
mature soon after the filing (Truby, 2012). Having filed for Chapter Eleven 
Bankruptcy Protection, Arcapita protected itself under U.S. laws from the obligation 
to repay its debt on the due date; and more importantly, protected its assets from 
being legally claimed as a collateral or compensation to its creditors. The creditors of 
the outstanding USD 1.1 billion debt facility were now unable to reclaim their dues 
since the investment firm, Arcapita, was now protected under U.S.A. laws, 
specifically under Chapter Eleven (United States Courts, 2016). If a different creditor 
provided credit to Arcapita through a special purpose vehicle, the creditor will still be 
legally able to claim its debts on the due date, and Arcapita would be obliged to repay 
its debt through the special purpose vehicle even if it was protected under Chapter 
Eleven bankruptcy law in the United States of America. This is because, since the 
special purpose vehicle is a separate legal entity, it would not be subject to United 
States of America Bankruptcy law protection even though Arcapita obtained legal 
bankruptcy protection. Therefore, this example may illustrate one of the reasons why 
creditors may prefer to finance firms through special purpose vehicles rather than 
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direct financing, since the sponsoring firms’ negative performance would not affect 
the obligation to repay its debt through the special purpose vehicle.  
 
However, the opposite may also be true. Just as the creditor having protected itself to 
receive its dues from the special purpose vehicle even if the parent company goes 
bankrupt, the parent company has also protected its own assets in case the special 
purpose vehicle goes bankrupt, or fails to pay its dues. This means, that if the special 
purpose vehicle (which was established by a parent company to obtain credit, for 
example, to finance an asset) goes bankrupt or fails to pay its dues, the creditor is 
legally limited to take action solely against the special purpose vehicle, and is not able 
to legally take action against the parent company or claim any of the parent 
company’s assets (Abdulla and Chee, 2010). Abdulla and Chee (2010) state that a 
special purpose vehicle “protects the assets of the parent company even if the 
subsidiary goes bankrupt (the protection applies the other way as well for the SPV 
[special purpose vehicle])” (Abdulla and Chee, 2010, p. 84). 	  
It may be important to note that the terminology “bankruptcy-remote” does not mean 
“bankruptcy proof” (McKune, 2004). In other words, bankruptcy remote does not 
mean that it is immune from being bankrupt. Rather, it means that the chance of being 
bankrupt is simply more remote (McKune, 2004).  
2.5.2 Taxation Benefits of Using Special Purpose Vehicles  
Corporations hugely benefit from special purpose vehicles to create tax efficient 
structures (Forbes and Sharma, 2008). Income tax, for example, differs in different 
jurisdictions. Therefore, if corporations establish special purpose vehicles in tax 
havens, they will either eliminate income tax or reduce it magnificently (Forbes and 
Sharma, 2008). The below illustrates an example: 
“Let's take XYZ, the global fashion brand, for example. It sells its ranges of 
male and female fashion garments through the wholesale channel. Its retail 
division consists of licensed and owned stores and concessions through which 
XYZ branded goods are sold. It also licenses its brand for products such as 
fragrances, watches…and branded mobile phones. It operates in the UK, 
Europe, US, Middle East, Asia and Australasia through these different 
channels. 
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As the brand is owned in the UK the existing royalty income of £5.3 million 
($8.9million) from retail and product licences comes to the UK and is subject 
to the standard rate of tax, 28%. If, after a restructuring, the XYZ income 
stream could be treated as due in Luxembourg rather than the UK, the tax rate 
on that income stream could be as low as 5.9% instead of 28%, resulting in a 
30% increase in after-tax return before capital costs compared to a UK 
location” (Forbes and Sharma, 2008). 
The above example clearly illustrates some main advantages in using special purpose 
vehicles in different jurisdictions. By legally applying a different form of structure, 
the tax on the income stream may be reduced from 28% to 5.9%, which may be 
considered as a significant drop. 
Another example includes an investment company looking to invest in the real estate 
market, using a “buy-to-let” strategy. If the company buys the property on its own, all 
earnings retrieved from the properties may be taxable in its operating country. 
However, the exact same investment executed through a special purpose vehicle in a 
tax-free jurisdiction, will enable earnings gained from the investment (to the special 
purpose vehicle) to be tax-free. In addition, the investing party may also choose when 
and how to transfer amounts from the special purpose vehicle to the investing 
company, thereby having more control on paying taxes (Hargreaves, 2014). Some of 
the advantages of using special purpose vehicles are summarised below:  
i. Tax Saving: Since the investment company (e.g. bank) controls the amount of 
income transferred from the special purpose vehicle to the investment company 
(for example, if the money is not needed, keeping it in the special purpose vehicle 
would reduce potential income tax liability) (Hargreaves, 2014). 
ii. Easier transfer of ownership: Adding or removing directors to suit the 
investment company’s situation would be easier. However, potential inheritance 
tax liabilities may exist (Hargreaves, 2014). 
iii. Multiple Investments through a single Special Purpose Vehicle: The same 
established special purpose vehicle might enter into multiple similar investments 
(for example, buying more property), to reduce charges and costs. This enables 
the investment company to build a property portfolio through a single special 
purpose vehicle (Hargreaves, 2014). 
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It is important to note that disadvantages also do exist when operating through special 
purpose vehicles, such as stamp duty taxation5 (Hargreaves, 2014). However, options 
for tax statues for establishing a special purpose vehicle, depending on the 
jurisdiction, includes a ‘zero-rate’ company. An example for a jurisdiction offering 
this is Jersey (Carey Olsen, 2016). Other authors who mention the tax advantage 
when transferring an asset to a special purpose vehicle is Hadnum (2013). 
The sophistication of special purpose vehicle structures may be more complex. 
However, it is evident from the above arguments that although special purpose 
vehicles can be complex in nature and in structure, the main purpose of establishing a 
special purpose vehicle remains clear, which is to meet a specific purpose. 
2.6 	  Types of Special Purpose Vehicles	  
 
According to Newman (2007), special purpose vehicles generally fall into three 
categories: (i) Joint Venture, (ii) Synthetic Lease, and (iii) Asset Securitization or off-
balance sheet financing. These three types are explained below:  
2.6.1 Joint Venture	  
 
A joint venture is when two or more parties engage in a venture that is separated 
legally from their respective firms. The channel used for this venture would be a 
special purpose vehicle (Newman, 2007). This special purpose vehicle may be formed 
in a number of ways such as a partnership, corporation, trust, and limited liability 
company (LLC) (Newman, 2007). As an example of a typical joint venture, as 
suggested by Newman (2007), can be the construction of a gas pipeline to conduct 
offshore oil drilling. The entire scope of the venture will be transferred into separate 
business entity – a special purpose vehicle - that would own both the assets and 
liabilities associated with the project. Since the risks and rewards of the project are 
now isolated solely with the special purpose vehicle, this creates an attractive 
incentive for the investors. This is because the investor would be able to assess the 
risks involved with this project, without the need to worry about the overall financial 
performance and risks associated with the corporations as a whole (Newman, 2007). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In the UK, changes to the stamp duty rules in the 2014 budget which were brought into force for land 
transactions on or after 20th March 2014, which means people will pay 15% tax on all purchases over £500,000; 
while below half a million standard stamp duty applies: 1% for properties up from £125,000 to £250,000, and 3% 
on properties from £251,000 to £500,000. (Hargreaves, 2014) 
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In order to avoid a situation where the special purpose vehicle (for example, through 
its trustee) acts in an unplanned manner after its formation, the chartering documents, 
such as the articles of incorporation, operating agreement, and partnership agreement, 
narrows the scope of the special purpose vehicle solely to the pre-planned and pre-
determined activities (Newman, 2007).  
 
Therefore, Newman (2007) raises some key observations to the special purpose 
vehicle joint venture context. The purpose and rationale of the joint venture is clear, 
transparent, and for the most part makes sense. The design and structure of the joint 
venture in order to achieve the desired end result and envisaged accomplishment 
makes sense. Newman (2007) argues that provided proper formation, protocols, and 
implementations are followed, this type of special purpose vehicle is a legitimate and 
non-controversial one. 
 
2.6.2 Synthetic Leases	  
 
This type of special purpose vehicle is not as simple as a joint venture (Newman, 
2007). As an example, Newman (2007) argues that if a company wants to use a 
specific building for twenty years, for example corporate offices, where the land and 
building purchase price is equivalent to USD 100 million, the company may form a 
special purpose vehicle to purchase the building. The special purpose vehicle would 
therefore need to borrow necessary funds to purchase such a building, and the 
financial institution may loan the special purpose vehicle up to 90 percent of the fair 
market value of the real estate - which is secured by the real estate, while the 
remaining 10 percent would be retrieved by the special purpose vehicle from outside 
equity investors(s). The outside investor(s) owns 100 percent of the shareholder 
equity in the special purpose vehicle, resulting in a structure where all of the outside 
equity being owned by someone other than the sponsoring corporation (Newman, 
2007). Corporations prefer this structure because these types of transaction, especially 
with this magnitude, would have a weighty impact on the corporation’s financial 
statements and tax returns (Newman, 2007). Accordingly, the aim is to structure the 
transaction in a manner that will be as advantageous as possible for financial and tax 
reporting purposes.  
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2.6.3 Asset-securitizations (off-balance sheet financing) 	  
 
A typical securitization involves a corporation who is referred to as the originator, 
selecting a group of assets into a special purpose vehicle (Newman, 2007). Assets 
transferred to the special purpose vehicle are usually account receivables. 
Theoretically speaking however, the assets may include any type of asset that has a 
potential inflow of payments. Either in the form of debt or equity, the special purpose 
vehicle will issue some type of security in exchange for cash (Newman, 2007). These 
securities would be issued to third party investors, and are backed by the assets that 
have been transferred to the special purpose vehicle (Newman, 2007). The special 
purpose vehicle would receive the money from the investors, and transfer it to the 
originator (Newman, 2007). The debtors, who have an outstanding balance owed to 
the originator, are informed of the asset transfers and are instructed to send the 
payments to the special purpose vehicle rather than the originator (Newman, 2007). In 
turn, the special purpose vehicle would pay the investors (security holders) upon 
receiving their cash (Newman, 2007).  
 
Similar to the synthetic leases, asset-securitization are also structured in manners to 
attain a more advantageous financial reporting (Newman, 2007). The balance sheet 
sensitivity is similar to the synthetic leases, while slight differences exist with regards 
to financial reporting (Newman, 2007). Because of the off-balance sheet nature of the 
transaction, the originator is not required to recognise the debt obligation (Newman, 
2007). Such a structure may positively improve the results of financial ratios, such as 
the debt-to-equity ratio.   
 
2.7 	  	  Accounting Treatment of Special Purpose Vehicles 	  	  
The key question to be asked is whether a special purpose vehicle is off-balance sheet 
or not, in respect to another entity (Gorton and Souleles, 2007). A primary benefit of 
special purpose vehicles in essence is the possibility for the accounting treatment to 
be off-balance sheet financing (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). This is due to many 
reasons. With an off-balance sheet structure, the sponsor may transfer any of its assets 
that negatively affect its financial statements, to a separately legal created special 
purpose vehicle. This would in turn enhance a firms (sponsor) balance sheet. 
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For this to be possible, the special purpose vehicle must be treated as a separate legal 
entity for financial reporting purposes, and therefore must meet certain criteria 
(Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). This accounting issue leads to a different question, 
which is whether the transfer of receivables from the sponsor to the special purpose 
vehicle is treated as a sale or as a loan for accounting purposes (Gorton and Souleles, 
2007). For the transfer to be treated as a sale, and hence receive off-balance sheet 
treatment, there are mainly two requirements, which are set out in Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 140 (FAS 140)6 (FASB, 2000). In order for the transfer to 
be considered as a true sale, the special purpose vehicle must be a qualifying special 
purpose vehicle, and the sponsor must surrender control of the receivables. A 
qualifying special purpose vehicle is a very limited scope special purpose vehicle that 
meets two conditions:  
• “It is a trust, corporation, or other legal entity whose activities are limited to 
(1) holding title to transferred financial assets, (2) issuing beneficial interests, 
(3) collecting cash proceeds from assets held, (4) reinvesting proceeds in 
financial instruments pending distribution to beneficial holders, and (5) 
distributing proceeds to the holders of its beneficial interests; and 
• It has a standing under the law distinct from the transferor” (Hartgraves and 
Benston, 2002, p. 253). 
This means that assets and liabilities initially owned by the sponsors may be 
transferred to the sponsor’s special purpose vehicle, thereby removing assets and 
liabilities from the sponsor’s (such as a bank) balance sheet (Amoruso and Duchac, 
2014). By being legally separated, the special purpose vehicle will generate its own 
financial statements that are exempt from consolidation by the sponsor (Amoruso and 
Duchac, 2014). 
There are vehicles other than special purpose vehicles that some companies use to 
avoid recognising assets and liabilities on their financial statements (Hartgraves and 
Benston, 2002).  These include operating leases, take-or-pay contracts, and 
throughout arrangements, which “enable a company to use something in its future 
operations in exchange for agreed upon payments” (Hartgraves and Benston, 2002, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  FAS 140: “Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets”. This issue was initially addressed in 
FAS 125. However, FAS 140 was later issued to clarify several outstanding questions left ambiguous.	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p.247). The accounting problem in these situations is determining whether an asset or 
liability exists, and when they should be reported on the balance sheet (Hartgraves 
and Benston, 2002).  
2.8 Origins and Evolvement of Special Purpose Vehicles	  
 	  
Interestingly, the origins of the concept of special purpose vehicles may be traced 
back to Shari’a (Islamic law) (Makdisi, 1999). This is because the concept of special 
purpose vehicles is an offshoot of the English “Trust” concept, and as explained 
earlier, one of the legal forms of special purpose vehicles are in the form of “trust” 
(Newman, 2007). Meanwhile, other authors such as PwC (2011) refer to this type of 
special purpose vehicle as a special purpose trust or “SPT”. As cited by Makdisi 
(1999), Cattan (1955) states that the English “Trust” closely resembled and probably 
derived from the earlier Islamic institution of “waqf”7.  
 
The emergence of special purpose vehicles in its modern form can be traced back to 
the 1970s (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). Literature tends to suggest that special 
purpose vehicles began appearing in the portfolio of investment banks and financial 
institutions in the late 1970s to early 1980s “primarily to help banks and other 
companies monetize, through off-balance-sheet securitizations, the substantial 
amounts of consumer receivables on their balance sheets” (Hartgraves and Benston, 
2002, p. 246).  
 
The use of special purpose vehicles grew in the 1980s (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). 
This growth was driven by a set of accounting standards issued in 1983 that provided 
the first financial reporting guidance for transactions involving special purpose 
vehicles (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). The first of these standards was the 
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards SFAS No. 76 (FASB, 1983), which 
dealt with the extinguishment of debt (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). The second of 
these standards was the Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 77 
(FASB, 1983a). Prior to these standards, financial reporting did not allow a company 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Makdisi (1999)	   raises many other interesting claims regarding the Islamic origins in the Common Law. For 
example, he identifies the royal English contract protected by debt as having its origins in the Islamic ‘aqd 
(contract), while the English Jury system having its origin in Lafif (a concept in the Maliki school of thought 
stating that when no evidence is presented, a group of twelve trusted individuals will state the ruling). 	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to record a transfer as a sale, if the seller yet had some sort of continuing obligation, 
which was uncertain at the time of the sale. When the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard (SFAS) No. 77 was issued, it allowed companies to record 
transfers as a sale even though the seller had some sort of continuing obligation, such 
as delivering the assets sold, provided this obligation could be estimated, for 
accounting purposes (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). Amoruso and Duchac (2014) are 
of the view that this change in accounting rule was critical in the evolution of the 
market, because “it opened the door for companies to remove financial assets from 
their balance sheets, even if these assets were sold into a trust with recourse” 
(Amoruso and Duchac, 2014, p.110). 
 
Later, in 1989, an Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) in the United States of 
America addressed the issue of when sponsors should consolidate their special 
purpose vehicles (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). Three criteria were set out for this8, 
where the guidance allowed the sponsor to avoid consolidation if there was: (1) A 
substantive equity investment by an independent third party who (2) has control of the 
special purpose vehicle, and  (3) has the substantive risks and rewards of owning the 
special purpose vehicle (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). This guidance was significant, 
as it provided the framework for determining when a special purpose vehicle could be 
treated as a separate financial reporting entity, with its assets and liabilities reported 
separately from the sponsor (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). 
 
Until the end of the twentieth century, although the special purpose vehicle market 
was continuously expanding, special purpose vehicles were not yet widely known, nor 
were a main concern or problems being witnessed in its practice (Amoruso and 
Duchac, 2014).  
 
According to McMillen (2013), it was during this time, prior to Mid-1990s, that 
special purpose vehicles started to be used in the Islamic financial industry for Shari’a 
(Islamic law) compliance purposes. The use of special purpose vehicles (for example, 
at locations such as the Cayman Islands and Bermuda), are used by Middle Eastern 
investors because of prevalent investment and transaction structures such as joint 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Topic D-14 “Transactions Involving Special-Purpose Entities” (EITF, 2002)	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ventures, corporate restructurings, private equity and real estate acquisitions (Elmalki 
and Stone, 2009).9 
Until a scandal known as the “Enron Scandal” 10, which is a scandal that led the Enron 
Corporation from having a market capitalisation of USD 60 billion in the beginning of 
2001, to being bankrupt by the end of 2001 (SEC, 2005)11, special purpose vehicles 
were not under any major criticism or scrutiny (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). The 
Enron Scandal, and later the 2008 global financial crises, massively increased special 
purpose vehicle awareness to the public, questioning their usage and accuracy in 
terms of financial reporting, regulation, and transparency (Amoruso and Duchac, 
2014). This is because, one of the reasons for the failure of Enron Corporation was 
USD 14 billion off-balance sheet debts, which were incurred through structured 
financing transactions involving the use of special purpose vehicles (SEC, 2005). The 
Enron Corporation was able to hide enormous amounts of debt through accounting 
frauds by using special purpose vehicles (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014 and Dharan, 
2002). This scandal evidences that special purpose vehicles may be used to hide debt 
from investors, auditors, regulators, and other stakeholders. Therefore, these huge 
business failures focused attention on the shortcomings of rule-based accounting 
standards that addressed off-balance sheet accounting and special purpose vehicle 
reporting (McKee et al, 2006). However, Newman (2007) argues that it was not the 
lack of accounting guidance that resulted in the special purpose vehicle scandal by 
Enron, rather a dishonest and fraudulent behaviour of Enron’s management.  
After the Enron Scandal, special purpose vehicles have come under major criticism 
and scrutiny in the financial industry (Newman, 2007). The line between the use and 
abuse of special purpose vehicles has become extremely thin, where the two are 
considered almost the same (Newman, 2007). It is almost as if special purpose 
vehicles are established solely for manipulative, fraudulent, obfuscate, and inherently 
negative purposes (Newman, 2007).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The timeline and reasons why the Islamic financial industry started operating through special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs) during the 1990s is further explained in chapter four.	  10	  The “Enron Scandal” was revealed late 2001 that led to the bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation, an American 
energy company based in the United States of America, and the de facto dissolution of Arthur Andersen, a major 
multi-international audit and accountancy firm. 
11	  The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) in the United Sates submitted a report and recommendations 
(Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) on arrangements with off-balance sheet 
implications, SPEs, and transparency of filings by issuers. As part of this SEC (2005) report, a historical context of 
the study included “Enron Corp”. 
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In 2007, concerns began to emerge regarding the possible impacts of special purpose 
vehicles on the financial system (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). These off-balance 
sheet vehicles were described by McCulley (2007) as a “shadow banking system” that 
provided liquidity to the financial markets without transparency or regulation. 
Problems started to arise where the default rate on loans held by the special purpose 
vehicles increased, and in turn caused the value of debt securities issued by special 
purpose vehicle securities to deteriorate (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). Although this 
did not have a huge impact on special purpose vehicles, this deterioration in the value 
of securities heavily impacted structured investment vehicles (SIVs)12 holding these 
securities (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). The structured investment vehicle crises 
began to emerge and spread out by late 2007 (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014).  
It is apparent from the Enron Scandal as well as other bailouts of major corporations13 
that special purpose vehicles played a huge role in leading to the 2008-2009 global 
financial crises. However, it should be noted that special purpose vehicles are merely 
separate legal entities and therefore, it may logically be claimed that those who 
establish and manage the special purpose vehicles are the real action players in the 
market.  
Lastly, in 2016, a set of confidential documents that was disclosed to the public, 
known as the “Panama Papers”, led to a media erupt, which provided detailed 
information of countless offshore companies with directors and links to politicians, 
government representatives, business institutions, and wealthy individuals who 
benefit from offshore companies (such as special purpose vehicles) for tax 
evasion/avoidance purposes as reported by the Guardian (2016), the New York Times 
(2016), British Broadcasting Corporation - BBC (2016), Reuters (2016), amongst 
others. This contemporary concern indicates that the issues faced by these offshore 
type companies still pose challenges to those parties who may be negatively affected 
by it.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  A pool of investment assets that attempts to profit from credit spreads between short-term debt and long-term 
structured finance products such as asset-backed securities (ABS).	  13	  HSBC bailed out two SIVs at roughly $45 billion in assets (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). Citigroup bailed out 
$49 billion in assets from SIVs, while Bear Steams loaned one SIV $3.2 billion (Connolly, 2007; Kelly & Ng, 
2007; Weil, 2007). Bear Steams ended up failing due to its SIV crisis, and the Federal Reserve set up a separate 
fund to absorb the company’s unhealthiest assets (Federal Reserve, 2013).	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2.9  Conclusion	  
After the 2008 global financial crisis, special purpose vehicles “have received 
negative publicity and faced heightened scrutiny from regulators” (Amoruso and 
Duchac, 2014, p.116). Special purpose vehicles are frequently used to hide debt from 
shareholders and investors, and used to “conceal responsibility for these entities 
behind contractual arrangements that conflict with underlying economic reality” 
(Amoruso and Duchac, 2014, p.116).  
Negativity towards special purpose vehicles is also witnessed throughout literature 
related to special purpose vehicles. Some journalistic literatures officially include 
negative wording proving that the initial intentions some originators of special 
purpose vehicles were to deceive those with the right to know. For example, Stewart 
(2005), mentions that the establishment of special purpose vehicles “...very easily 
develops in to a sustained policy of deceiving or depriving those with a right to 
know…which have to compound their deceit in order to remain intact and to sustain 
the lie” (Stewart, 2005, p.23). Another negative trait is the “proliferation - or domino-
effect procreation - of such entities is a typical effect of complex circumstances in 
which lies have to be compounded and expanded to retain theoretical credibility” 
(Stewart, 2005, p.24). Stewart (2005) considers the link between special purpose 
vehicles and money laundering as being “almost automatic” (Stewart, 2005, p.24), 
which is why money-laundering laws have been partly developed in a way to detect 
and discourage the formation of special purpose vehicles (Stewart, 2005).  
However, Stewart (2005) argues that the term “special purpose vehicle” does not in 
itself indicate any illegality such as fraud or scam. Although Stewart (2005) does 
indicate the intended deception by the originators being done through the usage of 
special purpose vehicles who end up having to compound their deceit in order to 
remain intact and to sustain the lie, he nevertheless mentions that special purpose 
vehicles yet remain a possible perfectly acceptable designation. This is because 
special purpose vehicles do not, in and off themselves, indicate any sort of illegality. 
Others who hold this view are Forbes and Sharma (2008), who stated:  
“Special purpose vehicle (SPV) is often considered a series of dirty words. 
The assumption being that something devious is going on to hide a potential 
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liability. But this simply is not the case. All financial instruments are exposed 
to misuse so of course special purpose vehicles are no exception, but they can 
be used for legitimate business advantage, especially regarding intangible 
assets”. (Forbes and Sharma, 2008) 
Also, Newman (2007) notes that evidence suggests that special purpose vehicle 
abusers represent a small pool of companies relative to the total population of public 
companies. This is worthy of note because Newman (2007) argues that it was not the 
accounting standards set that was the core of the problem, nor normal special purpose 
vehicle practices in the industry, rather, it was “SPV abuse”. Lastly, in terms of 
regulation, Amoruso and Duchac (2014) are of the view that the evolution of these 
entities and their relationship with structured investment vehicles posed a systematic 
challenge for regulating and developing a robust financial reporting model for special 
purpose vehicles.  
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3. Chapter Three: Maqāsid Al-Shari’a (Objectives of Islamic Law) 
and Islamic Financial Principles  
 
The below figure highlights the position of chapter three in light of the research 
outline: 
	  
Figure 3 Chapter Three Position (Author’s Diagram) 	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3.1 Introduction 
 
Islamic banking is a banking system that operates according to the principles of 
Shari’a (Islamic law) (Abdul-Raheem 2013, Kettel 2011, Abdul-Rahman 2010, 
Abdulla and Chee 2010, Soumare 2008, and Ayub 2007). The Shari’a (Islamic law) 
consists of rulings derived from four main sources, which are the Qur’an, sunna 
(Prophetic sayings and tradition), ijma’ (consensus), and qiyas (analogy) (Possami et. 
al 2015, Ahdar and Arony 2010, Auda 2008, Jokisch 2007, Ayub 2007, and Prince 
1986). Each ruling in Shari’a (Islamic law), whether general or specific, has a 
meaning and wisdom behind it (Ash-Shubailī 2015 and Auda 2008). The study of 
maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) looks into specific and general rulings 
of Shari’a (Islamic law), and is concerned with learning the meaning and wisdom 
behind specific legislated rulings (Ash-Shubailī, 2015). This field of study (maqāsid 
al-shari’a) is based on both usul al-fiqh (fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence) and 
fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) (Ash-Shubailī, 2015).  
 
Main Sources of Shari’a (Islamic Law) 
 
Figure 4 - Main Sources of Shari'a (Author's Diagram) 
 
Also, one of the main objectives of an Islamic economy is to achieve the maqāsid al-
shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) (Ginena and Hamid 2015, AlSerhan 2015, Al-
The Holy Qur'an 
Sunna (Prophetic Sayings and Traditions) 
Ijma' (Consensus) 
Qiyas (Analogy) 
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Enezi 2015, and Chapra 2006). Islamic banks are considered a significant component 
in achieving a successful Islamic economy (Al-Enezi, 2015). Islamic financial 
principles serve maqāsid al-shari’a and therefore, since Islamic banks operate 
according to the Shari’a (Islamic law), Islamic banks should obviously follow Islamic 
financial principles (Ayub, 2007).  
 
It may be concluded from the above, that in order to understand Islamic financial 
principles, it is imperative to understand two things: (1) The field of study and 
concept of maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) in relation to Islamic 
finance; and (2) the main Islamic financial principles. These two matters are 
important to understand because they are linked to special purpose vehicles in Islamic 
banking. Do special purpose vehicles serve maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic 
law)? Does the special purpose vehicle practice act according to Islamic financial 
principles? Understanding the study of maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) 
and Islamic financial principles may help in understanding and answering these 
questions, which are therefore explained in this chapter.   
 
3.2 Maqāsid Al-Shari’a (The Objectives of Islamic law)	  	  
Generally, there are specific maqāsid (objectives) and general maqāsid (objectives) 
(Ash-Shubailī, 2015). The maqāsid (objectives) for each hukm taklifi (injunctive 
ruling) in Islamic law is known as the specific maqāsid (objectives) (Ash-Shubailī, 
2015). Ash-Shubailī (2015) uses “fasting” as an example for a specific objective, who 
argues that the objective or wisdom behind this legislation is to remember the poor, 
and curb the self-desires of an individual (Ash-Shubailī, 2015). As for the general 
maqāsid (objectives), an example would be that the Shari’a (Islamic law) came to 
prevent harms and uphold interests (Ash-Shubailī, 2015).  
 
This section defines maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law), in addition to two 
other terminologies related to maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law), which 
are maslaha (interest/benefit) and mafsada (harm). Second, it will specifically 
identify how maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) relates to māl (wealth) 
and Islamic finance. 	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3.2.1. Definitions	  
 
The term “Shari’a”14 involves all the creeds and acts legislated by Allāh (God) (Ibn 
Taymiyah, 2005). “Maqāsid15 al-shari’a” (objectives of Islamic law) refers to the 
meaning and wisdom the Legislator was concerned with, both generally and 
specifically, to achieve the interests of mankind (Ash-Shubailī, 2015). This meaning 
is confirmed by a number of Shari’a jurists including Al-‘Izz Bin Abdel-Salām, Imam 
Al-Shātibï, and Imam Al-Ghazālï who state that it is known from the derived sources 
of Shari’a (Islamic law) that the objective of Shari’a is the well being of humans, 
both in their religion and their worldly affairs (Abdel-Salām 2008, Al-Shātibï, 2008, 
Ibn Āshūr 2004, Khallāf 1993, Al-Āmidi 1981, and Al-Ghazālï 1971).  
 
Shari’a jurists unanimously agree 16  that a main maqsad (objective) of Shari’a 
(Islamic law) is to protect the interests of mankind, which can be rightfully called a 
“maslaha (interest/benefit)”, and not the desires, short-term pleasures, or deviant lusts 
of mankind (Abu Zahra 2010, Al-Fawzān 2015, Khallāf 2008, and Sattam 2015). 
“Maslaha (interest/benefit)”17 is the preservation of maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of 
Islamic law) (Al-Ghazālï 2008, Al-Zarkashi 1992, and Al-Shawkānï, 1909). 
According to Imam Al-Ghazālï, maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) with 
respect to the creation are five, which is to protect and preserve for them their: (1) 
deen (religion/faith), (2) nafs (oneself, lives), (3) ‘aql (mind/intellect), (4) nasl 
(posterity/decedents), and (5) māl (wealth) (Al-Ghazālï 2008 and Al-Būtï 2009). 
Anything that repels what causes harm to these five categories is considered a 
“maslaha” (an interest/benefit), while anything that causes harm to these five 
categories is the opposite of maslaha (interest/beneficial), which is considered as a 
“mafsada” (that which causes harm) (Al-Ghazālï, 2008).  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The linguistic meaning of “Shari’a” refers to a place from which water descends (Ibn Mandhūr, 2003). 
15 Linguistically, “maqāsid” refers to “qasd”, a word with three meanings: (1) the determination and undertaking 
something, (2) straightness on the path, and (3) moderation in matters (Al-Zamakhshari, 1998). 
16 There are differences amongst scholars regarding whether the masālih (benefits) were initially intended by the 
Lawgiver or not, which is debated in great length amongst ahl al-sunna, mu’tazilites, ash’arites (different 
denominations of Islam with regards to aqeedah (creed), while the issue was also addressed by scholars of kalam 
(theology). However, these are philosophical differences and they are in unanimous agreement that the laws of 
Shari’a (Islamic law) are comprised of masālih (benefits) for mankind (Al-Fawzān, 2015).  
17 Etymologically, “maslaha” means what is beneficial in its absolute sense, and contains a strong aspect of salaāh 
(good) (Al-Shartūnï 1983, Ibn Āshūr 2004, Al-Ghazali, 2008).	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Figure 5 - Maqāsid Al-Shari'a (Objectives of Islamic Law) (Author’s Diagram, theory extracted from Al-
Ghazali (2008)) 	  
As for the masālih (interests/benefits), with respect to its: importance, significance, 
people’s need for them, their effect on the well-being of mankind, and providence of 
its security and stabilizing its existence - they are not all considered to be of the same 
level of importance (Al-Fawzān, 2015). There are some masālih (interests/benefits) 
that are less important than others (Al-Fawzān, 2015). The highest level of masālih 
(interests/benefits) with respect to its significance is al-dharūriyāt (necessities), 
followed by hājiyyāt (needs) and tāhsīniyyāt (complementary) (Al-Fawzān, 2015). 
The above five categories mentioned by Al-Ghazālï (2008) are all considered as 
dharūriyāt (necessities) (Al-Fawzān, 2015). Therefore, this means that the protection 
and perseverance of lawful māl (wealth), is considered a “dharūra (necessity)”, 
holding the highest rank of al-masālih (interests/benefits) in maqāsid al-shari’a 
(objectives of Islamic law).  
 
Since Islamic finance mainly deals in financial transactions, it may be concluded that 
the relationship between maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) and Islamic 
finance is mainly in the fifth category, which is māl (wealth). It may also be 
Deen!(Religion/Faith)!
Nafs!(Oneself/Lives)!
‘Aql,(Mind/Intellect),
Nasl!(Posterity/Descendants),
Māl!(Wealth)!
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concluded that the protection and perseverance of Islamic banks capital and financial 
transactions also holds a high ranking of importance and significance according to 
maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law), and may be considered a dharūra 
(necessity). The Shari’a (Islamic law) concept of dharūra (necessity) is further 
discussed later in this chapter. 
3.2.2. Maqāsid Al-Shari’a (Objectives of Islamic law) of Māl  (Wealth) 	  
 
Islamic finance is a system of finance that is in line with Shari’a (Islamic law) rules 
and principles (Abdulla & Chee 2010 and Ayub 2007).  It was also previously 
concluded that each Shari’a ruling (al-ahkām al-taklīfīya) has a specific maqsad 
(objective) (Ash-Shubailī, 2015). Therefore, it may be concluded that Islamic finance 
in essence, should fulfill many of maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) (Al-
Qura-Dāghï, 2011). It was also concluded that the link between Islamic finance and 
maqāsid al-shari’a (the objectives of Islamic law) is mainly in māl (wealth), where 
protecting and persevering māl (wealth) may be considered a dharūra (necessity), 
which is the highest rank of masālih (interests/benefits) (Al-Ghazālï, 2008).  
 
According to Al-Qaradhāwï (2008), there are a number of different types of maqāsid 
(objectives) that are related to māl (wealth) (Al-Qaradhāwï, 2008). This includes 
maqāsid (objectives) with respect to māl (wealth) (1) value and structure, (2) link 
with faith and morality, (3) production, (4) consumption, (5) circulation; and (6) 
distribution (Al-Qaradhāwï, 2008).  
 
3.2.3. Maqāsid Al-Shari’a (Objectives of Islamic Law) and the Islamic 
Economy 	  	  
Since the Islamic economy includes Islamic banking and finance within it, 
understanding the main maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) relating to an 
Islamic economy may be useful to understand. According to Al-Qura-Dāghï (2011), 
the maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) of an Islamic economy includes the 
following: 
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1. The achievement of succession and empowerment of the earth, which is done 
through developing the land and making it upright for the whole of humanity (Al-
Qura-Dāghï, 2011). 
2. The (general) development of the human being and the society economically, 
socially, culturally, and intellectually (Al-Qura Dāghï, 2011). 
3. Protection of wealth along with its enhancement through investments and 
engagement in (business) contracts with risk management (Al-Qura-Dāghï, 
2011). Also, to manage māl (wealth) in a balanced manner, without extravagant 
spending, stinginess, or miserliness (Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2011). 
 
3.2.4. 	  Maqāsid Al-Shari’a and Special Purpose Vehicles	  	  	  
A question that may be significant to address is whether the theoretical concept of 
special purpose vehicles serves or goes against maqāsid al-shari’a (the objectives of 
Islamic law). It may be concluded from the previous section(s), that whether special 
purpose vehicles serve or go against maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) is 
dependent on whether the activities undertaken through a special purpose vehicle in 
Islamic finance is in accordance with Shari’a (Islamic law) requirements or not. The 
following may clarify this understanding: 
 
1. If the special purpose vehicle fulfills Shari’a (Islamic law) requirements, engage 
in lawful activities, and/or abstain from prohibited activities, its activities are 
serving maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law). This is because the 
Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings by default serve the philosophy of maqāsid al-
shari’a (objectives of Islamic law). 
 
2. If the special purpose vehicle does not fulfill a Shari’a (Islamic law) requirement, 
without a valid reason, and/or engages in activities that are prohibited in Shari’a 
(Islamic law), then this special purpose vehicle practice goes against maqāsid al-
shari’a (objectives of Islamic law). 
 
The below provides arguments relating to whether or not special purpose vehicles 
serve maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law):  
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A. Arguments supporting the notion that Special Purpose Vehicles serve 
Maqāsid Al-Shari’a (Objectives of Islamic law):	  	  i. Removing Hardship	  
 
Evidence for removing hardship and facilitating ease being considered as a maqsad 
(objective) is found in the Qur’an18: “Allah intends for you ease, and He does not 
want to make things difficult for you”19 (Al-Hilali & MuhsinKhan, 1996, p.57) and 
“Allah does not want to place you in difficulty”20 (Al-Hilali & MuhsinKhan, 1996, 
p.216)21.  
 
Therefore, it may be argued that special purpose vehicles serve the general maqsad 
(objective) of Shari’a (Islamic law), which is “removing hardship and facilitating 
things for people” (Ash-Shubailī, 2015). This is because special purpose vehicles, in 
essence, are established because of their practicality and to make things easy, as 
evidenced in chapter two. If strictness was practiced by those with the authority of 
approvals, such as the Shari’a body or regulator, who disallow special purpose 
vehicles to be used as a tool in an investment structure, this may oblige banks to pay 
higher taxes, reduce the financial performance of their balance sheets, increase 
establishment fees and other costs, reduce the legal benefits for the transaction, and 
complicate the transactions due to certain jurisdiction bureaucracies. Thus, logically, 
this may inflict hardships on Islamic banks managements when dealing with their 
financial operations.  
 ii. Protecting Māl (Wealth)	  
 
Protecting and preserving peoples māl (wealth) is a significant maqsad (objective) of 
Shari’a (Islamic law), which also holds the highest ranking of masālih 
(interests/benefits) (Al-Ghazālï 2008 and Al-Fawzān 2015). Since one of the benefits 
for special purpose vehicles is to protect its shareholders funds even if the sponsoring 
entity goes bankrupt, and will not be affected by the poor financial performance of the 
sponsoring entity (Abdulla and Chee, 2010), this by extension means that the legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The Qur’an is the first and primary source of Shari’a (Islamic law)	  
19 Interpretation of the meanings of the	  Qur’an, Chapter 2: Verse 185	  
20	  Interpretation of the meanings of the	  Qur’an, Chapter 5: Verse 6	  
21 This is also evidenced by the second source of Shari’a (Islamic law), the Prophetic Sunna, when he (pbuh) said 
“Treat people with ease and do not be hard on them; give them glad tidings and don’t fill them with aversion” 
(Bukhari and Muslim). 
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structures of special purpose vehicles may protect the māl (wealth) of shareholders. 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the special purpose vehicle legal structure serves 
as a maslaha (interest/benefit), as it protects and preserves individuals’ māl (wealth) 
(Al-Ghazālï 2008 and Al-Būtï 2009).  
 iii. Promoting Economic Development	  
 
It may be argued that special purpose vehicles serve the economic well being of an 
economy. Since special purpose vehicle structures reduce tax obligations, regulatory 
requirements, and other hardships, this may increase trade in the market. Therefore, 
more business contracts will be entered into and in turn help the economy grow. A 
growth in business transactions will also help Islamic banks attain business 
opportunities that will enhance shareholder wealth, which is one of the objectives of 
maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) (Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2011).  
 B. Arguments supporting the notion that Special Purpose Vehicles does not 
serve Maqāsid Al-Shari’a (Objectives of Islamic Law)	  	  
i. Lack of Transparency	  
 
Shari’a (Islamic law) prohibits illusory practices and considers it to be one of the 
detestable sins, which is a statement accepted by the unanimity of Shari’a scholars or 
jurists (Al-Nawawi, 2015). Chapter two concluded that the establishment of special 
purpose vehicles “...very easily develops in to a sustained policy of deceiving or 
depriving those with a right to know…which have to compound their deceit in order 
to remain intact and to sustain the lie” (Stewart, 2005, p.23). If these actions 
mentioned by Stewart (2005) were true, it may be concluded that the misleading 
practices involved with special purpose vehicles are not acceptable according to 
Shari’a (Islamic law).  
 
The question that arises is whether Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists should prohibit or 
discourage special purpose vehicles, in order to annihilate the means and method that 
lead to such disingenuous practices, called as sad al-tharā’i (prohibition of evasive 
legal devices) in Shari’a (Islamic law), which is further discussed in section 3.3.4.  
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ii. Spread of Mafāsid (Harms)	  
 
It may be assumed that if Islamic banks engaged in misleading practices through 
special purpose vehicles, similar to the claims put forth by Stewart (2005), those in 
charge of such practices may be the respected individuals who are in charge of 
planning and initiating such special purpose vehicle transactions, such as Islamic 
banking managers. If these bank managers mislead those with a right to know, such as 
the board of directors, shareholders, regulators, Shari’a Supervisory Boards, auditors, 
or other stakeholders, these disingenuous practices may lead to the following: 
 
1. Board of Directors may approve special purpose vehicle transactions harmful to 
them and the shareholders, if bank managements lack transparency when 
displaying the investment structures for approval. This is because a possible lack 
of transparency may lead to a hidden detail(s) not known to the board of directors, 
which might have affected their decision. Also, this may further have a negative 
impact on the māl (wealth) of shareholders as capital contributors, and therefore 
may be considered as a mafsada (harmful) (Al-Ghazālï 2008 and Al-Būtï 2009). 
 
2. Board of Directors rationale in their decisions may further be affected due to 
possible lack of transparency by management. For example, if financial statements 
presented to the board lack transparency (i.e. hidden debts or financial deals 
executed through special purpose vehicles that are not clearly presented in 
financials) where it portrays a positive financial performance rather than the 
realistic performance, this may lead the board to approve compensations and 
bonuses to management that would have otherwise not been the case. This 
negative affect on the māl (wealth) of shareholders may also be considered a 
mafsada (harmful) (Al-Ghazālï 2008 and Al-Būtï 2009).  
 
3. Shari’a Supervisory Boards of Islamic banks may issue Shari’a (Islamic law) 
rulings on special purpose vehicle structures that do not necessarily reflect the 
underlying economic reality of the transaction. For example, if a Shari’a 
Supervisory Board unknowingly approves a special purpose structure that includes 
an element of riba (i.e. which were hidden through the layering of special purpose 
vehicles), in reality, all the mafāsid (harms) associated with riba (commonly 
referred to as interest or usury) would exist in the transaction. This by extension 
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means that if many similar structures were approved in various Islamic banks, all 
the mafāsid (harms) associated with riba (commonly referred to as interest or 
usury) may spread across the Islamic banking industry. If the mafāsid (harms) 
pertaining to riba (commonly referred to as usury or interest) spreads throughout 
the Islamic banking industry, then this would serve against maqāsid al-shari’a 
(objectives of Islamic law) (Al-Qaradhāwï, 2008).  
 
4. Regulators may not regulate efficiently, nor hold the Islamic banks accountable, to 
protect the stakeholders and economy due to possible mismanagements by Islamic 
banks. This will lead to a mafsada  (harm) where the regulator will not be able to 
protect the māl (wealth) of the shareholders, and may inefficiently regulate the 
tadāwul (circulation) of māl (wealth) - both of which are considered as mafāsid 
(harms) and go against maqasid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law).  
 
5. Auditors (whether internal or Shari’a) may not spot or report necessary findings in 
there reports, and therefore the bank would not rectify mistakes and cause mafāsid 
(harms) to the economy, even when a proper corporate governance and auditing 
infrastructure is set into place.  
3.2.5. Summary of Special Purpose Vehicles and Maqāsid Al-Shari’a 
(Objectives of Islamic Law)	  	  
Special purpose vehicles serve and go against maqāsid al-shari’a (the objectives of 
Islamic law), depending on the practice of Islamic banks. Special purpose vehicles 
may serve maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) by removing hardships such 
as legal, regulatory, and taxation. The removal of these hardships further increases 
economic activities and development, which is one of the maqāsid (objectives) in 
Shari’a (Islamic law). Lastly, special purpose vehicles may further serve the maqāsid 
al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) by protecting the māl (wealth) of shareholders, 
through its various forms of legal structures.  
 
However, special purpose vehicles may not serve maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of 
Islamic law) since it may be considered as a gateway to non-transparent practices by 
banks (Stewart, 2005). This in turn would lead to a variety of mafāsid (harms) that 
may negatively impact the maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) in the 
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Islamic banking industry. It is imperative to note, that these mafāsid (harms) being 
spread out the banking industry may not be a result of special purpose vehicles as a 
concept nor its legal framework, however may be a result of the abuse of special 
purpose vehicles by the Islamic banking industry. This is similar to Stewart (2005) 
statements, as described in chapter two.  
 
3.3 Islamic Financial Principles 	  
The Shari’a (Islamic law) does not recognise transactions that constitute an element 
or object that is considered illegitimate (Ayub, 2007). Therefore, the Shari’a (Islamic 
law) has identified particular elements that need to be avoided while engaging in 
transactions (Ayub, 2007). These prohibitions include riba (commonly referred to as 
usury or interest) and gharar (uncertainty) (Ayub 2007 and Al-Enezi 2015). The 
Shari’a (Islamic law) also prohibits actions that lead to prohibitive activities, such as 
hila (legal stratagem or ruse) to ultimately engage in prohibited activities, and thari’a 
(means and method) that leads to a prohibited activity (Al-Enezi, 2015). This section 
explains the main concept of Islamic financial principles pertaining to these four 
prohibitions, because they are related and may be used in special purpose vehicle 
structures. 
3.3.1. Prohibition of Riba (commonly referred to as Usury or Interest)	  
	  
In Shari’a (Islamic law), the term “riba (commonly referred to as usury or interest)” 
means an addition, however low in number, over and above the principal of a loan or 
debt (Ayub, 2007).  “Riba means and includes any increase over and above the 
principal amount payable in a contract obligation, not covered by a corresponding 
increase in labour, commodity, risk or expertise” (Ayub, 2007, p. 53).  
There is no difference of opinion regarding the prohibition of riba (commonly 
referred to as usury or interest) in Shari’a (Islamic law) according to Islamic scholars 
(Ayub, 2007). This is due to the fact that the two main sources of Shari’a (Islamic 
law) – the Qur’an22 and sunna23 – both strictly prohibit riba (commonly referred to as 
usury or interest (Ayub, 2007). However, differences exist regarding the meaning of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Please See Qur’an: Surah Al-Baqara, verse 275-281; Surah Al-Imran, verse 130; Surah Al-Nisa’, verse 161; 
Surah Al-Rum, Verse 29.	  
23 Examples: Muslim, Al-Tirmidhi, and Imam Ahmed. 
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riba (commonly referred to usury or interest) or what constitutes riba (commonly 
referred to as usury or interest) in modern transactions (Ayub, 2007). For example, 
Al-Tantawi (2001), the rector of Al-Azhar24 claimed that compensations made by the 
banks to its depositors (known today as interest) do not constitute an element of the 
forbidden riba (commonly referred to as usury or interest). However, this view is held 
by Al-Tantawi (2001) only in the context where the depositor/banker relationship 
should be viewed as savers giving their funds to banks as investment managers 
(which would be a mudhāraba25). If the relationship is viewed (or under contractual 
terms) as a lender/borrower relationship, then Al-Tantawi (2001) himself also holds 
the view that interest in these transactions does constitute the element of the forbidden 
riba (commonly referred to as usury or interest). Therefore regardless of this debate, 
all contractual lender/borrower relationships with interest do constitute an element of 
the forbidden riba (usually referred to as usury or interest) even according to Al-
Tantawi (2001).  
Also, the majority of Shari’a (Islamic law) scholars argue that modern interest-based 
transactions include an element of riba (Al-Enezi, 2015). The researcher accepts this 
view mainly for the following reasons: 
1. The Qur’an, being the first and primary source of Shari’a (Islamic law), 
explicitly states26 that if a lent amount is returned to the creditor, it should 
equal the principal amount, to avoid oppressing or being oppressed (Al-Hilali 
and MuhsinKhan, 1996). This means that demanding an increase in return for 
a lent amount constitutes oppression and is forbidden according to Shari’a 
(Islamic law). 
2. The Qur’an elaborates27 that Allah has permitted trade but prohibited riba (Al-
Hilali and MuhsinKhan, 1996), which indicates that an increase in a sale price 
(e.g. profit) is permissible since it is actual trade, opposed to an increase for a 
lent amount.   
3. There are many hadiths (Prophetic traditions and sayings) that prohibits 
dealing with riba (commonly referred to as riba or interest).28 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Al-Azhar is one of the oldest and most authentic Islamic universities in the world, headquartered in Egypt. 
25 Mudhāraba is a type Islamic business explained in chapter four. 
26 Please see Qur’an, Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 279 (2:279)	  
27 Please see Qur’an, Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 275 (2:275) 
28 Examples: Muslim, Al-Tirmidhi, and Imam Ahmed.	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4. If it was assumed that interest does not constitute the prohibited riba 
(commonly referred to as usury or interest) mentioned in the Qur’an and 
hadith (Prophetic traditions and sayings), then the third source of Shari’a 
(Islamic law), which is ijma’ (consensus), would still prove that interest is 
forbidden and does constitute an element of the forbidden riba (commonly 
referred to as riba or interest).  
Therefore, it may be concluded that interest-based activities include an element of 
riba (commonly referred to as usury or interest), which is prohibited in Shari’a 
(Islamic law). Khan (1986) states that this prohibition is largely due to its negative 
distributive justice and equity effects (Visser & McIntosh, 1998). Choudhury and 
Malik (1992) further comment that due to this prohibition, it perhaps developed the 
most sophisticated and complete theoretical systems of an interest-free economy in 
the world (Visser & McIntosh, 1998). As discussed in chapter four, this development 
includes the concept of establishing multiple special purpose vehicle structures that 
either avoids interest-based transactions, or separates interest-based transactions from 
Islamic banks (McMillen, 2013). 
3.3.2. Prohibition of Gharar (Uncertainty)	  	  
Gharar (uncertainty) generally means that in which the outcome is unknown (Ibn 
Taymiyah 2001, Al-Sarkhasi 1989, and Ibn Taymiyah 2005), or that whose nature and 
consequences are hidden (Al-Shirāzi, n.d.). Ibn Hazm (n.d.) defines gharar 
(uncertainty) as being: when the buyer does not know what he bought, or the seller 
does not know what he sold. For example, selling an asset to be delivered in the future 
without providing specifications of the asset (for example, selling an apartment 
without revealing the size or location of the apartment) contains an element of gharar 
(uncertainty). Al-Zuhaily (n.d.), who lists and analyses all the various definitions of 
gharar (uncertainty) of many classical fuqaha (Islamic jurists), believes that Al-
Sarkhasi’s (1989) definition is the most accurate one, which is “that whose outcome 
(or consequences) are hidden”. 
 
Gharar (uncertainty) is prohibited in Shari’a (Islamic law) (Ibn Majeh n.d., Muslim 
n.d., Al-Tirmidhi 1998, Al-Nisā’i 1986, and Abu Dawūd n.d.) and therefore, 
according to Shari’a (Islamic law), the existence of gharar (uncertainty) nullifies a 
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contract (Sultan 2007, Ramadan 2006, and Buang 2000). According to El-Gamal 
(2001), Al-Darīr (1997) lists four conditions for gharar (uncertainty) to nullify a 
contract: 
1. “It must be major. [...] 
2. The potentially affected contract must be a commutative financial contract. 
[...] 
3. The gharar must affect the principal components of the contract (e.g. the price 
and object of sale, language of the contract, etc.). Thus, the sale of a pregnant 
cow is valid, even though the status of the fetus calf may not be known.  
4. That there is no need met by the contract containing gharar which cannot be 
met otherwise.” (El-Gamal, 2001, p.4)  
3.3.3. Prohibition of using Hīla (Legal Stratagems) to engage in prohibited 
activities	  
	  
Initially, hila (legal stratagem or ruse) and makhārij (Shari’a solutions) have the same 
meaning in Shari’a (Islamic law) (Al-Enezi, 2015). With reference to classical 
Islamic texts, many Shari’a (Islamic law) scholars referred to this section of Shari’a 
(Islamic law) as “the book of hiyal (legal stratagems, ruse, legal tricks, etc.)”, while 
others referred to the same section as “the book of makhārij” (Ibn Najim, 1999). 
However, the term “hiyal” throughout history prevailed as being the prohibited action 
of developing tricks that lead to prohibited activities, while the term “makhārij” 
prevailed as being seeking alternative solutions that is permissible in Shari’a (Islamic 
law) (Al-Enezi, 2015). It is now common between the fuqahā (Islamic jurists) that 
when the term “hiyal” is used, it refers to an action or trick to make lawful what is 
actually not lawful (Ibn Taymiyah 1998 and Ibn Al-Qayyim 2002). Therefore, 
engaging in hiyal (legal stratagems or ruse) in order to engage in prohibited activities 
is prohibited in Shari’a (Islamic law) (Al-Qaradhāwï 1978 and Al-Enezi, 2015). Ibn 
Taymiyah (2005) argues that the same mafāsid (harms) included within these 
prohibited activities are also included within this type of hiyal (legal stratagems or 
ruse), except that this type of hiyal (legal stratagems) additionally includes an element 
of deception.  
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As explained in the introduction of this chapter, one of the main objectives of an 
Islamic economy is to achieve the maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law), 
while the Islamic banking industry is considered a significant component in achieving 
a successful Islamic economy (Al-Enezi, 2015). Therefore, in order to achieve such 
objectives, Islamic banks started using what is known as fiqh al-hiyal wal makhārij 
(Islamic jurisprudence of hiyal (legal stratagems) and makhārij (Shari’a solutions)) 
(Al-Enezi, 2015). However, Islamic banks (whether intentionally or not) started 
adopting the prohibited type of hiyal (legal stratagems), which ultimately leads to 
engaging in prohibited activities (Al-Enezi, 2015). For example, this may include 
Islamic banks using hiyal (legal stratagems) to ultimately indirectly engage in 
prohibited activities or industries. Al-Enezi (2015) argues that the list below may have 
acted as reasons for engaging in this prohibited type of hiyal (legal stratagems):  
 
1. The Islamic banking industry is a young industry and therefore not 
sophisticated as the conventional banking industry. 
2. Islamic banks want to compete with conventional banks  
3. Islamic banks co-mingled prohibited hiyal (legal stratagems) with lawful 
makhārij (Shari’a solutions), where the distinction became not always clearly 
recognizable. 
4. Many Islamic financial engineers do not have Shari’a (Islamic law) 
educational backgrounds. 
5. Islamic banks persist on attaining profitability without taking risk (avoiding 
the risk-reward factor of Islamic banking).  
 
Engaging in hiyal (legal stratagems) to engage in unlawful activities exists in the 
Islamic banking industry (Al-Enezi, 2015). Al-Enezi (2015) claims that this is true 
despite the fact that many contemporary fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) scholars, Islamic 
fiqhi (jurisprudence) infrastructure organizations, and Shari’a Supervisory Boards are 
exhorting effort to cleanse the industry from these misleading practices, and rather 
find makhārij (Shari’a compliant solutions or alternatives) to these prohibited 
practices. 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, special purpose vehicles are separate legal entities 
created for a specific (financial) purpose. Due to being able to structure transactions 
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with a tool that is legally separated from an Islamic bank, Islamic banks may use 
special purpose vehicle structures as one of the main methodologies to engage in hila 
(legal stratagem) in order to engage in conventional (or prohibited) activities or 
transactions. The empirical chapters further discusses this matter.   
 
3.3.4. Sad Al-Tharā’i (Prohibition of Evasive Legal Devices) 	  
	  
In many cases, a specific activity is not considered prohibited itself, however it may 
act as the cause that leads to prohibited activities. A thari’a is the means and method 
to arrive of something (e.g. engage in an activity) (Ibn Taymiyah 1998 and Ibn Al-
Qayyim 2002). Therefore, eradicating the thari’a (means and method) that lead to 
engaging in prohibited activities is known in Shari’a (Islamic law) as sad al-tharā’i 
(prohibition of evasive legal devices) (Al-Qaradhāwï 1978 and Al-Enezi 2015). 
However, if a thari’a (means and method) no longer leads to a prohibited activity, it 
may be deemed permissible and re-used, known as fat’h al-tharai’ (approval of 
evasive legal devices) (Al-Enezi, 2015).  
 
To clarify this concept and as an example, if an Islamic bank leases a building to a 
company who continues to operate a prohibited business (for example, in the 
gambling industry), the renewal of the lease would indicate that this prohibited 
business will continue to operate so long as the lease agreements are renewed. The 
Islamic bank may therefore, avoid renewing the lease agreement to this company, as a 
way of eradicating the thari’a (means) that led to the opening of the prohibited 
businesses. This is because this business may lead to the spread of mafāsid (harms). 
This practice may be referred to as sad al-thari’a (prohibition of evasive legal 
devices).  
 
3.3.5. Exceptions in Shari’a (Islamic law) Rulings: Al-Dharūriyāt (Necessities)	  	  
Al-dharūriyāt (necessities) is the plural of dharūra (necessity). It may be useful to 
understand this branch of Shari’a (Islamic law), since it may provide a justification to 
engage in what is initially considered unlawful in Shari’a (Islamic law), considered as 
an exception (Al-Qaradhāwï, 1978). 
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The types of masālih (interests/benefits) intended by Shari’a (Islamic law) are three: 
(1) Necessities (Al-Dharūriyāt), (2) Needs (Hājiyyāt), and (3) Amenities 
(Tahsiniyyāt) (Al-Fawzān, 2015). It was previously explained that not all masālih 
(interests/benefits) are considered to be in the same level of importance, where some 
masālih (interests/benefits) are less important than others (Al-Fawzān, 2015). It was 
also previously explained that with respect to its significance, al-dharūriyāt 
(necessities) is considered to be the highest level of masālih (interests/benefits) (Al-
Fawzān, 2015).  
 
Al-dharūriyāt (necessities) refers to a thing, which without it, the welfare of the 
religion and/or worldly life cannot be established (Al-Shatibi 2008 and Al-Fawzān 
2015). In other words, it is the matter that is needed to establish and sustain the well 
being of religion and the worldly life (Al-Shatibi 2008). Al-Shatibi (2008) explains 
that if a dharūra (necessity) is missing, the welfare of the world will be impacted 
negatively that would spread corruption in this world.  
 
As explained in section 3.2.1, the dharūriyāt (necessities) are limited to five 
necessities: (1) deen (religion), (2) nafs (oneself, lives), (3) ‘aql (intellect), (4) nasl 
(posterity/decedents), and (5) māl (wealth) (Al-Ghazālï 2008 and Al-Būtï 2009). 
However, these are comprehensive necessities, meaning that anything falling into a 
category of repelling what causes harm to these five comprehensive necessities may 
be considered a maslaha (interest/benefit), while anything causing harm to these five 
comprehensive categories may considered as a mafsada (harm) (Al-Ghazālï 2008). 
Thus, what may be considered a dharūra (necessity) is not limited to the above five 
terminologies.  
 
For example, the consumption of pork is initially considered prohibited in Shari’a 
(Islamic law)29 (Al-Hilali and MuhsinKhan, 1996). However, the same verse where 
the Qur’an30 prohibits pork consumption explicitly provides an exception for those 
who are forced by necessity to engage in what was initially prohibited (Al-Hilali and 
MuhsinKhan, 1996). Therefore, if an individual finds no other food to consume 
except for pork, it is completely acceptable to consume pork according to Shari’a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Please see Qur’an: Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 173 (2:173) 
30 Please see Qur’an: Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 173 (2:173)	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(Islamic law), since it was done out of dharūra (necessity) and not intentional 
transgression (Al-Qaradhāwï, 1978).  
 
Likewise and using analogical methods, it may be concluded that engaging in initially 
prohibited interest-based transactions may be acceptable in Shari’a (Islamic law) if it 
was done out of dharūra (necessity) (Al-Qaradhāwï, 1978). For example, shelter is 
considered a dharūra (necessity) and therefore, if an individual finds no other means 
to house or shelter his family except through an interest-based loan, then this would 
be considered acceptable according to Shari’a (Islamic law). This is because the 
masālih (interests/benefits) of housing outweighs the mafāsid (harms) in obtaining an 
interest-based loan.  
 
By understanding this concept of dharūra (necessity), it may be imperative to 
understand Islamic banking structure and transactions on a case-by-case basis, in 
order to understand whether the concept of dharūra (necessity) exists, where the 
Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings may provide exceptions (Al-Qaradhāwï, 1978). This 
may further be important to understand since two identical special purpose vehicle 
transactions may have different rulings, depending on the dharūra (necessity) of each 
individual case. It also clarifies that Islamic banks may not replicate Islamic 
investment structures adopted by other Islamic banks since the details of the approval 
may not be available nor clarified to them.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The Shari’a (Islamic law) is derived from four main sources, which are the Qur’an, 
sunna (Prophetic sayings and traditions), ijma’ (consensus), and qiyas (analogy). 
There is a higher objective and wisdom behind each Shari’a (Islamic law) ruling 
(Ash-Shubailī, 2015). The maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) in respect to 
the creation is five, which is to preserve and protect for them their deen 
(religion/faith), nafs (oneself/lives), ‘aql (mind/intellect), nasl (posterity/descendants), 
and māl (wealth).  
Islamic banking includes main prohibitions, such as riba (commonly referred to as 
usury or interest) and gharar (uncertainty). Also, since hila (legal stratagem) and 
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makhārij (Shari’a solutions) closely resemble each other (Al-Enezi 2015), the ability 
to accurately distinguish whether a certain practice is a hila (legal stratagem or ruse) 
or makhraj (Shari’a solution) becomes specifically important.  
Also, whether a certain situation is considered a dharūra (necessity) or not, 
determines whether an Islamic bank can directly engage in (initially) prohibited 
activities according to Shari’a (Islamic law). However, if special purpose vehicles are 
considered separate legal entities, can Islamic banks indirectly engage in prohibited 
activities through special purpose vehicles regardless of whether a circumstance was 
considered a dharūra (necessity) or not?  
Al-Enezi (2015) argues that there are Islamic banks that engage in hila (legal 
stratagem) in order to ultimately engage in prohibited (e.g. interest-based) activities. 
However, it is unclear how Al-Enezi (2015) derived to this conclusion, but what may 
be apparent is that the ability to engage in hila (legal stratagem or ruse) through the 
use of special purpose vehicles may easily be possible. The empirical chapters further 
discuss the practice of special purpose vehicles by Islamic banks.  
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4. Chapter Four: Islamic Financial Products  
 
The below figure highlights the position of chapter four in light of the research 
outline: 
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4.1 Introduction	  	  
This chapter will explain the main Islamic financial products that are (or may be) used 
in conjunction with special purpose vehicles, which are: (1) tawarruq (monetization), 
(2) murābaha (cost-plus sale), (3) ijāra (lease), (4) mushāraka (contractual 
partnership) (5) mudhāraba (another form of partnership) and (5) sukūk (commonly 
referred to as Islamic bonds). This is because these five Islamic products are the main 
products related to Islamic banking (Ayub, 2007). These five Islamic banking 
products may be used in conjunction with special purpose vehicles for financing and 
investment transactions or structures. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the 
concept of these Islamic products in order to gain a better understanding of how 
special purpose vehicles may operate in the Islamic banking industry. 
 
4.2 Islamic Financial Products	  	  
4.2.1 Tawarruq (Monetization)	  	  
A. Tawarruq (Monetization) Definitions	  	  
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) defines tawarruq (monetization) as: “the process of purchasing a 
commodity for a deferred price determined through Musawamah (Bargaining) or 
Murabahah (Mark-up Sale), and selling it to a third party for a spot price so as to 
obtain cash” (AAOIFI 2015c, p.758). 
 
Tawarruq (monetization) means to buy a commodity on credit, then sell it to a third 
party for cash (spot payment) for a price that is less than the original price the 
commodity was purchased for, in order to obtain instant cash or liquidity (Al-Qura-
Dāghï, 2009 and Kuwait-Awqaf, 1988). In fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), the Hanbali 
doctrine of Islamic law is the only doctrine that uses the term “tawarruq 
(monetization)” as a distinct product (Al-Bahūtï, 2000 and Ibn Muflih, 2003). The 
other doctrines of Islamic law explain the concept of tawarruq (monetization) as a 
division within their explanation of ‘īnah (a type of sale that involves selling a 
commodity on credit, thereafter re-purchasing the same commodity on spot payment 
for a lower price) (Kuwait-Awqaf, 1988).  
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The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Fiqh Academy (2009) defines 
tawarruq (monetization) as:  
“A person (mustawriq) who buys a merchandise at a deferred price, in order to 
sell it in cash at a lower price. Usually, he sells the merchandise to a third 
party, with the aim to obtain cash. This is the classical tawarruq, which is 
permissible, provided that it complies with the Shari’ah requirements on sale 
(bay’)”. (OIC, 2009) 
If the word “usually” in the definition implies that a tawarruq (monetization) 
transaction may not involve a third party, the accuracy of this definition may be 
questioned since the lack of involvement of a third party is considered a “‘īnah” and 
not a “tawarruq” (Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2009 and Kuwait-Awqaf, 1988). It may be 
significant to note here that the main difference between tawarruq and ‘īnah is the 
existence of a third party in tawarruq, whereas in ‘īnah - the original seller will 
repurchase the commodity at a lower price without the existence of a third party 
(Kuwait-Awqaf, 1988 and Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2009). 
 
B. Shari’a (Islamic law) Ruling of Tawarruq (Monetization)	  
 
The permissibility of tawarruq (monetization) under Shari’a (Islamic law) has been 
an issue of debate amongst both classical and contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) 
jurists. The majority of classical Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists consider the practice of 
tawarruq (monetization) - whether being referred to in the term of “tawarruq 
monetization)” or otherwise - to be permissible under Shari’a (Islamic law) (Kuwait-
Awqaf, 1988). These include classical Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists from Hanafi, 
Māliki, Shāfi’i, and Hanbali doctrines of Shari’a (Islamic law) (Ibn Al-Hamām 2010, 
Ibn Rushd 1998, Al-Shāfi’i 2001, and Al-Mardawi 1956, respectively). Some 
classical Hanafi and Māliki Shari’a (Islamic law) scholars consider tawarruq 
(monetization) as makrūh (discouraged or disliked) under Shari’a (Islamic law) (Al-
Zayl’ī 1896 and Al-Hattāb 2010, respectively), where one narration in the Hanbali 
doctrine of Shari’a (Islamic law) supports this view (Ibn Muflih, 2003). However, 
there is also a narration in the Hanbali doctrine of Shari’a (Islamic law) that considers 
tawarruq (monetization) to be prohibited under Shari’a (Islamic law) (Al-Mardawi 
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1956 and Ibn Taymiyah 1998a). This view of tawarruq (monetization) being 
prohibited is also supported and held by two classical and accomplished Shari’a 
(Islamic law) jurists, who are Ibn Taymiyah (1987) (according to one of his two 
opinions) and Ibn Al-Qayyim (2002).  
 
The views of contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists pertaining to tawarruq 
(monetization) are similar to the abovementioned opinions of classical Shari’a 
(Islamic law) jurists, claiming that tawarruq (monetization) is either permissible, 
makrūh (discouraged or disliked), or prohibited, according to each independent 
opinion. However, a heavy debate amongst contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) 
jurists is not regarding the tawarruq (monetization) concept described by the classical 
Shari’a jurists, which is also known as “al-tawarruq al-fardi (individual tawarruq)” 
(Bouheraoua, 2009). Rather, the debate amongst the contemporary Shari’a (Islamic 
law) jurists is regarding modern (Islamic) banking application of tawarruq 
(monetization), referred to and known as “al-tawarruq al-masrafi (banking 
tawarruq)”. The key difference between tawarruq al-fardi (individual tawarruq) and 
al-tawarruq al-masrafi (banking tawarruq) is that al-tawarruq al-masrafi (banking 
tawarruq) involves a concept of “al-tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq)” 
(Bouheraoua, 2009). Al-Tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq) is when the 
seller, buyer who intends to sell to a third party, and the third party all intend and 
execute the transaction simultaneously, referred to as “organized tawarruq” (OIC, 
2009). The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Fiqh Academy (2009) defined  
“organized tawarruq” as:  
“When a person (mustawriq) buys a merchandise from a local or international 
market on deferred price basis. The financier arranges the sale agreement 
either himself or through his agent. Simultaneously, the mustawriq and the 
financier execute the transactions, usually at a lower spot price”. (OIC, 2009) 
This concept is one of the key additions to contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) and 
fiqhi (Islamic jurisprudence) literature relating to tawarruq, where contemporary 
Islamic fiqhi (jurisprudential) literature includes the term and concept of “al-tawarruq 
al-munadham (organized tawarruq)”. This terminology, “al-tawarruq al-munadham 
(organized tawarruq)”, does not exist in classical Shari’a (Islamic law) texts and 
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literature probably due to the possibility of it being a contemporary phenomenon, and 
therefore was not commented on by classical Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists. 
 
i. Shari’a (Islamic law) Ruling on Al-Tawarruq Al-Masrafi (Banking Tawarruq)	  
 
Although the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Fiqh Academy views 
tawarruq al-fardi (individual tawarruq) as being permissible according to Shari’a 
(Islamic law), it however ruled that the practice of al-tawarruq al-masrafi (banking 
tawarruq) is prohibited under Shari’a (Islamic law) due to it being munadham 
(organized) (OIC, 2009). The specific ruling regarding its prohibition of tawarruq al-
munadham (organized tawarruq) practices by Islamic banks is:  
“It is not permissible to execute both tawarruq (organized and reversed) 
because simultaneous transactions occur between the financier and the 
mustawriq, whether it is done explicitly or implicitly or based on common 
practice, in exchange for a financial obligation. This is considered a deception, 
i.e. in order to get the additional quick cash from the contract. Hence, the 
transaction is considered as containing the element of riba” (OIC, 2009).  
The researcher believes that this view may be stringent since it does not provide an 
alternative to a tawarruq (monetization) nor a conventional loan, and is considering 
two lawful sale agreements (which may have met the conditions of bai’ (sales) in 
Shari’a (Islamic law)) as prohibited without providing sufficient evidence. If 
tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq) practiced by modern Islamic banks is 
considered plainly prohibited by the Organization of Islamic Council (OIC) Fiqh 
Academy (2009), this implies that customers who want to adhere to Shari’a compliant 
products for cash financing might as well obtain conventional loans rather than a 
tawarruq (monetization). Therefore, even if tawarruq al-munadham (organized 
tawarruq) was actually prohibited, it should serve as a temporary substitute for a 
conventional loan, until another acceptable substitute to a cash loan is made available 
(Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2009). 
 
However, there are quite a few of influential contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) 
jurists who consider al-tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq) as lawful 
according to Shari’a (Islamic law) (Al-Enezi, 2015). These include Sh. Abdulla Al-
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Menea, Sh. Mohammed Uthmani, and Sh. Mohammed Al-Qarri (Al-Enezi, 2015) - 
who argue that there is no difference between al-tawarruq al-fardi (individual 
tawarruq) and tawarruq al-masrafi (banking tawarruq). This may be a more 
acceptable view, since it serves as a substitute to a conventional loan under actual 
sales (of commodities) agreements, whether it was a normal or organized tawarruq 
(monetization). The question that may arise here is if a sufficient alternative Shari’a 
compliant financial product comes into existence, should this view or the continuous 
use of tawarruq (monetization) still be acceptable? In any case, this issue remains a 
debate amongst contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists. 
 
C. Islamic Banks and Tawarruq (Monetization)	  
 
As discussed in chapter three, a creditor providing a cash-based loan in order to 
retrieve an amount that is higher than the lent amount includes an element of riba 
(commonly referred to as usury or interest) (El-Enezi, 2015). The conventional 
banking loan system is based on this structure, which is known as interest-based 
banking or interest-based loans (Al-Qaradhāwï, 2008). The concept of riba 
(commonly referred to as usury or interest) is prohibited in Shari’a (Islamic law) and 
therefore, interest-based loans are considered prohibited under Shari’a (Islamic law) 
(Al-Qaradhāwï, 2008). The substitute used by individuals or institutions wanting to 
adhere to Shari’a (Islamic law) principles in their financial dealings is tawarruq 
(monetization), considering it to be the suitable substitute (Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2009 and 
Ayub, 2007). This product (tawarruq) enables parties to obtain liquidity or credit 
without the need to enter into riba-based transactions, but rather through the above-
described sale agreement (Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2009). 
  
However, tawarruq (monetization) practiced by modern (Islamic) banks are 
“tawarruq al-masrafi (banking tawarruq)”, which are structured as a tawarruq al-
munadham (organized tawarruq). The debates by contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) 
jurists explained in the previous section displayed that the majority of Shari’a 
(Islamic law) jurists view tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq) as prohibited, 
while a minority of influential Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists consider it to be lawful 
(OIC, 2009). Differences in branches of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) exist because 
Shari’a (Islamic law) is a broad chain where these differences are allowed in Shari’a 
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(Islamic law) within the same law. Despite these heavy debates regarding tawarruq 
al-munadham (organized tawarruq), in addition to its prohibition by the Organization 
of Islamic Council (OIC) Fiqh Academy (OIC, 2003), it is interesting to note that 
many Islamic banks nevertheless use tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq) as 
their methodology of financing (Ayub, 2007). This is probably due to the fact that 
Islamic banks are not obliged to follow Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings pronounced by 
international Islamic or fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) organizations, but rather are 
subject to the rulings and interpretations of their Shari’a Supervisory Boards (Abdulla 
and Chee, 2010). Therefore, if the Shari’a Supervisory Boards at Islamic banks 
consider tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq) permissible or approve it on an 
exceptional basis by considering the transaction as a dharūra (necessity), Islamic 
banks would be able to use tawarruq al-munadham (organized tawarruq) as their 
main method of financing without any regulative difficulty.  
 
The below diagram is a simple illustration for how Islamic banks are able to finance 
customers through the use of tawarruq (monetization) without engaging in interest-
based lending: 
 
Figure 7 Tawarruq (Monetization) Transaction (Author’s Diagram) 
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Having diagrammatically understood the concept of tawarruq (monetization), this 
product may be used in special purpose vehicle transactions where Islamic 
financing(s) is included. Below illustrates this example: 	  
Example of a Tawarruq (Monetization) in an SPV Transaction 	  
 
n Tawarruq Transaction 
Figure 8 Tawarruq (Monetization) in an SPV Structure (Author’s Diagram) 	  
4.2.2 Murābaha (Cost-Plus Sale)	  	  
“Murābaha (cost-plus sale)” is a term that is included in classical Shari’a (Islamic 
law) literature that refers to a sale, where the seller would sell a product for an amount 
equivalent to its initial purchased amount, in addition to a known profit (Al-
Murghayāni 1936, Ibn Al-Hamām 2010, Al-Nawawi 2003, and Ibn Qudāmah 1994). 
In a murābaha (cost-plus sale) transaction, the seller is required to convey to the 
buyer the initial price he (seller) purchased the commodity for, whereby the exact 
profit may also be accurately calculated by the buyer (Ibn Qudāmah, 1997).  	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In a murābaha (cost-plus sale) transaction, the ultimate purpose is that the buyer will 
get a (physical) hold and benefit from the asset bought (contrary to tawarruq 
(monetization), where the buyer sells the asset to a third party to attain the ultimate 
purpose of obtaining cash or liquidity). Like many other Islamic sale agreements, 
there are specific conditions that must be met to execute a valid murābaha sale 
(Ayub, 2007). In a murābaha (cost-plus sale), as well as all other Islamic sale 
agreements, one of the main conditions is that the seller needs to legally own the asset 
prior to selling it (Ayub, 2007).  
 
A. Murābaha (Cost-Plus Sale) Transactions in Islamic Banks  	  
Islamic banks use Murābaha (cost-plus sale) as a method of offering finance to its 
customers (Ayub, 2007). To simplify this understanding, an Islamic bank would 
purchase an asset for a spot payment; thereafter sell it to the customer on credit (for 
an amount equivalent to its principal plus a conveyed profit) (Ayub, 2007). This 
provides opportunities for customers to buy an asset from a bank (on credit) rather 
than obtaining an interest-based loan to buy an asset (Ayub, 2007). Islamic banks use 
this tool when they want to finance customers who wish to attain specific assets for 
beneficiary purposes (Ayub, 2007). Therefore, this also leads to the necessity of 
explaining a specific type of murābaha used by Islamic banks, which is the ‘bai’ al-
murabaha lil āmir bil shirā (murābaha to purchase orderer or MPO)’. Islamic banks 
are aware of which assets to purchase because the customer informs the Islamic bank 
of his intention to buy a specific asset. 
 
B. Al-Murābaha lil Āmer bil Shirā (Murābaha to Purchase Orderer)	  	  
Al-Murābaha lil āmer bil shirā (murābaha to purchase orderer or MPO) is “an 
arrangement wherein the bank, upon request by the customer, purchases an asset from 
a third party and sells the same to the customer on a deferred payment basis” (Ayub, 
2007, p.222). Ayub (2007) further explains “this variant is being widely used by 
almost all Islamic banks operating in various parts of the world and by the Islamic 
Development Bank for its foreign trade-financing operations” (Ayub, 2007, p.222). 
 
A difference of opinions between classical Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists exists 
regarding the Shari’a (Islamic law) ruling for al-murābaha lil āmir bil shirā 
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(murābaha to purchase orderer). The debate mainly exists regarding whether or not 
the customer - referred to as ‘al-āmir (the orderer)’ – is obliged to purchase the asset 
in which he initially expressed his intention to purchase (therefore considered as a 
promise and binding), or solely an expression of intention that may change 
(considered non-binding). If the customer’s expression of intention is non-binding, 
then the murābaha lil āmir bil shirā (murābaha to purchase orderer) is considered 
lawful in Shari’a (Islamic law) according to the Hanafi (Al-Sarkhasi, 1989) and 
Shāfi’i (Al-Shāfi’i, 2001 and Al-Nawawi, 2003) doctrines of Islamic law (Al-Enezi, 
2015). It is however considered prohibited according to the Māliki doctrine of Islamic 
law (Ibn Rushd, 1988), as well as an acknowledged recent contemporary Shari’a 
(Islamic law) jurist Ibn Othaimīn (2004), who considered it prohibited and whose 
literature indicates that it as a type of bai’ al- īnah  (Ibn Othamīn, 2004, p.211). 
However, Qassās (2010) explains that when a customer’s (orderer) expression to 
purchase the asset is not a promise (therefore non-binding), then al-murābaha lil āmir 
bil shirā (murābaha to purchase orderer) is considered lawful in Shari’a (Islamic law) 
according to the unanimous agreement of contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) jurists. 
Below is an example of a murābaha (cost-plus sale): 
 
Figure 9 Murabaha in an SPV Structure (Author’s Diagram) 
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4.2.3 Ijāra (Lease)	  
 
Ijāra (lease) is a contract that involves one party providing a certain (lawful) benefit 
to a beneficiary, for a pre-specified duration and compensation, to be paid by the 
beneficiary (Ibn Al-Najjār 1999, Al-Bahūtï 2000, Al-Murghayāni1936, and Al-Hattāb 
2010). Ayub (2007) defines ijāra as “a contract of a known and proposed usufruct of 
specified assets for a specified time period against a specified and lawful return or 
consideration for the service or return for the benefit proposed to be taken, or for the 
effort or work proposed to be expended” (Ayub, 2007, p.279). In other words, ijāra 
(lease) refers to leasing agreement/transaction that adheres to conditions prescribed by 
Shari’a (Islamic law) (Ayub, 2007). According to these definitions, Ayub (2007) lists 
five essentials of ijāra (lease): (1) It is a contract (2) for a known usufruct to be 
transferred (3) of a specific asset (4) for a specified time (5) and an agreed pre-
specified rent amount. 
 
A. Ijāra (Lease) and Islamic Banking 	  	  
“According to contemporary jurists and experts on Islamic finance, Ijarah has great 
potential as an alternative to interest in respect of evolving a Shar ̄ı ́ah-compliant 
financial system” (Ayub, 2007, p.279). In the murābaha (cost-plus sale) section, it 
was evident that Islamic banks purchasing the asset had the ultimate purpose of 
selling it to a customer for profit, through a murābaha (cost-plus sale) contract (Ayub, 
2007). In ijāra (lease) contracts, rather than selling the asset to its customer, the bank 
leases the asset to the customer for periodic payments (Ayub, 2007). However, this 
does not mean that in all ijāra (lease) contracts, the customer would not end up 
owning the asset (Ayub, 2007). There are different types of ijāra (lease) contracts, 
one of them being ijāra muntahia bil tamlīk (lease-to-own), which enables the 
customer (beneficiary) to own the asset at the end of the lease period (Ayub, 2007).  
 
i. Ijāra Muntahia bil Tamlīk (Lease to Own)	  	  
Ijāra muntahia bil tamlīk’ (lease-to-own) is a contract that involves the Islamic bank 
purchasing and legally owning a lawful asset in order to lease it to a potential 
customer for an agreed tenure and rental amount, where the lessee would end up 
owning the asset at the end of the lease period (Al-Hāfi, 2000).  
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B. Ijāra (Islamic leasing) Diagram	  	  
The below diagram simply displays how an ijāra (lease) transaction may be 
structured using a special purpose vehicle: 
 
 
Figure 10 Ijara in an SPV Structure (Author’s Diagram) 	  
The reasons for establishing a special purpose vehicle rather than directly obtaining 
finance to purchase and lease the asset, are similar to the reasons mentioned in chapter 
two (e.g. regulatory, legal, accounting, and taxation benefits). The above diagram 
displays a simple ijāra (lease) transaction structure that includes Islamic financing 
(for example, a tawarruq (monetization) transaction). However, in many cases, 
conventional financings are included in Islamic special purpose vehicle structures 
(McMillen, 2013). This raises a key question: how can Islamic banks, whose essence 
is based on the prohibition of interest-based transactions, structure transactions 
through the use of special purpose vehicle structures to obtain conventional 
financing? This issue is further examined and discussed later throughout this research.  
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4.2.4 Mushāraka (Contractual Partnership)	  	  
Sharikat al-‘aqd, known today as “mushāraka (contractual partnership)” refers to an 
“agreement between two or more parties to combine their assets, labour or liabilities 
for the purpose of making profits” (AAOIFI, 2015d, p.326). It is a simple concept of a 
partnership agreement with rules and regulations that needs to comply with Shari’a 
(Islamic law). Modern corporations that are considered as a mushārakas (contractual 
partnerships) include: 
 
1. “Stock company 
2. Joint-liability company 
3. Partnership in commendum 
4. Company limited by shares 
5. Allotment (Muhassah) partnership 
6. Diminishing partnership (this partnership that originated from sharikat 
al ‘inan)” (AAOIFI, 2015d, p.327) 
 
The above types of corporations may be incorporated as special purpose vehicles.  
4.2.5 Mudhāraba (A form of Partnership)	  	  
A mudhāraba (a form of partnership) is a type of partnership, where one party 
provides the capital (known as rub il mal), while the other party provides labour 
(known as the mudhārib) (AAOIFI, 2015e). Islamic banks are able to use this type of 
partnerships with partners through the use of special purpose vehicles, since the 
Islamic bank can act as the capital contributor (rub il mal) to a special purpose 
vehicle, while the partner managing the special purpose vehicle investments is the 
investment manager (mudhārib), or vice versa. The definition evidences that 
mudhāraba (a form of partnership) may act as a tool for Islamic financial engineers to 
use when Islamic investments are structured. 
4.2.6 Sukūk (Commonly referred to as Islamic bonds)	  	  
The term “sukūk (commonly referred to as Islamic bonds)” refers to title deeds of 
shares owned by sukūk holders, the shares of which represent ownership in a specific 
benefit, assets, services, or investment activities, that provide the sukūk holders the 
entitlement of rights retrieved from these sukūk (commonly referred to as Islamic 
bonds) (Al-Qura-Dāghï, 2009a). The Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
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Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) defined sukūk (commonly referred to as 
Islamic bonds) as: “certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in 
ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or (in the ownership of) the assets 
of particular projects or special investment activity, however, this is true after the 
receipt of the value of the Sukūk, the closing of subscription and the employment of 
funds received for the purpose for which the sukūk were issued” (AAOIFI, 2015f, 
p.468). AAOIFI (2015f) refers to the sukūk standard as “investment sukūk”. This is in 
order to distinguish it from shares and bonds (AAOIFI, 2015f). The below diagram is 
an example illustration of how a sukūk structure may operate: 
 
 
Figure 11 SPV in a Sukūk Structure (Author’s Diagram) 	  
In the above diagram, the shares the investors own in the special purpose vehicle 
represent actual ownership of the asset. Therefore, the percentage each investor owns 
represents an ownership percentage in the actual asset. Each share is known as a 
“sakk”, which is the singular of “sukūk” (sukūk is plural). Therefore, the investors 
own sukūk that pay them dividends through Islamic forms of businesses (e.g. in this 
case, ijāra [leasing] sukūk).  
Islamic(Bank( Investors(
1. Seeks 
 Investors 
(
2. Establishes (pay issue price) 
 SPV 
( SPV(
Trader (e.g. 
Real Estate 
Company) 
3. B
uys A
sset 4.
 O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
(A
ss
et
) T
ra
ns
fe
rr
ed
 
Lessee(
5. L
ease
s A
sset
 
6. R
ece
ives
 ren
tal p
aym
ents
 
7. Profits distributed to investors 
(according to shares in SPV) 
8. SPV pays Islamic Bank management fees (Islamic bank can also 
buy shares in SPV) 
	   75 
4.3 Conventional Financing(s) in Islamic Special Purpose Vehicle 
Structures	  
 
It was previously explained (in the ijāra (lease) section) that Islamic special purpose 
vehicle structures may include conventional financing within their structures 
(McMillen, 2013). The below is an example of how conventional financing is 
included in an Islamic special purpose vehicle structure that may be considered 
Shari’a compliant, subject to meeting several specific conditions (detailed in the 
empirical chapters): 
 
Figure 12 Conventional Financing in an (Islamic) SPV Structure 	  
The key information in the above diagram is the legal separation of the special 
purpose vehicle obtaining conventional financing, and the Islamic bank. This is 
because legally, the special purpose vehicle (SPV 1) established by the Islamic bank 
is solely leasing an asset from a different legal entity. The Islamic bank, does not own 
the special purpose vehicle that obtained a conventional loan and purchased the asset 
(SPV 2). Rather, the special purpose vehicle owned by the Islamic bank (SPV 1) is 
solely leasing the asset from a separate legal entity that was established by an external 
party (SPV 2), and sub-leases it to a third party company. Therefore, as far as the 
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Islamic bank is concerned, it is solely engaging in an ijāra (lease) transaction 
business.  
 
Although actual structures may be more sophisticated, the concept is yet similar. The 
above-like structures may have understandably been heavily criticised by Islamic 
finance critiques (McMillen, 2013). However, before generalizing a criticism on the 
Islamic banking industry as a whole, it is imperative to first understand the history of 
when, why, and how these structures were brought into existence: 
 
1. Shari’a Supervisory Boards who have approved this structure indicated (as 
shown in chapter six) that this is not an approved “mother-structure” that Islamic 
banks can use freely. Rather, it is approved on a case-by-case31 basis as a solution 
to a current challenge in the global market that the Islamic banking industry 
faces. Furthermore, there are numerous necessary conditions that need to be met 
for the structure to be Shari’a (Islamic law) compliant.32  
2. One of the greatest hurdles to the expansion of Islamic finance is the fact that the 
world is dominated by interest-based financing systems (McMillen, 2013). The 
majority of the world’s financial instruments and transactions are interest-based 
(McMillen, 2013). “The legal, regulatory, tax, accounting, and other regimes, 
principles and procedures are constructed to support and maintain these interest-
based instruments, transactions, analytical techniques and processes, assumptions 
and institutions. There are no Islamic banks in many jurisdictions” (McMillen, 
2013, p.189).  
3. Prior to mid-to-late 1990s, investments from the Middle East into secular states 
(for example, the United States of America) were made without considering 
Shari’a compliance. The leverage for real estate acquisitions, private equity 
transactions, investment in equipment, and all other investments were provided 
by U.S. banks with interest-based loans. No other alternatives existed in the 
market (McMillen, 2013).  
4. Mid-to-late 1990s, a group of Middle Eastern investors, from the State of Kuwait, 
Abu Dhabi, the Kingdom of Bahrain, amongst other countries, sought to develop 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Depending on the type of business, jurisdiction, whether it is considered a necessity, amongst many other 
conditions. 
32 The conditions are discussed in detail in chapter six.  
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structures in order to invest in the United States of America in a Shari’a 
compliant manner (McMillen, 2013).  
5. U.S. lawyers worked closely with theirs clients (Middle Eastern investors and 
their Shari’a Supervisory Boards) to develop alternative Shari’a compliant 
structures (McMillen, 2013). Leverage financing had to be obtained from U.S. 
banks that had no knowledge or experience with Shari’a compliant banking 
practices, and were not motivated to modify their existing practices (for example, 
the underwriting, credit review, and standardised transactional structures and 
documentation, and more) to enable investors to adhere to Shari’a-compliant 
banking practices - that were relatively insignificant in size at the time 
(McMillen, 2013). 
6. U.S. Banks and their lawyers (with rare exceptions by one or two banks) were not 
willing to consider analysing Shari’a compliant transactions (due to having an 
existing established risk evaluation and risk protection measures, including 
standardised practices, procedures and documentation – all of which were 
developed and have been highly refined in a system unaware of Shari’a (Islamic 
law) and its financial practices (McMillen, 2013).  
7. The lawyers of the Shari’a compliant investors were innovative in coming up 
with solutions to face this challenge by developing a structure that would be 
familiar to (i) U.S. banks and their lawyers, and (ii) may be deemed Shari’a 
compliant according to the investors Shari’a Supervisory Boards (McMillen, 
2013).  
 
Understanding the above occurrences and timeline may be imperative to comprehend 
since it shows that the development of Islamic special purpose vehicle structures with 
the use of conventional finance was created as a makhraj (Shari’a solution to a 
current problem) and not hila (legal stratagem or ruse) to engage in conventional 
activities. This is apparent due to the fact that effort was being exhorted to innovate a 
Shari’a solution as an alternative to global modern conventional financial practices. 
Being fully Shari’a compliant, or establishing a structure without conventional 
financings, was not an option due to the global frameworks underlying the 
international financial industry. For clarification purposes and as an example, the 
below diagram illustrates a more sophisticated ijāra (lease) transaction: 
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Figure 13 Generic Lease (Ijāra) Finance Structure (McMillen, 2012) 	  
4.4 Conclusion	  	  
The main Islamic banking products that may be used in conjunction with special 
purpose vehicles is tawarruq (monetization), murābaha (cost-plus sale), ijāra (lease), 
mushāraka (contractual partnership), and sukūk (commonly referred to as Islamic 
bonds). Generally, all of these products are considered Shari’a compliant except for 
tawarruq (monetization), in which a debate exists. The contemporary debate mainly 
relates to one type of tawarruq (monetization), known as al-tawarruq al-masrafi 
(banking tawarruq), which includes an element of al-tawarruq al-munadham 
(organized tawarruq). The majority of contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) scholars, 
including the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), consider al-tawarruq al-
munadham (organized tawarruq) to be prohibited in Shari’a (Islamic law). However, 
a minority but influential contemporary Shari’a (Islamic law) scholars consider this 
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type of tawarruq (monetization) as perfectly acceptable according to Shari’a (Islamic 
law).   
 
Islamic special purpose vehicle structures may include conventional financings, if the 
special purpose vehicles engaged in conventional transactions were legally separated 
from the Islamic bank. This is subject to several Shari’a (Islamic law) conditions that 
should be met. Criticisms regarding these types of special purpose vehicle structures 
exist (McMillen, 2013). However, it was concluded that understanding the timeline 
and how these Islamic special purpose vehicle structures that includes conventional 
financings came into existence was imperative prior to opining on similar structures. 
In short, these structures were established in order to simultaneously meet U.S. laws 
in addition to Shari’a (Islamic law) requirements, to meet the needs of a group of 
Middle Eastern investors who preferred to invest in the United States of America in a 
Shari’a compliant way (McMillen, 2013). Therefore, the efforts into initiating this 
structure may be considered a makhraj (Shari’a solution) rather than hila (legal 
stratagem), since the ultimate purpose of the structure was to engage in a Shari’a 
compliant manner in a jurisdiction that made it very difficult to do so.  
 
This is not to say however, that engaging in hila (legal stratagem or ruse) to obtain 
conventional financing (for invalid reasons) through the use of special purpose 
vehicles by Islamic banks does not exist. According to Al-Enezi (2015), hila (legal 
stratagem) does exist within the Islamic banking industry. Furthermore, it may be that 
Islamic banks are able, through hiyal (legal stratagems), to engage in interest-based 
financings through the use of special purpose vehicles without valid reasons. To state 
that this occurs as a fact however requires accompanied evidence. To generalise and 
claim that all Islamic special purpose vehicle structures that include conventional 
financings are hiyal (legal stratagems) may prove to be inaccurate. However, since the 
empirical chapters (six and seven) investigate special purpose vehicle practices by the 
Islamic banking industry, this issue may be further investigated and clarified in those 
chapters. 	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5. Chapter Five: Research Methodology  
 
The below figure highlights the position of chapter five in light of the research 
outline: 
	  
Figure 14 Chapter Five Position 	  	    
CHAPTER	  ONE	   • Introduction	  
CHAPTER	  TWO	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  1:	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  THREE	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  2:	  Maqasid	  Al-­‐Shari'a	  and	  Islamic	  Financial	  Principles	  
CHAPTER	  FOUR	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  3:	  Islamic	  Financial	  Products	  
CHAPTER	  FIVE	   • Research	  Methodology	  
CHAPTER	  SIX	   • Empirical	  No.	  1:	  Perspective	  of	  Practioners	  regarding	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  SEVEN	   • Empirical	  No.	  2:	  Practice	  and	  Behaviour	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Banking	  Industry	  towards	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  EIGHT	   • Conclusion	  
	   81 
5.1 Introduction 	  
 
Bryman (2008) defines methodology as practices and techniques that are used to 
gather, process, manipulate and interpret information that may be used to test theories 
and ideas about social life. A research methodology is the means by which individuals 
collect data to answer research questions, or to test hypotheses (Munro, 2006).   
 
The research methodology is the philosophy or general principal that guides this 
research, while the research methods are the tools used to gather data needed for the 
research (Dawson, 2002). The research methods also include tools used to gather, 
analyse, and interpret data obtained that are guided by the research methodology 
(Gray et al., 2007). As a term, “research methodology” refers to specific procedures 
undertaken to accomplish the specific aims for a research project (Munro, 2006).  
 
The research methodology and methods chosen for this research are dependent on the 
research aims and objectives mentioned in chapter one, in addition to being 
influenced by the epistemological stance of the researcher. This chapter first explains 
the paradigm and epistemological stance of the researcher. Thereafter, the chapter 
identifies the research methodology and methods used for the research. 	  	  
5.2 Research Philosophy	  
 
5.2.1 Research Paradigm	  	  
Paradigm comes from the Greek word that means an example or pattern (Paradigm, 
2005). It has been used in science since the 1960s to refer to a theoretical framework 
(Paradigm, 2005). A paradigm is a conceptual tool that differentiates the theoretical 
perspectives within a discipline (Paradigm, 2001). 	  
 
Constructivism is a theory of knowledge that has roots in philosophy and psychology 
(Husen and Postlethwaite, 1989). It is considered a proposed “theory of knowing”, an 
alternative to a different epistemological position known as objectivism (Hardy and 
Taylor, 1997).  In short, constructivism is a philosophical view of how individuals 
come to understand or know (Savery and Duffy, 2001). The researcher is inclined to a 
constructivist paradigm, rather than an objectivist or subjectivist paradigm. 
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“Constructivism suggests that reality is more in the mind of the knower, that the 
knower constructs a reality, or at least interprets it, based upon his or her 
apperceptions” (Jonassen, 1991). The below table provides a clearer understanding of 
constructivism by distinguishing it from objectivism: 
 
Objectivism	  vs.	  Constructivism	  
	   Objectivism	   Constructivism	  
Reality	  (real	  world)	   External	  to	  the	  knower	   Determined	  by	  the	  knower	  
Mind	   Mirror	  of	  nature	   Perceiver	  of	  interpreter	  of	  nature	  
Thought	   Represents	  (or	  mirrors)	   Beyond	  the	  mirroring	  of	  reality	  
Meaning	   External	  to	  the	  understander	   Determined	  by	  the	  understander	  
	  
Symbols	  
Represent	  reality	  and	  are	  
internal	  representations	  of	  
external	  realities	  
Are	  tools	  for	  constructing	  reality	  
and	  are	  representations	  of	  internal	  
reality	  	  
Table 1 Objectivism vs. Constructivism (Author’s Diagram, theories extracted from Jonassen (1991)) 	  
The researcher views knowledge to have the need of involving interpretive 
characteristics, combined with a constructivist way of thinking. However, this does 
not mean that the researcher claims that the objectivist assumptions should be 
discarded in favor of the constructive assumptions. Rather, the researcher believes 
that the different paradigms and epistemological stances that exist are debatable, and 
may be subject to other factors. The favoring of the constructivist paradigm is solely 
to display the cognitive psychology of the researcher, in order to understand the mind 
interpreting the results of this research.  
 
“Constructivism does not preclude the existence of an external reality; it merely 
claims that each of us constructs our own reality through interpreting perceptual 
experiences of the external world” (Jonassen, 1991). The researcher believes that 
knowledge should not be passive, and that the responsibility for learning may be 
placed more upon the learner rather than external factors. This view is acceptable in 
constructivism, which claims learners are not submissive to knowledge as portrayed 
by the world or mirroring knowledge passed to them as reality (Glasersfeld, 1989). 
Rather, learners construct their own understanding, trying to find meaning 
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(Glasersfeld, 1989). These beliefs by extension mean that individuals should exhort 
effort into seeking knowledge, authenticating information and interpreting knowledge 
to find out the wisdom or meaning behind the knowledge, rather than accepting the 
external world as a reality without understanding the objectivity behind it.  
5.2.2 Critical Theory 	  	  
According to Bohman (2005), theorists differentiate between “critical” from a 
“traditional” theory according to a specific practical purpose: which is that a theory is 
critical to an extent that it seeks “emancipation from slavery” (Horkheimer, 1972, 
p.246 cited in Bohman, 2005). It also acts as a “liberating”, “influence”, and works 
“to create a world which satisfies the needs and powers of humans” (Horkheimer, 
1972, p.246 cited in Bohman, 2005). The researcher favours critical theory due to its 
formulation of emancipatory strategies that enhance the social conditions of society 
(Corradetti, 2011). These strategies fit within maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of 
Islamic law) explained by Al-Ghazālï (2008).  
 
The Frankfurt School began with Horkheimer, extended to Marcuse (1969) and 
Habermas (1971), who have authored literature in these philosophical subject matters 
(Bohman, 2005) that include views held by the researcher. The reason why this 
research may be considered as following a critical theory approach is because, 
according to Bohman (2005), any philosophical approach with similar practical aims 
could be called a critical theory. This is particularly significant to the researcher since 
the type of organizations being examined in the empirical study are Islamic banks, 
which should be the type of organizations that should have a moral and just approach 
(Ayub, 2007). 
 
Examples of other literature relating to critical theory include Chambers (2004), 
Couzens (1994), Geuss (1981), Honneth (2004), and Ingram (1990). However, what 
may be extracted from critical theory to a culture relating to the banking industry is 
the sense of liberation, employee emancipation in conditions of oppression, 
eradication of self-interests, problem identification and proposed solutions to those 
with the ability to change. 	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Furthermore, literature tends to suggest that the concept of Islamic critical theory is a 
new phenomenon that has not been written about by many scholars. For example, 
Gilani-Williams (2014) claims that only three scholars mentioned the concept of 
Islamic critical theory, who are Kazmi (2000), Sharify-Funk (Bahi, 2008), and Sadek 
(2012). Each author discusses the concept of Islamic critical theory from a different 
angle. For example, the Kazmi (2000) discussion relating to Islamic critical theory 
comes from an angle arguing that Muslims should be proactive after saying the 
declaration of faith (known as shahāda), while Sadek (2012) tries to enhance the 
concept of Islamic critical theory in relation to Islamic politics and democracy. 
However, the main reason why this research touches upon the concept of Islamic 
critical theory is because according to the review of literature relating to Western 
critical theory and maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law), there are many 
similarities between the objectives of both concepts. For example, Western critical 
theory and maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) share the ideas of 
supporting emancipatory strategies such as emancipatory from slavery, achieving 
social justice, helping the poor, amongst others. According to Bohman (2005), any 
philosophical approach with similar aims may be referred to as critical theory. 
Therefore, in accordance with the argument put forth by Bohman (2005), any sub-
divisions of maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) that have similar aims 
with Western critical theory may also be namely referred to as critical theory. The 
difference that may arise between critical theory and Islamic critical theory, is that the 
roots of Western critical theory has Marxist roots (Corradetti, 2011), while Islamic 
critical theory has Islamic roots (Kazmi, 2000) and/or is currently being enhanced 
based on Islamic philosophical roots (Gilani-Williams, 2014).  
5.3 Research Methodology	  	  
 
Generally, there are three types of research methodologies, which are the qualitative, 
quantitative, and mixed-methods methodologies (Aliaga and Gunderson, 2000). 
Qualitative research involves the exploration of diverse attitudes, behaviours, and 
experiences through methods similar to interviews (Dawson, 2002). On the other 
hand, a quantitative research methodology involves explaining a phenomenon by 
collecting numerical data, which are analysed using mathematically based methods 
(Aliago & Gunderson, 2000). “Quantitative research emphasizes ordinal measures 
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and number” (Gray et al., 2007, p.61). Furthermore, mixed methods is when the 
researcher “collects, analyses, mixes, and draws inferences from both quantitative and 
qualitative data in a single study or a program of inquiry” (Cameron, 2011). This 
research uses a qualitative methodology due to its aims and objectives illustrated in 
chapter one. The next section discusses the concept of a qualitative methodology in 
more detail. 
5.3.1 Qualitative Methodology	  
 
 
Qualitative research involves a holistic or all-inclusive approach that involves 
discovery (Creswell, 1994). Qualitative research is not necessarily based on a unified 
theory or a methodological approach (Flick, 2006), where more than one method can 
be adopted within a qualitative research project, such as interviews and document 
analysis (Gray, 2009). Gray (2009) suggests that qualitative data can be a powerful 
source of analysis, even though criticisms exist which considers qualitative research 
to be (in some areas) less valid and less reliable than quantitative research (Gray, 
2009).  The qualitative research community includes individuals who intend to 
implement a critical interpretive approach, and may adopt a constructivist and/or 
critical theory (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
“The qualitative research community consists of groups of globally dispersed 
persons who are attempting to implement a critical interpretive approach… 
These individuals employ constructivist theory, critical theory…” (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005, p.xiv)  
Furthermore, according to Gray (2009), Miles and Huberman (1994) list a number of 
characteristics that is involved in most qualitative research:  
 
• “It is conducted through intense contact within a ‘field’ or real life 
setting. 
• The researcher’s role is to gain a ‘holistic’ or integrated overview of the 
study, including the perceptions of participants. 
• Themes that emerge from the data are often reviewed with informants 
for verification. 
• The main focus of research is to understand the ways in which people 
act and account for their actions” (Gray, 2009, p.166-167) 
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5.3.2 Case Study as a Methodology 
 
A common way to engage in a qualitative enquiry is to use a case study (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2005). According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), a “case study is not a 
methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied” (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2005, p.443). Furthermore, using a case study approach on a constructive paradigm is 
not a new phenomenon. According to Baxter and Jack (2008), both Stake (1995) and 
Yin (2003) base their approach to case study on a constructive paradigm. Yin (2003) 
defines a case study as: 
 
“an empirical inquiry that 
1. Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when 
2. The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” 
(Yin, 2003, p.13). 
 
A case study enables the researcher to analytically generalise theories (Yin, 2003). 
Case study research consists of investigating primary and secondary data relating to 
the phenomena within the context of this research, similar to the definition of case 
study research put forth by Hartley (2004). Hartley (2004) further explains that this is 
done in order “to provide an analysis of the context and processes which illuminate 
the theoretical issues being studied” (Hartley, 2004, p.323).  
 
Generally, there are four types of case study designs, which are: (1) single case study, 
holistic, (2) single case, embedded, (3) multiple case, holistic, and (4) multiple case, 
embedded (Gray 2004 and Flick 2006). This is further illustrated below: 
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Figure 15 Main Types of Case Study Designs (Gray, 2004, p.132) 	  
Within a single case study, there may only be one unit of analysis, referred to as 
holistic, or multiple units of analysis, referred to as embedded (Gray, 2004). To 
clarify this matter further, this research uses the Kingdom of Bahrain as a single case 
study, by holistically analysing one special purpose vehicle transaction structure. This 
structure includes a single case study design and one unit of analysis, referred to as 
single/holistic. The research may have analysed multiple special purpose vehicle 
transaction structures, which would have been multiple units of analysis, referred to 
as single/embedded. The reason for selecting a holistic approach rather than an 
embedded one is because qualitative research generally involves a holistic or all-
inclusive approach that involves discovery (Creswell, 1994). 
 
The concept of holistic (unit of analysis) and embedded (multiple units of analysis) 
may also apply to a multiple case study design. For example, if this research were 
using three geographical jurisdictions as case study, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the 
State of Dubai, and Malaysia, this would be considered a multiple case study design. 
The research may have included a single unit of analysis for each case study 
Single Case Designs Multiple Case Designs 
Type 1 
Single/Holistic  
Type 2 
Single/Embedded  
Type 3 
Multiple/Holistic  
Type 4 
Multiple/Embedded  
Holistic (Single 
Unit of Analysis) 
Embedded (Multiple 
Units of Analysis) 
Main Types of Case Study Designs  
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jurisdiction (holistic), or multiple units of analysis (embedded) for each case study 
jurisdiction. However, the research uses a single case study design, by using the 
Kingdom of Bahrain as a case study. Details pertaining to the reasons for selecting the 
Kingdom of Bahrain as the jurisdiction for the case study are explained in the 
following section.  	  
5.3.2.1 The Kingdom of Bahrain as a Case Study 	  
The Kingdom of Bahrain may arguably be considered a suitable Islamic financial 
centre to use as a case study. The Kingdom of Bahrain may be considered as one of 
the global leaders in Islamic finance, and according to the Central Bank of Bahrain is 
“host to the largest concentration of Islamic financial institutions in the Middle East” 
(CBB, 2012). The growth of the Islamic banking industry in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
may statistically be witnessed as its assets grew from USD 1.9 billion in 2000 to USD 
24.9 billion in 2014 (CBB, 2015). This asset growth from the year 2000 to 2014 
evidences a growth exceeding 1000%. The market share of the Islamic banking 
industry in the Kingdom of Bahrain has also increased from 1.8% of total banking 
assets in the year 2000, to 13.3% in August 2012 (CBB, 2012). Thus, these statistics 
signal a growth of the market share of the Islamic banking industry in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain. Furthermore, the Bahraini banking system as a whole (including 
conventional banking but excluding the Central Bank of Bahrain) as of 2014 had an 
aggregate total asset of USD 189.3 billion (CBB, 2015). 
 
By 2012, Bahrain had seven takaful (Islamic insurance) and two re-takaful companies 
(CBB, 2012). Furthermore, the Kingdom of Bahrain has been on the forefront of the 
sukūk (commonly referred to as Islamic bonds) market, including leasing securities 
and short-term government sukūk (commonly referred to as Islamic bonds) (CBB, 
2012). The Kingdom of Bahrain is home to multiple international organizations 
central to the development of Islamic finance (CBB, 2012), such as the Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), International 
Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), 
Liquidity Management Centre (LMC), Shariya Review Bureau, amongst others 
(CBB, 2012).  
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Furthermore, the regulator of the banking industry in the Kingdom of Bahrain is the 
Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB). The Central Bank of Bahrain has played a significant 
role in the country where it installed comprehensive prudential and reporting 
frameworks for the Islamic finance industry. The Central Bank of Bahrain rulebook 
for Islamic financial institutions (Volume II) covers areas such as licensing 
requirements, capital adequacy, risk management, business conduct, financial crime 
and disclosure/reporting requirements. Furthermore, evidence of the CBBs keenness 
for the development of the Islamic financial industry is the “Waqf Fund”33 which was 
established under the auspices of the CBB in partnership with the Islamic banking 
industry, playing a key role in the development of the Islamic and Shari’a industry 
(CBB, 2012a). 
 
Lastly, as of July 2015, there were a total of 403 banks and financial institutions in the 
Kingdom (CBB, 2015a). This includes 79 conventional banks, 24 Islamic banks, 140 
Insurance companies, 52 investment firms, 82 financial institutions with specialized 
licenses, and 26 capital market licenses. This indicates that the Bahraini market may 
be a huge and rapidly growing financial centre, with an arguably competitive role as 
an Islamic financial hub.  
 
The abovementioned statistics helped guide this research to use the Kingdom of 
Bahrain as a case study.  	  
5.4 Research Methods 	  
The research methods are the tools used to gather, analyse, and interpret the obtained 
data, which is guided by the research methodology (Gray et al., 2007). Within the 
realm of using a qualitative methodology, the research uses various research methods 
that are explained in this section. In particular, this section explains two types of 
research methods, which are the research methods used for data collection, and the 
research methods used for empirical data analysis.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The waqf fund was established by the Central Bank of Bahrain to promote and help the Islamic banking industry 
through various activities.	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5.4.1 Research Methods for Data Collection 	  
Both primary and secondary data are collected for the research. The primary data 
collection tool is semi-structured interviews. As for the secondary data, this includes 
annual reports (which includes financial and Shari’a Supervisory Board annual 
reports), publicised regulatory data pertaining to special purpose vehicles in the 
Islamic banking industry, and a real-life executed special purpose vehicle structure 
obtained as a unit of analysis. The methods of using these data collection tools are 
explained below: 
 
5.4.1.1 Primary Data: Semi-Structured Interviews	  	  
An interview involves a conversation between people where at least one person is a 
researcher (Gray, 2009). By engaging in conversations with Islamic banking 
stakeholders, the researcher will be able to obtain information that may not 
necessarily exist in literature. Since this data may offer important information, 
interviews arise as a data collection method that may be useful for the research. 
Furthermore, interviews may also be useful since it is more likely that individuals 
“may enjoy talking about their work rather than filling questionnaires” (Gray, 2009, 
p.370). Also, interviews allow the Islamic banking stakeholders to “reflect on events 
without having to commit themselves in writing, often because they feel the 
information may be confidential” (Gray, 2009, p.370).  
 
Semi-structured interviews are usually used in qualitative research, where the 
interviews are not standardised (Gray 2009 and Dawson 2002). In a semi-structured 
interview, the researcher wants to obtain knowledge on specific information, which 
can be used in comparison and to contrast with information gained in other interviews 
(Dawson, 2002). Therefore, the researcher is required to ask the same questions to 
each interviewee (Dawson, 2002). Yet, the researcher should be able to remain 
flexible, due to the fact that significant information may arise during an interview 
(Dawson, 2002). To ensure continuity, the researcher produces an “interview 
schedule” (e.g. list of specific questions or topics) to organize the discussion 
(Dawson, 2002).  
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The chosen method for collecting primary data for this research is semi-structured 
interviews. The following list summarises the reasons for choosing interviews as a 
method for data collection: 	  
• More realistic feedback was expected to be obtained through this type of 
interviews, since interviewees may be more open to talk about their work rather 
than filling in questionnaires (Gray, 2004).  
 
• Semi-structured interviews may allow interviewees to reflect upon on events, and 
may consequently provide more descriptive answers, rather than solely 
committing themselves to writing (Gray, 2004).  
 
• In line with the research methodology and as explained in section 5.3.1, most 
qualitative researches involve intense contact with a field or real life setting, 
where the role of the researcher is to gain a holistic overview of the study that 
includes the perception of participants (Gray 2009, Miles and Huberman 1994). 
 
A. Interview Questions 
 
During the review of literature for this research, a set of questions was raised in 
relation and in significance to the research topic34. As such, the following list of set of 
questions were developed by the researcher that was asked to interviewees:	  
 
1. Do you (Islamic Bank) use SPVs in your transactions/investments? 
2. Which of your (Islamic Bank) investments include SPVs in its structure? What is 
the percentage? 
3. What is the reason for using SPVs in your transactions/structures? (legal, taxation, 
Shari’a, regulation, etc.?) 
4. Do you believe that SPVs are essential in your work as a Bank?  
a. (If answer is Yes): Why?  
i. What are the reasons for their significance 
b.  (If answer is No): Why not? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Please refer to Appendix II (Conceptual Framework Summary Table) for more details and indications to 
understand how certain questions were being developed throughout the research	  
	   92 
i. Then why is it used in many structures and #% of your 
investments? 
5. Do (and which of) your SPV structures include conventional financing within 
them? 
a. (If yes: how do you reconcile this with Islamic finance?) 
6. Where conventional financing exists within an SPV structure, what does the 
Conventional Bank obtain as a financial guarantee? 
7. How do you treat SPVs from an accounting point of view? 
8. What is the difference between your (Islamic bank) SPV practices and 
conventional banks? 9. Do you think that your (Bahraini Islamic Banks) SPV practices are similar to 
those of other countries, such as Malaysia and Dubai?	  
10. When is the Shari’a Supervisory Board (or SSB) exposed to a (SPV) structure or 
a transaction, and when do they approve/disapprove it. 
11. Where an SSB has approved a mother-structure (i.e. SPV structure), can the bank 
use the same structure for other transactions without SSB approval?  
a. (If answer yes): Although the structure is the same, who reviews the 
different details for the transaction?  
i. (If it is the Shari’a auditor): How often does the Shari’a auditor 
review transactions? Does the Shari’a auditor review transactions 
on a case-by -case basis? 
ii. Where a structure being used is similar to what has been 
previously approved by the SSB, does the Shari’a auditor have 
the authority to approve/disapprove the structure after having 
looked at the details?  
iii. How often does a Shari’a auditor conduct a periodic audit on 
these investments or transactions?  
iv. What is the procedure of Shari’a auditing on such investments? 
b. (If answer is no): Does this mean the SSB reviews all transactions on a 
case by case basis, even though the bank will use a structure that has 
been previously approved by the SSB? 
12. Do all transactions go through the Shari’a Compliance Department prior to 
execution? 
a. (If yes): Are all of the transactions circulated to the SSB? 
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b. (If no): How do you determine which transactions need to be submitted 
to the SCD prior to execution?	  
13. Since interest-bearing loans are largely the main prohibition in Islamic banking, 
how do the SSB justify the permissibility of SPV structures with conventional 
financing? 
a. (If answer is that SPV is a separate legal entity having nothing to do with 
the bank): Does that mean Islamic banks can deal freely with 
conventional financiers provided that it is done through SPVs? 
i. (If answer yes: then does Islamic banking differ from 
conventional banking by having SPVs in the middle? 
b. (If answer is that SPVs are used for conventional facilities when these 
conventional facilities need to be used as a basis of necessity): Does that 
mean it is prohibited in Shari’a to deal with conventional financing 
through SPVs if there was no necessity? 
i. If yes: how do you determine necessity? 
What is the specific SSB fatwa regarding the SPV structures for your 
investments? 	  
14. “Following a round table discussion with the Waqf Fund involving several 
notable Shari’a scholars, it was observed that some SPVs associated with locally 
incorporated Islamic banks were not subject to Shari’a compliance review which 
has resulted in some SPVs to undertake activities that were not Shari’a compliant, 
or at least their activities had not been reviewed as Shari’a compliant.” CBB 
Circular EDBS/KH/238/2013 
 
“The governance of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) in the Islamic banking 
industry has been occupying the minds of key stakeholders, it has emerged” (Gulf 
Daily News – March 2013) 
 
a. What do you think of the above circular and article?  
b. What do you think prompted the CBB to issue such a circular? 
c. What do you think of the proposed changes to the CBB Rulebook 
regarding SPVs for Islamic banks? 	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The application of the semi-structured interviews was designed by dividing it into 
three segments:  
B. Interview Segments 
 
The interview process involves three segments. The first segment was designed by 
interviewing five practitioners in the Islamic banking industry in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain. This included two Shari’a managers, two investment managers, and one risk 
manager. The five interviewees were asked the questions displayed in the previous 
section. This was in order to obtain knowledge on specific information that can be 
used in comparison and contrast to other interviewees, which is a subset of the semi-
structured interviews (Dawson, 2002). The researcher then undertook a pilot study 
(Appendix I) in order to (1) test the questions (2) obtain an initial understanding of the 
industry’s feedback (3) to practice and enhance the interviewers interview skills. This 
preliminary analysis helped determine the empirical data analysis research method for 
the interview analysis, which as described later, is a thematic analysis. Having tested 
the interview questions in the first segment, the interviewer viewed the type of 
interview and questions to be informative, serving the research questions and 
obtaining data through interviewee responses. However, there were four questions 
that were removed as the result of the pilot study: 
 
• Section (a) of question four, where it asks “why” the interviewer believes special 
purpose vehicles are essential (if the interviewer mentioned it as being essential in 
question four). This is because each time an interviewee responds to special 
purpose vehicles as being essential, question (4a) turned out to be a repetition of 
question three (what are the reasons for using special purpose vehicles). Therefore 
all five interviewee answers were “it is essential due to the reasons mentioned in 
my answer for question three”. This question (4a) was therefore considered a 
repetition and unneeded.  
• Question six asks what would act as the financial guarantee for the conventional 
financier. All interviewees indicated that the asset being purchased as used as a 
collateral from the conventional financiers. This answer was viewed as being the 
same answer to all interviewees and an obvious phenomenon, and therefore not 
needed.  
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• The answer to question twelve was always answered along with question ten.  
• Although paraphrased differently, question thirteen was removed because each 
time the fifth question was asked, the answer to question thirteen would be 
answered along with it. This researcher viewed question five sufficient to obtain 
the answer to question thirteen as well.  
 
The pilot study also revealed that practitioners-interviewees view recorded interviews 
as being a sensitive issue, since an accidental leak of the voice recordings may place 
them in unwanted situations and similar to Gray (2009) statements regarding 
confidentiality preferences of interviewees. A practical test was also conducted when 
two practitioner-interviewees35 agreed for their interviews to be recorded to test 
possible interview outcomes. The results revealed that interviewees in recorded 
interviews were very formal and guarded each word being uttered, which limited the 
information given by the interviewees, as opposed to openness and transparency in 
unrecorded interviews. Furthermore, without recording and with note taking, the 
interviewees felt free in expressing themselves openly. This approach was viewed as 
being more suitable for the research as it was imperative to obtain unlimited 
informative information to the extent possible, for the empirical data analysis. 
 
The second segment of interviews involved interviewing thirty interviewees, who 
were largely practitioners in the Islamic banking industry in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain36. Lastly, the third segment of interviews consists of nine elite interviewees, 
which mainly includes chief executive officers and Shari’a Supervisory Board 
members. The Shari’a Supervisory Board member interviewees largely consist of 
highly experienced Shari’a (Islamic law) scholars who serve on numerous Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards globally.  
 
The following table summarises the interviews conducted that includes the dates and 
durations of the interviews, as well as the positions of interviewees: 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Practitioner-interviewees does not include Shari’a Supervisory Board members, where four Shari’a Supervisory 
Board members agreed for the interviews to be recorded without limitations 
36 Segment II of the interview process also includes two board members and two Shari’a Supervisory Board 
members of Islamic banks. 	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Interview List 
 
Interviewee 
No. 
Interview Date Position as of the Interview Date Interview 
Duration 
(Minutes) 
Segment I and II Interview List  
001 Aug. 2. 2015 Shari'a Manager 70 
002 Aug. 3. 2015 Director, Private Equity 70 
003 Aug. 3. 2015  Ex-Acting Risk Manager 115 
004 Aug. 4. 2015 Ex-Chief Investment Officer  55 
005 Aug. 4. 2015 Head of Shari'a & SSB Member 60 
006 Aug. 4. 2015 Head of Shari'a  65 
007 Aug. 5. 2015 Director, Compliance Officer 105 
008 Aug. 5. 2015 Shari'a Reviewer 30 
009 Aug. 5. 2015 Head, Compliance & AML 45 
010 Aug. 5. 2015 Head of Shari'a  45 
011 Aug. 9. 2015 Group Head of Shari'a  60 
012 Aug. 9. 2015 Head of Shari'a & SSB Member 60 
013 Aug. 10. 2015 Head of Compliance 75 
014 Aug. 10. 2015 Head of Shari'a  30 
015 Aug. 12. 2015 Shari'a Scholar  50 
016 Aug. 13. 2015 Shari'a Scholar 60 
017 Aug. 13. 2015 Head of Islamic Finance 70 
018 Aug. 16. 2015 Director, Investment RM  60 
019 Aug. 16. 2015 Financial Management  60 
020 Aug. 16. 2015 Global Head, Financial Management 30 
021 Aug. 17. 2015 Vice President, Compliance 70 
022 Aug. 18. 2015 Head of Investment Management 60 
023 Aug. 18. 2015 Secretary General  40 
024 Aug. 22. 2015 Shari'a Manager 35 
025 Aug. 24. 2015 Board Member 90 
026 Aug. 25. 2015 Chief Investment Officer 60 
027 Aug. 26. 2015 Investment Officer 95 
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028 Aug. 27. 2015 Investment Manager 45 
029 Aug. 27. 2015 Executive Director  55 
030 Aug. 30. 2015 Head of Investment Administration 60 
031 Sep. 1. 2015 Vice Chairman 75 
032 Sep. 2. 2015 Head of Islamic Finance School 120 
033 Sep. 13. 2015 Lawyer and Professor 60 
034 Sep. 16. 2015 Head of Islamic Finance  90 
035 Nov. 23. 2015 Lawyer  55 
Segment III Interview List 
036 Feb. 27. 2016 Shari'a Scholar 70 
037 Mar. 9. 2016 Chief Executive Officer 60 
038 March 10. 2016 Shari’a Scholar 120 
039 March 12. 2016 Shari’a Scholar  30 
040 March 12. 2016 Shari’a Scholar 20 
041 March 14. 2016 Shari’a Scholar  120 
042 March 16. 2016 Chief Executive Officer 45 
043 March 22. 2016 Shari’a Scholar 56 
044 March 22. 2016 Shari’a Scholar 45 
Total  2791 
Average 63.4 
Table 2 List of Interviewees  	  
C. Interview Durations 	  
Table No. 2 demonstrates the duration for each interview conducted. The table reveals 
that the total duration of interviews conducted in the interview process amounted to 
2791 minutes, which is around forty-seven hours. Therefore, the average duration per 
interview is equivalent to 63.6 minutes.  
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Figure 16 Interview Durations  	  
D. Interview Coverage: By Departments 
 
The below table presents the percentage of interviewees relative to their respective 
departments for Segments I and II: 
 
Interview Coverage for Segment I and II: By Departments 
Department Total  Percentage 
(Rounded) 
Internal Shari’a Review 9 26% 
Investment 8 23% 
Compliance and Regulator 5 14% 
Board of Directors and Shari’a Board Members 4 11% 
Risk and Financial Management 3 9% 
Legal 3 9% 
Others  3 9% 
Total  35 100% 
Table 3 Segment II Interview Coverage: By Departments  
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Figure 17 Segment II Interviewees Departments  	  
As illustrated above, the internal Shari’a and investment departments represent the 
majority coverage relative to other departments. Collectively, they cover 49% of the 
department coverage of the Islamic banking industry. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the investment managers are the investment decision-making body, while the 
internal Shari’a review department is responsible for ensuring Shari’a compliance 
internally. Therefore, these two functions were considered crucial departments due to 
the research area. The remaining 51% collectively include departments that also play 
key roles in structuring or regulating special purpose vehicle transactions in their 
respective banks.  
 
Furthermore, the interview process in Segment II largely included interviewing 
several practitioners for each bank. This was in order to verify consistencies of 
knowledge, adherence to process, policy and procedures, practice, and whether 
differences of understandings and opinions existed between practitioners within a 
single Islamic bank, which may affect the behaviour of special purpose vehicle 
practices.  
 
 
Segments I & II Interviewees Departments 
Internal	  Shari'a	  Review	  
Investment	  	  
Compliance	  &	  Regulator	  
Risk	  &	  Financial	  Management	  Board	  of	  Directors	  &	  Shari'a	  Boards	  Law	  Firms	  
Others	  
26%	  
23%	  
14%	  
9%	  
11%	  
9%	  
9%	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E. Interview Coverage: By Islamic Banking Sector 
 
The interviewees selected represented ten Islamic banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain. 
This includes six Islamic investment (wholesale) banks and four Islamic retail banks. 
Due to the analysis of interview responses, it may be important to classify the four 
Islamic retail banks as follows: 
 
• Islamic Retail Bank One: Is heavily involved in international Islamic 
investment activities.  
• Islamic Retail Bank Two: Is heavily involved in local (Bahraini market) Islamic 
investment activities.  
• Islamic Retail Bank Three: Was formerly a conventional investment bank that 
converted into an Islamic retail bank. 
• Islamic Retail Bank Four: Does not engage in investment activities. Rather, it 
was established and remains to offer solely Islamic banking retail services.  
 
Thus, these ten Islamic banks represent around 42% of the Islamic banking industry 
in the Kingdom of Bahrain, since the total Islamic banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain 
are twenty-four banks (CBB, 2015a).  
 
 
Figure 18 Interview Coverage: By Islamic Banking Sector  
 
Interview Coverage of the Islamic Banking Industry in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain 
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Since the Kingdom of Bahrain has one regulator for its banking (including Islamic 
banking) industry, which is the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB), it was included to 
understand the regulatory perspective regarding special purpose vehicle practices in 
the Islamic banking industry. Also, two Islamic infrastructure organizations were 
included: (1) the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), and (2) the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), due 
to their significance and contribution to the industry. Interviewees also included 
individuals who represent three law firms, two of which are international law firms 
that deal with Islamic special purpose vehicle transactions on a continual basis. 
 
In order to diversify the sample, the researcher included one conventional wholesale 
bank in the Kingdom of Bahrain, one Islamic bank in a GCC37 country outside of the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, and two independent financial experts, all of which who are 
included under “others” in the below table. The below table displays the sectors 
represented in the interview process of Segment I and II:  
 
Interviewee Sectors for Segment I and II 
Sector Total Percentage (Rounded) 
Islamic Investment Banks 6 27% 
Islamic Retail Banks 4 18% 
Regulator 1 5% 
Islamic Infrastructure Organizations 2 9% 
Law Firms 3 14% 
Education  1 5% 
Others 5 23% 
Total  22 100% 
Table 4 Interviewee Sectors: Percentage  
 
The pie graph below illustrates the percentage of sectors engaged in the interview 
process of Segment II: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Gulf Cooperation Council  
	   102 
 
Figure 19 Interviewee Sectors: Pie Graph 	  
It was previously explained that the third segment of the interview process consisted 
nine interviewees. Although the second segment of interviews largely consisted of 
practitioner-interviewees, footnote 36 mentioned that two Shari’a scholars and two 
board members of Islamic banks were also included in Segment II. In addition to the 
nine elite interviewees interviewed in Segment III, this leads to a total of thirteen elite 
interviewees that were included in the research. Collectively, the elite interviewees 
consist of two board members, two chief executive officers, and nine Shari’a 
Supervisory Board members, as illustrated below: 
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Elite Interviewees 
 
Figure 20 Elite Interviewees	  
 
5.4.1.2 Secondary Data 	  
Secondary data refers to information or data that was collected by a party other than 
the researcher or user (Schutt, 2006). As explained earlier, the research uses 
secondary data to analyse the Islamic banking industry practice towards special 
purpose vehicles. This mainly includes annual reports (which includes financial 
statements and Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports); regulatory consultations 
relating to Islamic banking special purpose vehicle transactions, and a real-life 
Islamic banking executed special purpose vehicle Islamic transaction structure.  
 
A. Annual Reports 
 
The annual reports of Islamic banks include the financial and Shari’a Supervisory 
Board annual reports. The researcher uses annual reports to investigate how many 
Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles. On the other hand, the financial 
statements are mainly used to identify which transactions or industry includes the 
usage of special purpose vehicles by an Islamic bank.  
 
SSB	  Members	   CEOs	   Board	  Members	  
69%	  
15%	  
15%	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Although Shari’a (Islamic law) audit points are usually mentioned in internal Shari’a 
audit reports that are confidential, rather than a publicised Shari’a Supervisory Board 
annual report, major Shari’a (Islamic law) violations may be reported by Shari’a 
Supervisory Board members in their Shari’a Supervisory Board annual report. This is 
in order for the Shari’a Supervisory Board to enable transparency to be practiced by 
the Islamic bank with its shareholders. Therefore, the researcher examines if any 
Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports specifically includes special purpose 
vehicle practices or violations that may be analysed.  
 
B. Regulatory Consultation(s) relating to Special Purpose Vehicles 	  
Prior to amending the regulatory rulebook by the Central Bank of Bahrain, the 
regulator first consults with Islamic banks by circulating newly proposed changes 
along with an introductory letter. Thereafter, the Islamic banking industry responds to 
the circular by providing their feedback regarding the proposed changes by the 
regulator. Finalised regulatory consultations with Islamic banks usually include a 
reference to the draft directive, comments by the Islamic banking industry, and the 
response of the Central Bank of Bahrain to industry comments. The research uses 
regulatory consultations pertaining to special purpose vehicles in the Islamic banking 
industry, since it may provide evidence relating to the behaviour of the regulator 
towards special purpose vehicles, in addition to the official opinions of the Islamic 
banking industry.  
 
The second regulatory consultation in which the rhetoric are analysed relates to the 
protection of control functions at Islamic banks. This is because without regulatory 
protection, the internal Shari’a and other control functions may not perform 
effectively, which may lead to Islamic banks having additional abilities to abuse 
special purpose vehicle transactions.  
 
C. Executed Special Purpose Vehicle Transaction Structure as a Unit of 
Analysis 	  
The interview process revealed the most common structure used for Islamic special 
purpose vehicle transactions. Thus, the researcher obtained a similar real-life 
contemporary special purpose vehicle structure transacted by an Islamic bank in the 
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Kingdom of Bahrain to use for the research. This type of secondary data was collected 
for analysis as a specific case study as a unit of analysis (Yin, 2003). As explained 
previously, according to Gray (2009) and Flick (2006), there are mainly four types of 
case study designs, which are: 
 
1. Type 1: Single Case Study, Holistic 
2. Type 2: Single Case, Embedded 
3. Type 3: Multiple Case, Holistic 
4. Type 4: Multiple Case, Embedded 
 
The idea behind choosing a case study design is to understand a special purpose 
vehicle structure, in a jurisdiction where Islamic banking arguably plays an 
imperative global role. Chapter one revealed that the Bahraini (and perhaps other) 
Islamic banking industry includes Islamic banks that indirectly obtain conventional 
loans through the use of special purpose vehicles. Yin (2003) explains that a case 
study design should be considered when a research focuses on answering “why” and 
“how” questions. Moreover, chapter one explains that the research partially aims to 
answer why, and how, Islamic banks engage in interest-based transactions, if the main 
principal underlying the philosophy of Islamic banking is a strict and unanimous 
prohibition of riba (commonly referred to as usury or interest). Therefore, in line with 
the research aims and objectives, the research uses a special purpose vehicle structure 
as a unit of analysis, which includes conventional financings. This would help the 
research investigate and analyse the concept underlying these practices. The research 
obtained one unit of analysis to holistically analyse, because chapter one revealed that 
some Islamic banks engage in similar practices. Therefore, an all-inclusive or holistic 
view may enable the analysis to focus on the core research questions rather than a 
divided attention for a comparative or multiple units of analysis. The primary data 
collection through interviews may reveal how many Islamic banks engage in similar 
transaction structures. The case study design adopted by this research is illustrated 
below: 
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Case Study Design: Single/Holistic 
 
Figure 21 Case Study Design (Author's Diagram, adapting Flick 2006 theories) 	  
5.4.2 Research Methods for Empirical Data Analysis 	  
5.4.2.1 Primary Data Analysis Tool: Thematic Analysis  
 
The first empirical chapter uses a thematic analysis to analyse the interview 
responses. The thematic analysis approach may have originated in the 1960s by the 
recognition of Gerald Holton (Holton, 2000). It involves a categorization strategy for 
qualitative data (Boyatzis, 1998). Thematic analysis as a technique may be used in a 
wide range of research methodologies; it tends to be particularly used in research with 
an interpretivist approach (Thematic Analysis, 2011). “Thematic analysis is the 
process of looking over data in order to identify recurrent, salient and self-evident 
points, issues, words, terms, events, language, discourse, images, allusions and so on 
and so forth. These noticeably repetitive pieces of data can be clustered together 
under a label (that may also emerge from the respondent data or be allocated by the 
researcher) for the theme” (Thematic Analysis, 2011). 
Single Case Study: Kingdom of Bahrain 
Case/Unit of Analysis: 
Executed Islamic SPV Structure 
# 1: Collection and 
Interpretation 
Set of Questions: 
Using qualitative test 
questions created by a 
conceptual 
framework summary  
Holistic:  
SPV Structure as a Units of Analysis  
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A thematic analysis involves the researcher reviewing the data, making notes, and 
sorting them into categories (Boyatzis, 1998). This is the strategy the research uses to 
analyse interview responses. The researcher, initially through the pilot study, analysed 
the responses obtained from interviewees by reviewing the data several times. Similar 
language, terms, points, and ideas existed between different interviewees depending 
on the question. As such, each question or set of questions was/were placed under one 
theme where a thematic analysis was chosen as the empirical data analysis tool for the 
primary data.  
 
The generated themes was a result of the pilot study conducted after the first segment 
of interviews, displayed below:  
 
Theme Derived from Answers for Interview 
Question No. 
1. Special Purpose Vehicle Market Share One and Two 
2. Reasons for Using Special Purpose 
Vehicles 
Three 
3. Special Purpose Vehicles and 
Conventional Financings 
Five 
4. Accounting of Special Purpose 
Vehicles 
Seven 
5. Difference between Islamic and 
Conventional banks Practices towards 
Special Purpose Vehicles 
Eight 
6. Difference between Special Purpose 
Vehicle Practice in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain relative to the International 
Islamic Banking Industry 
Nine 
7. Shari’a Approval Structure Ten 
8. Non-existence of a Shari’a approved 
Islamic Special Purpose Vehicle 
“Mother-Structure” 
Eleven 
9. Industry Feedback Relating to 
Regulatory Circular regarding Shari’a 
Compliance and Special Purpose Vehicle 
Transactions 
Fourteen 
Table 5 Linking developed themes with interview questions38 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Note: As explained earlier, the interview questions four, six, twelve, and thirteen are not included in the above 
table because it was removed after the pilot study. 
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5.4.2.2 Secondary Data Analysis Tool: Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
According to Titscher et. al (2000), content analysis is considered the longest method 
of text analysis, relative to the other empirical methods of social investigation 
(Kohlbacher, 2006). Titscher et. al (2000) mentions that the term content analysis 
originally referred to methods that concentrated on direct quantifiable aspects of text 
content, “and as a rule on absolute and relative frequencies of words per text or 
surface unit” (Kohlbacher, 2006 and Titscher et al., 2000, p.55) Babbie (2001) defines 
content analysis as the study of recorded human communications, which is a coding 
operation that acts as the process of transferring raw data into a standardised form 
(Kohlbacher, 2006). Classical content analysis includes techniques for reducing texts 
to a “unit by variable” matrix, thereafter analyse that matrix quantitatively to test a 
hypothesis (Kohlbacher 2006, and Ryan & Bernard 2000).  
 
Content analysis, which was initially solely quantitative, was criticised as a research 
tool from various perspectives (Kohlbacher, 2006). For example, Ritsert (1972) 
criticised (quantitative) content analysis when he stated that the context regarding the 
components of the text, distinctive individual cases, and the things that do not appear 
in a text, are all not taken into account in a quantitative content analysis. As a result, 
the qualitative content analysis has been developed to try and overcome the 
shortcomings of a classical quantitative content analysis (Kohlbacher, 2006). 
According to Titscher et al. (2000), one of the most popular developed qualitative 
content analysis includes an approach taken by Marying (2002). Marying (2002) 
qualitative content analysis applies a “systematic, theory guided approach to text 
analysis using a category system” (Kohlbacher, 2006). A qualitative content analysis 
may be similar to a thematic analysis in the sense where both research tools involve a 
categorization strategy. Bryman (2004) defines a qualitative content analysis as being: 
 
“An approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in 
the construction of the meaning of and in texts. There is an emphasis on 
allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the 
significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item 
being analyzed (and the categories derived from it) appeared” (Bryman, 
2004, p.542). 
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This research uses a qualitative content analysis by qualitatively analysing the 
secondary data. In line with the Bryman (2004) definition of qualitative content 
analysis, categories emerged out of the data during the review of secondary data. The 
categorization strategy involves analysing special purpose vehicle usage or market 
share through the annual and financial reports. On the other hand, the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board annual report enabled the emergence of a category relating to 
analysing the behaviour of Shari’a Supervisory Boards towards special purpose 
vehicle abuse, especially in terms of reporting. Two categories emerged out of 
analysing the regulatory consultations regarding special purpose vehicles and Shari’a 
compliance, the first being analysing the regulatory behaviour towards special 
purpose vehicle abuse, and the second being the reaction of the Islamic banking 
industry regarding the proposal in the regulatory consultation. The regulatory 
behaviour towards protecting control functions at Islamic banks emerged as a result of 
a second regulatory consultation. As for the special purpose vehicle structure 
transaction obtained as a case study (unit of analysis), the main category is to 
determine whether the structure is Shari’a compliant or not. The below table 
summarises the categories that emerged by analysing the secondary data: 
 
Secondary Data Emergent Category 
Annual Reports 
 
• Financial Report 
• Shari’a Supervisory Board 
Report 
SPV usage in the Islamic banking 
industry 
• Same as above 
• Behaviour of Shari’a Supervisory 
Board towards SPV abuse 
Regulatory Consultations regarding: 
• SPV and Shari’a Compliance 
 
• Protecting Control Functions  
Regulatory behaviour towards SPV abuse 
• Industry reaction towards new 
SPV regulatory proposals 
• Regulator action to protect control 
functions at Islamic banks 
Real-life executed SPV Transaction 
Structure 
Is the structure Shari’a compliant? 
Table 6 Categories Emerged from Content Analysis 
  
The details pertaining to the analysis of the real-life executed special purpose vehicle 
transaction is explained in the following section.  
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5.4.3 Criterion for Shari’a Compliant Special Purpose Vehicle Transactions	  
 
Prior to using content analysis as a tool to the first two categories of secondary data 
(annual reports and regulatory consultations), a content analysis summary table was 
constructed (Appendix IV) to determine the Shari’a (Islamic law) ruling of selected 
subject matters in a special purpose vehicle structure. The subject matters selected 
were dependent on the review of literature chapters, conceptual framework (Appendix 
II), and a summary content analysis table specifically relating to the Shari’a 
compliance of selected special purpose vehicle subject matters (Appendix IV). This 
analysis was conducted in order to help understand and analyse a real-life executed 
special purpose vehicle structure, and to understand possible Shari’a (Islamic law) 
rulings for each product, industry, type of financing, or other subject matters in a 
special purpose vehicle structure. 
 
Furthermore, this initial content analysis39 helped to create the following standards, 
displayed as test questions, which may be used to generally and indicatively analyse 
the overall Shari’a compliance of a special purpose vehicle structure. The following 
qualitative test questions are used to analyse the third category of secondary data, 
which is the real-life executed special purpose vehicle structure transaction: 
 
I. Test Question One: Is the business the Islamic bank is investing in Shari’a 
compliant? 
 
This encompasses the ultimate industrial business or service the bank is 
investing in. For example, the aircraft, shipping, telecommunications, or 
information technology (IT) industries are generally Shari’a compliant40. On 
the other hand, gambling and alcoholic beverage industries are prohibited 
under Shari’a (Islamic law). This question is not about whether the special 
purpose vehicle in the investment structure obtains conventional loans or 
engages in prohibited activities.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 A content analysis summary is displayed in Appendix IV	  
40 Subject to meeting certain conditions (e.g. ratios relating to existing conventional debts of the company) 
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II. Test Question Two: Is there a Special Purpose Vehicle in the structure that 
will engage in non-Shari’a compliant activities or transactions? 
 
This involves the special purpose vehicle(s) in an investment structure, 
whether directly owned by an Islamic bank or through other relationships. 
This is because a special purpose vehicle may not be directly owned by an 
Islamic bank but may still be included in the investment structure as a partner. 
The activity or this special purpose vehicle relating to the transaction needs to 
be known in order to understand the relationship between the Islamic bank and 
the special purpose vehicle.  
 
III. Test Question Three: Does the Islamic Bank legally own the Special Purpose 
Vehicle that will engage in a conventional/non-Shari’a compliant 
transaction(s)? 
 
This question determines whether the Islamic bank owns the special purpose 
vehicle(s) in an investment transaction or not. The legal ownership of a special 
purpose vehicle by an Islamic bank may place Shari’a (Islamic law) 
restrictions on the activities the special purpose vehicle may engage in. 
However, restrictions may differ depending on the percentage of ownership. 
For example, generally, the Islamic bank owning more than 50% would be the 
majority shareholder, with veto and / or voting powers.  Another example 
would be if an Islamic bank owned 33% or less (≥ 33%), its power over the 
control of the special purpose vehicle is limited, and therefore the restrictions 
would differ (McMillen, 2013).  
 
IV. Test Question Four: Does the Islamic bank have any sort of control, whether 
direct or indirect, through proxies for example, on non-Shari’a compliant 
separately owned the Special Purpose Vehicle? 
 
The answer to this question may determine whether the Islamic bank 
influences a special purpose vehicle owned by an external party or not. Islamic 
banks may not legally own special purpose vehicles but simultaneously have 
control or influence over the special purpose vehicles. 
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V. Test Question Five: Is there evidence for hiyal (legal stratagems) taken place 
by an Islamic bank after executing the special purpose vehicle structure or 
transaction? 
 
The answer to this question may determine whether an Islamic bank took 
advantage of the use of special purpose vehicles as separate legal entities by 
abusing them to engage in non-Shari’a compliant activities or transactions. 
 
Answering the above questions may generally help in analysing whether a special 
purpose vehicle transaction is Shari’a compliant or not. These qualitative test 
questions are applied in chapter seven to a contemporary special purpose vehicle 
structure transacted by an Islamic bank in the Kingdom of Bahrain as a case study to 
partially conduct the empirical data analysis.  	  
5.5 Conclusion	  
 
The philosophical research assumptions held by the researcher relate to ideas derived 
from constructivism and critical theory. The research methodology adopts a 
qualitative methodology. The research further uses a case study methodology, by 
using the Kingdom of Bahrain as a case study. The research methods for data 
collection relating to primary data are semi-structured interviews. Data collection for 
secondary data includes (1) annual reports of Islamic banks (which includes financial 
and Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports), (2) publicised regulatory 
consultations with the Islamic banking industry relating to special purpose vehicles, 
and (3) a real-life executed special purpose vehicles structure transaction by an 
Islamic bank. For empirical data analysis, the research uses a thematic analysis for the 
primary data (interviews), and a content analysis for the secondary data.  
 
The limitations to the research methodology chosen were considered during the 
course of the research. For example, qualitative research is considered as less valid 
than a quantitative research (Gray, 2009). On the other hand, one of the criticisms 
relating to case studies is that it tends to focus on collecting information that is up to 
date and therefore, may involve using solely contemporary documentation with direct 
	   113 
observation and/or systematic interviewing (Gray, 2009). Yin (2003) also claims that 
a case study approach is not universally accepted nor is considered as reliable by 
researchers. One of the reasons Gray (2009) mentions regarding this lack of reliability 
is that it is difficult to generalise from a single case study. Furthermore, it may be 
argued that using a “single/embedded” case study design may be more useful than a 
“single/holistic” case study design.  	  
However, limitations and criticisms may exist for almost all methodologies and/or 
methods. For example, a criticism of the quantitative methodology is that it can 
involve either none or little interaction with people or field settings (Gray, 2009). It 
was however important to particularly display the methodological limitations 
pertaining to this research in order to apprehend possible limitations that may have 
been placed upon this study.  	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6. Chapter Six: Perspective of Practitioners regarding Special 
Purpose Vehicles  	  
The below figure highlights the position of chapter six in light of the research outline: 
 
 
Figure 22 Chapter Six Position (Author’s Diagram) 	    
CHAPTER	  ONE	   • Introduction	  
CHAPTER	  TWO	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  1:	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  THREE	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  2:	  Maqasid	  Al-­‐Shari'a	  and	  Islamic	  Financial	  Principles	  
CHAPTER	  FOUR	   • Review	  of	  Literature	  No.	  3:	  Islamic	  Financial	  Products	  
CHAPTER	  FIVE	   • Research	  Methodology	  
CHAPTER	  SIX	   • Empirical	  No.	  1:	  Perspective	  of	  Practioners	  regarding	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  SEVEN	   • Empirical	  No.	  2:	  Practice	  and	  Behaviour	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Banking	  Industry	  towards	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles	  
CHAPTER	  EIGHT	   • Conclusion	  
	   115 
6.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the perception of Islamic banking practitioners towards special 
purpose vehicles in the Islamic banking industry, using the Kingdom of Bahrain as a 
case study. The analysis includes analysing primary data by qualitatively analysing 
the interviewee responses using a thematic analysis. The interviews were divided into 
three segments, the first being five interviewees, the second thirty interviewees, and 
the third nine interviewees. Therefore, the total number of interviewees was forty-
four. 
 
The thematic analysis involves placing each interview question, or set of questions, 
under a theme that is used for analysis (Boyatzis, 1998). As explained in the research 
methodology chapter, the selected themes and which questions represent such themes 
have been determined as a result of the pilot study (Appendix I).  	  
6.2 Industry Feedback of Islamic Banking Industry in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain	  	  
This section analyses the interviewee responses in the first and second segment of 
interviews using a thematic analysis, which includes responses from thirty-five 
interviewees.   
6.2.1 Special Purpose Vehicle Market Share	  
 
Out of thirty-five interviews, thirty-two interviewees indicated that their respective 
banks use special purpose vehicles in their investment structures and transactions. The 
question did not apply to the remaining three interviewees because: 
 
• One of the interviewees represented a fully-fledged Islamic retail bank 
(referred to in the research methodology chapter as “Islamic Bank Four”) that 
does not engage in investment transactions. However, this interviewee 
indicated that the bank once established a special purpose vehicle in order to 
distribute shares as bonuses, due to newly introduced regulatory requirements.  
• The second interviewee, whom although works in an Islamic retail bank that 
was previously a conventional investment bank (that engaged in special 
purpose vehicle transactions), indicated that he/she joined the respective bank 
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after the conversion of this bank (Islamic Bank three) from a conventional 
investment bank to a fully-fledged Islamic retail bank. This question therefore 
did not apply to this interviewee.  
• The third interviewee this question did not apply to is because the interviewee 
represented an Islamic infrastructure organization that did not engage in 
investment transactions.  
 
The above indicates that Islamic investment banks - or Islamic retail banks engaging 
in investment transactions - all use special purpose vehicles as a part of their 
investment operations and/or transactions. Islamic retail banks solely engaged in retail 
activities generally do not use special purpose vehicles. Thus, it may be safely 
claimed that the majority of Islamic banks that engage in investment transactions use 
special purpose vehicles. Below is a bar graph that illustrates the interviewee answers: 
 
 
Figure 23 SPV Usage in the Islamic Banking Industry   
 
Having established that the majority of Islamic banks engaged in investment 
transactions use special purpose vehicles, it was imperative to understand how often 
(or which of the transactions) Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles. Twenty-
eight interviewees indicated that special purpose vehicles are used in 90% - 100% of 
their investment transactions. The remaining seven interviewees are as follows: 
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• The question was not applicable to four interviewees, because they either 
represented an Islamic infrastructure organization or an Islamic retail bank that 
does not engage in investment transactions.  
 
• One interviewee divided the answer into two sections over the past decade. 
From 2005 – 2010, the Islamic investment bank used special purpose vehicles 
in 100% of their transactions. However, from 2010 – 2015, special purpose 
vehicles were used solely in around 50% of investment transactions executed 
by the bank. The interviewee explained that this decrease in the usage of 
special purpose vehicles was due to many factors, including: (1) business 
decreased post the global financial crises, (2) taxation either decreased or was 
removed in many jurisdictions which did not require the creation of special 
purpose vehicles, (3) regulatory rules were altered in a way that the reasons for 
Islamic banks to establish special purpose vehicles was not as significant, (4) a 
substitute now exists (i.e. project companies - which are similar to special 
purpose vehicles, however have real offices and employees). 
 
• One interviewee indicated that special purpose vehicles are used in less than 
50% of the banks investments. This is due to the fact that the bank this 
interviewee represents was a conventional investment bank that converted into 
an Islamic retail bank. This conversion from an investment to a fully-fledged 
retail bank eradicated the use of special purpose vehicles and decreased 
existing special purpose vehicles by selling existing investments.  
 
• One interviewee who represents an Islamic retail bank that is heavily engaged 
in investment activities in the local (Bahraini) market, explained that special 
purpose vehicles are used in around 10-15% of the banks investments. This is 
because most investments were local investments, while special purpose 
vehicles are needed when investments were made internationally.  
 
The below bar graph illustrates the above answers: 
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Figure 24 Percentage of Islamic Bank's investments using SPVs  
 
As the question applied to thirty-one interviewees, while twenty-eight interviewees 
indicated that special purpose vehicles are used in 90% - 100% of their investment 
transactions, this indicates 90.3% 41 of these Islamic banks use special purpose 
vehicles in the majority (around 90% - 100%) of their investment transactions.   
 
The exceptions for an Islamic bank not using special purpose vehicles are either 
Islamic retail banks that do not engage in investment transactions, or an Islamic bank 
that does not engage in international investments (solely local). There are no 
international investment transactions that do not use special purpose vehicles in its 
structure. This may suggest that special purpose vehicles may be deemed as an 
essential tool for Islamic investment structures, and that the practice of establishing 
special purpose vehicles is spread throughout the industry. The below bar graph 
combines both figures numbers twenty-three and twenty-four:  
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Figure 25 Combining of Figures 23 and 24  
 
“Without a doubt, SPVs are used in 100% of Islamic [international] investment 
transactions… Why don’t you check [Islamic bank name]? The judge42 recently 
ruled in favor of [Islamic bank name] by drawing all the banks investment 
structures in front of him, he realised these transactions were all fiduciary-
based, and found some 20,000 to 22,000 SPVs within one Islamic bank!” 
 – Shari’a Scholar 
 
The Islamic bank referred to in the above quotation has its full documentation 
publicised, because it filed for Chapter Eleven bankruptcy in the United States of 
America and as a result, was obliged to publicise all its documentation. In relation to 
special purpose vehicles, this revealed that this one Islamic bank had established more 
than 20,000 special purpose vehicles. This may further indicate that the establishment 
of special purpose vehicles may be widely spread as a practice in the Islamic banking 
investment industry. The interview process revealed that the establishment of special 
purpose vehicles was almost necessary each time an international investment was 
being structured. In this regard, an interviewee simply mentioned: 
 
“An SPV is merely a tool [used in investment transactions]…” – Board Member 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The interviewee is referring to a judge ruling in favor of a bank who filed for Chapter 11 (Bankruptcy) in the 
United States of America. Although this is public data, the name of the bank was removed for anonymity 
purposes.  
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6.2.2 Reasons for Using Special Purpose Vehicles	  
 
A thematic analysis has been conducted for this section on its own. This is because 
the reasons for using special purpose vehicles varied in which the researcher viewed 
the requirement of categorizing the diverse reasons to use for analysis. The thematic 
analysis narrows down answers delivered by the thirty-five interviewees (Segment I 
and II) for the third interview question: “What is the reason for using special purpose 
vehicles in your transactions/structures?” into specific themes. This is also because 
many of the reasons mentioned by the interviewees were similar to those of others, 
and analysing patterns on interviewees answers to generic reasons may be imperative 
to understand (Thematic Analysis, 2011). The themes for the main reasons why 
special purpose vehicles are created are:  
 
Main Reasons why Islamic Banks use Special Purpose Vehicles 
(According to Interviewee Responses) 
 
Figure 26 Main Reasons for using SPVs (Author’s Diagram) 
 
As explained, the above themes have been created as a result of the answers obtained 
from the interviewees for the third question. The below explains the reasons for 
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Islamic banks using special purpose vehicles according to the interviewees with a 
constructivist or interpretivist approach, but also slightly shows a quantitative aspect 
in relation to interviewees answers or repetitions. This is not to switch the initial 
constructivist paradigm to a positivist paradigm. “A common error in … qualitative 
research is switching from a critical or constructivist paradigm back to a materialistic, 
positivist paradigm part of the way through the research process, most often at the 
interpretive moment” (Crabtree and Miller, 1999, p.132). Rather, it is in order to be 
able to display interviewee answers through diagrammatic figures for the reader to 
identify possible patterns (for example, taxation as a reason for using special purpose 
vehicles was mentioned by the highest number of interviewees). 
6.2.2.1 Shareholding Structure 	  
 
Islamic investment banks may be required to allocate voting and other decision-
making powers to certain investors, such as placing them as members of the Board of 
Directors. The Islamic investment bank do not want to take the risk of placing 
investors of one investment, on the board of directors of the bank as a whole with 
board power. Therefore, the Islamic bank creates a separate legal entity (special 
purpose vehicle) structured in a pre-agreed manner in terms of Board representation, 
distribution of control of power and decision making (veto) for that specific 
investment. Twelve out of thirty-five interviewees mentioned this reason.  
 
“… How can I allow outside investors become partners in my bank as a whole 
when they’re investing in one investment? That’s a huge risk. Imagine them 
(outside investors) having equal shareholding or voting rights in the bank as a 
whole? … [Rather,] we create a separate entity, [and] then all of us become 
partners in that entity … and then we control [allocation of investment] return, 
[the] investment process, [etc.]” – Investment Manager 
 
The above quote indicates that investment managers establish special purpose 
vehicles in order to be able to orchestrate the shareholding structure of a specific 
investment, which makes sense, especially from a risk management perspective. This 
practice may represent efficiency in terms of investment risk and legal management. 
However, each party may have different preferences according to their interest. For 
example, another interviewee mentioned that investors have started requesting Islamic 
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banks to have direct shares in the Islamic banks themselves rather the separate special 
purpose vehicles.  
 
“Now… investors are starting to say: ‘no [we don’t want] SPVs, we want to be 
partners with the bank’… which is difficult. That must be difficult. Of course, 
very difficult” - Board Member 
 
This represents the viewpoint of investors rather than investment managers. It reflects 
the opposite view of the investment managers’ preference, where investors might 
have realised that owning shares directly with the bank places them at a stronger 
position in terms of decision making to protect their wealth. According to Al-Ghazālï 
(2008) and Al-Būtï (2009), protecting such wealth is considered as one of the highest 
level of maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law). This also makes sense from 
the perspective of investors. This is because if the bank mismanaged the investment 
that possibly led to irregularities or disputes, investors would only be able to sue the 
special purpose vehicle in offshore jurisdictions, such as the Bahamas or the Cayman 
Islands, which may be difficult for investors. This indicates that the preference of a 
specific structure highly depends on the perspective of the stakeholder.  
 
Lastly, establishing special purpose vehicles for the orchestration of shareholding and 
ownership structures may also be required when certain jurisdictions have placed 
limitations on foreign ownership. The below quote clarifies this statement:  
 
“Sometimes, certain jurisdictions don’t allow foreign ownership above a certain 
percentage. So we create an SPV and nominate a local owner [to own a certain 
percentage on our behalf] and protect ourselves through a murābaha 
agreement”. – Chief Investment Officer 
 
The above indicates that special purpose vehicles may solve challenges that 
businesses may face. In chapter three, it was explained that one of the arguments 
supporting the notion that special purpose vehicles serve maqāsid al-shari’a 
(objectives of Islamic law), is that they remove hardship and make things easy (Al-
Hilali & MuhsinKhan, 1996). The above responses indicate that special purpose 
vehicles removes hardship and facilitates things for people, which is considered as a 
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general maqsad (objective) in Shari’a (Islamic law) (Ash-Shubailī, 2015). If it is 
assumed that special purpose vehicles did not exist; does this mean that all the 
problems solved as a result of special purpose vehicles would still exist? Does this 
indicate that all types of investment companies, including Islamic banks, would have 
to take more risks to obtain outside investors by allocating shares to them within the 
company (i.e. Islamic bank) as a whole? Furthermore, would the absence of special 
purpose vehicles disable Islamic banks from investing, or establishing companies, in 
jurisdictions where foreign ownership is either not allowed or limited? Does all the 
benefits that come along with special purpose vehicles disappear in the absence of 
special purpose vehicles?  
6.2.2.2 Limiting Liability and Creating Bankruptcy Remote Structures	  
 
Similar to a statement put forth by Topno (2005), Abdulla and Chee (2010), ten 
interviewees indicated that their respective Islamic banks legally structure their 
investments in a manner where the bank will not be held liable for any default or 
damages. Rather, the special purpose vehicle is the sole entity that would be 
responsible for liabilities. This enables banks to manage their risk of loss effectively 
that are able to enter into investments without putting the Islamic bank at risk. This 
further indicates that special purpose vehicles assist investment managers in 
protecting the māl (wealth) of an investment, which according to Al-Ghazālï (2008) 
and Al-Būtï (2009), is considered as one of the main dharūriyāt (necessities) in 
Shari’a (Islamic law) that holds one of the highest ranks in maqāsid al-shari’a 
(objectives of Islamic law).  
 
According to these ten interviewees, limiting the liability of the Islamic banks is one 
of the key reasons for establishing special purpose vehicles. Most of the interviewees 
who mentioned this reason are either the Islamic banks’ investment managers or 
lawyers.  
 
Similar to the response of the ten interviewees and as displayed in chapter two, 
creating a bankruptcy-remote structure being one of the main reasons for establishing 
special purpose vehicles was mentioned by many authors, including Topno (2005), 
Abdulla and Chee (2010), and McKune (2004). One of the ten interviewees added 
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that just as the Islamic bank distancing itself from any liability, the establishment of 
special purpose vehicles also distance investors from the Islamic banks’ risks of loss, 
similar to the arguments put forth by Abdulla and Chee (2010). Below is the quotation 
if this interviewee’s statement: 
 
“…[By establishing and SPV, you] distance the Bank and its shareholders from 
the risks of the SPV… but you also distance the investors of the SPV from the 
Bank’s risks”. – Compliance Officer 
 
Investment managers seemed to have the same attitude, response, or pattern when 
asked why they thought special purpose vehicles was established. Many of them 
without elaborating on different reasons, simply explained that special purpose 
vehicles are created to limit the liability of the bank. The below quote is an example 
of the full response given by a chief investment officer when asked why special 
purpose vehicles are established: 
 
“You’re purely limiting your liability”. – Chief Investment Officer  
 
An Islamic finance lawyer further elaborated that direct ownership may pose threats 
to the owners. The below quote elaborates on this matter: 
 
“The simplest reason for establishing an SPV, is because it’s a separate entity… 
if [the SPV] is sued, it’s separate [from the bank]… You take an asset out of a 
legal person - to another person… the reason for this is because you want 
someone else to hold it (the asset), because maybe it (the asset) causes a legal 
threat to them (the bank)… There is also what we call ‘jurisdiction shopping’, 
which is finding out where is the best jurisdiction to establish your SPV in. I 
think it was Richard Branson, who is one of the richest people in the world, but 
he doesn’t prefer to have direct ownership. No one wants to own nowadays”  
– Islamic Finance Lawyer  
 
The question that arises here, is that if no one wants to have direct ownership because 
of the possible threats this legal structure may have on the owner, then who owns the 
special purpose vehicles on behalf of the initial originators (i.e. Islamic banks)? Are 
they not placed in risky positions? Or are they legally protected? One interviewee 
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mentioned that the Islamic bank/investors, as the initial originator of the special 
purpose vehicles, are protected through legal tools that make it impossible for the 
direct/legal owners to “walk away with the Islamic bank’s assets”. However, if the 
special purpose vehicle is sued, who is responsible? Is it the legal owners or initial 
originator? Multiple questions arise with these types of fiduciary-based relationships 
and structures that yet remain unclearly answered. There seems to be lack of a 
complete transparency, which supports the notion discussed in chapter three that 
special purpose vehicles may serve against maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic 
law) due to transparency issues. This is because the Shari’a (Islamic law) encourages 
transparency and either discourages or prohibits purposeful non-transparent practices 
(Al-Nawawi, 2015). 	  
6.2.2.3 Taxation 	  
 
Twenty-four interviewees mentioned taxation as one of the main reasons for 
establishing special purpose vehicles, similar to arguments put forth by various 
authors such as Hargreaves (2014), Hadnum (2013), Forbes and Sharma (2008), 
amongst others. This represents the highest number of interviewees who mentioned a 
single reason for why special purpose vehicles were established.  
 
Amongst the different categories of interviewees such as investment managers, 
academics, lawyers, and Shari’a managers, there seems to be a debate regarding the 
acceptability of tax avoidance (and not the illegal type of tax ‘evasion’) from a moral 
viewpoint. The main points of views are: is it efficient to create tax-efficient 
structures for profitability purposes that are considered legally acceptable? Or is there 
an issue of morality, where large corporations are able to legally avoid tax, while the 
mass population does not have the ability or capacity to do the same. Firstly, because 
the Kingdom of Bahrain was used as a case study (an individual tax-free country), 
where the majority of interviewees do not necessarily pay or realise individual or 
income tax affects, the issue of tax-efficient structures was not raised as a negative 
reason or from a negative moral standpoint. It was seen as either being legally 
acceptable or a fraud. If it was legal, then tax efficient structures were required to 
protect the māl (wealth) of the bank from extravagant spending on unnecessary loss of 
profits. However, this was argued by some academics that do not necessarily work in 
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the Kingdom of Bahrain. Although this issue remains to be a point of debate, it is first 
important to understand the details of the interviewee responses relating to taxation as 
a main reason for creating special purpose vehicles.   
 
All twenty-four interviewees stated that special purpose vehicles are usually 
established in what is known as “tax haven” jurisdictions. Therefore, Islamic banks 
prefer using special purpose vehicles in certain jurisdictions to benefit from their 
taxation laws and in turn are used as a strategy to enhance their investment 
performance. The below two quotes are examples for this view: 
 
“Certain jurisdictions have tax treaty agreements with other jurisdictions. For 
example, if I want to invest in Turkey, we use [establish an SPV in] 
Luxemburg, which reduces dividend withholding tax from 15% to 10%...”  
– Islamic Bank Manager  
 
“[SPVs are used] To avoid double tax. If the bank establishes an SPV in India 
and invests in India, there is tax. If we establish an SPV in the Caymans 
[Cayman Island], then transfer funds to another SPV in Mauritius, that invests 
in an SPV located in India, it’s not taxable… the lawyers usually explain these 
taxation laws prior to a transaction”. – Islamic Bank Manager 
 
Furthermore, three out of the twenty-four interviewees further added that there are 
certain jurisdictions that either decrease or annihilates taxation on companies who are 
in debt. Therefore, Islamic banks sometimes establish two (or more) special purpose 
vehicles that lend to one another, known as inter-lending, as a technique to either 
decrease or eradicate tax. An example of a quote mentioning this is displayed below: 	  
“SPVs owned by the same Islamic bank can lend each other interest-based loans 
- because they’re owned by the same entity43 – and the reason why we do this is 
to [either] remove or decrease tax”44 – Shari’a Manager 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The interviewee is referring to a Shari’a (Islamic law) concept, where one of the requirements for interest being 
considered as the prohibited riba is to have at least two separate parties (a lender can lend himself an interest-
based loan). Therefore, SPVs that have one owner, can lend each other interest-based loans since it is not 
considered as the prohibited riba.  
44 The interviewee is referring to jurisdictions that decrease or annihilate tax requirements to indebted entities. 
	   127 
6.2.2.4 Regulatory and Compliance Requirements 	  
 
Through the use of special purpose vehicles, Islamic banks would have less reporting 
requirements. This encourages banks to use special purpose vehicles since more 
compliance/legal requirements are considered a hassle for investment managers. Ten 
out of thirty-five interviewees mentioned this reason.  
 
One out of the ten interviewees elaborated on regulatory requirements. The 
interviewee explained that Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles as a tool to 
adhere to regulatory requirements, as displayed in the below quote: 
 
“For example, the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) requires a minimum of 12% 
Capital-Adequacy Ratio (CAR). The Capital Adequacy Ratio is = Equity / Risk-
Weighted Assets (RWA). The percentage of this ratio should not be less than 
12%. Therefore, some Islamic banks create special purpose vehicles, and 
transfer selected Risk-Weighted Assets to the special purpose vehicle (it is 
removed from the banks balance sheet and transferred to the special purpose 
vehicle balance sheet). This in turn reduces the banks Risk-Weighted Assets 
(RWA), which in turn would increase the Banks Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR). Can you clarify what exactly is RWA? What constitutes RWA? …. Risk-
Weighted Assets (RWA) are assets that are not easily liquidated. For example, 
cash holds a zero risk-weight, while the risk-weight on real estate is 200%. 
Therefore, if a bank owns real estate assets worth $ 5m, the risk-weight is $ 
10m, used for calculation purposes”. – Risk Manager  
 
The above quote may raise regulatory questions. With the same type of equity and 
assets, an Islamic bank may manipulate its capital-adequacy ratio by establishing 
special purpose vehicle(s) and transferring selected risk-weighted assets to a separate 
legal entity. A question that arises here is that if we were to assume that there are two 
Islamic banks with the identical financials that own identical assets, where one 
Islamic Bank established a special purpose vehicle and transferred a high risk-
weighted asset(s) to the special purpose vehicle, and the other Islamic Bank did not 
establish a special purpose vehicle and continued to directly legally own all the high-
risk weighted asset(s). This means that the two Islamic banks with initially the same 
financials and in reality identical assets now have different capital adequacy ratios 
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(CAR). Is this considered as a manipulation? Are regulators aware and/or do they 
accept this act? Is it legally acceptable and therefore the regulators or auditors are not 
able to object to this act? Or is it a perfectly acceptable strategy where other banks 
may choose to act similarly or not depending on their ability or strategy? This point 
may be debatable. 
 
6.2.2.5 Legal Issues	  
 
Seventeen out thirty-five interviewees indicated that establishing special purpose 
vehicles means there will be less legal requirements for the Islamic banks. Also, it is 
much quicker to incorporate a special purpose vehicle in the known tax-haven 
jurisdictions (such as the Cayman Islands or Jersey), while on the other hand; 
incorporating a special purpose vehicle in the Kingdom of Bahrain requires a long and 
complicated process. The below quotes further elaborates on this advantage: 
 
“In Bahrain, it might take me two weeks to establish an SPV. In Cayman, it 
takes one day”. – Compliance Officer 
 
“SPV has easiness… no (Bahraini) municipality (requirements)… the board of 
directors formation is completed within twenty-four hours” – Islamic Bank 
Manager 	  
“[SPVs are established because] This is how it’s done. Bahrain is a 
bureaucracy45” Islamic Bank Manager 
 
Again, this further suggests that special purpose vehicles serve maqāsid al-shari’a 
(objectives of Islamic law) in terms of removing hardship, promoting easiness, and 
facilitating processes for individuals (Ash-Shubailī, 2015). In this regard and in 
August 2015, one interviewee indicated that the Kingdom of Bahrain was in the 
process of trying to enable the Kingdom of Bahrain to become a special purpose 
vehicle-hub. The interviewee mentioned: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The interviewee is referring to the bureaucratic environment of the Kingdom of Bahrain that may slow the 
process of establishing an SPV in Bahrain.  
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“Bahrain was trying for a while to allow the establishment of SPVs in Bahrain 
to become easy (ease the process of SPV establishment in Bahrain) to replace 
Cayman and other secrecy jurisdictions…they (legislators, regulators, or the 
government) were trying to push the banks to open SPVs in Bahrain (rather than 
the Cayman islands and other preferred SPV jurisdictions)”46 – Islamic Bank 
Manager 
 
Later in April 2016, a local Bahraini newspaper publicised that the Kingdom of 
Bahrain was aiming to position itself as a regional special purpose vehicle hub 
(TradeArabia, 2016).  This was evidenced based on a roundtable meeting held in 
cooperation with the Central Bank of Bahrain and the Economic Development Board 
(EDB)47 in the Kingdom of Bahrain (TradeArabia, 2016). This is probably due to the 
fact that the Economic Development Board rightfully wants to encourage a more 
positive investment climate in the Kingdom of Bahrain for economic purposes. This 
may obviously lead to necessary regulatory developments and enhancements. 
However, according to one elite interviewee, the Kingdom of Bahrain already started 
drafting a law specifically for special purpose vehicles in the Kingdom of Bahrain. 
This further indicates that the climate and nature of special purpose vehicles in terms 
of encouragement, and regulation, is heading towards a new path in the country. 
Although it may be encouraged from an economic point of view, it also raises 
questions about future prospects pertaining to special purpose vehicles, regulatory 
enhancements, and how to deal with challenges posed along with special purpose 
vehicles. One may conclude that if managed and regulated properly and as argued by 
Stewart (2005), a special purpose vehicle may be a perfectly acceptable designation. 
On the other hand, if challenges were still posed by special purpose vehicles, 
regulatory developments would continue to be critically required.  	  
6.2.2.6 Shari’a Compliance	  
 
From an Islamic banking perspective, which includes a banking philosophy that is 
required to adhere to Shari’a (Islamic law) principles (Abdul-Raheem 2013, Kettel 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The Bahrain Economic Development Board (EDB) is a public agency with an overall responsibility for 
attracting inward investment into the Kingdom of Bahrain and supporting initiatives that help enhance the 
investment climate in the country.	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2011, Abdul-Rahman 2010, Abdulla and Chee 2010, Soumare 2008, and Ayub 2007), 
this may probably be the most significant element of the research, and may be one of 
the major challenges facing the Islamic banking industry. Since Islamic banks are 
prohibited from engaging in interest-based activities (Ayub, 2007, Khan 1986, 
Choudhury and Malik 1992), Islamic banks sometimes initiate the establishment of 
separate legal entities in order to indirectly engage in interest-based activities. The 
Islamic bank would execute a Shari’a compliant deal with a special purpose vehicle 
(for example, a tawarruq (monetization) financing), where the special purpose vehicle 
would then engage in a transaction that would have otherwise been prohibited for the 
Islamic bank to do so directly. Most commonly, this includes the legally separated 
special purpose vehicles to engage in interest-based activities. However, a common 
argument provided is that Islamic banks are neither responsible nor accounted for 
separate legal entities. Ten out of thirty-five interviewees mentioned this reason. This 
raised a number of questions such as: Is this authentic? Is the Islamic banking 
industry regulated properly? Are the Shari’a bodies are conducting their duties 
efficiently? Or perhaps there might be explanations or justifications to such practices? 
 
The two main views held by the interviewees regarding this practice, are that five 
interviewees believe this to be a manipulative and a misleading practice, while four 
interviewees believe this to be as a solution in times of necessity. The five 
interviewees who explained this as being a misleading practice, mentioned that the 
Islamic bank would either: 
 
1. Execute these transactions without prior Shari’a approvals 
2. Manipulatively structure investments in a way indicating that no Islamic 
financings are available for the investment, and that the bank would 
financially be in trouble if the investment were not entered into 
3. Structure a transaction portraying the Islamic bank as not having a majority 
share (less than 33%) in the special purpose vehicle, where the bank 
realistically has full power and control over the special purpose vehicle.  
4. Structuring a transaction that includes a special purpose vehicle, portraying the 
special purpose vehicle as an external investment partner. Therefore, the 
Shari’a Supervisory Board is not concerned nor asks about the activities of an 
external company. In reality, the Islamic bank fully controls this separate 
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special purpose vehicle and engages in prohibited activities freely without the 
supervision of the Shari’a Supervisory Board.  
5. Amongst other techniques 
 
The interviewees explained that by implementing the above, Islamic banks are able 
to: (1) convince the Islamic shareholders/investors that the investment was fully 
Shari’a compliant to obtain funds, (2) convince the Shari’a Supervisory Board that 
the investment structure should be deemed Shari’a compliant, (3) convince the 
regulator that the transaction was approved by the Shari’a Supervisory Board, (4) 
engage in non-Shari’a compliant investment or transactions freely and indirectly, 
amongst other actions.  
 
“The mentality [of the investment department] is not to achieve Shari’a 
compliance in a manner that is acceptable to [the] investment [team], but rather 
how to trick the Shari’a department into believing it is Shari’a compliant and 
obtain an approval…” – Islamic Bank Investment Manager 
 
 “I work in the investment department and I see them (investment team). At the 
initiation stage of planning, they plan on how to initially structure it in a way to 
obtain a Shari’a approval, knowing that after the execution they will change the 
structure. After execution, they apply for another approval to change the initial 
structure and explain it’s out of necessity, (as if there were unseen future 
circumstances). The Shari’a body cannot cancel a whole executed transaction 
and waste millions [based on a structural issue], so they provide an exception 
(approval)…but it was all planned from the beginning. And this is just one 
example”. – Islamic Bank Investment Manager 
 
The above example provided as an insight by an investment manager indicates that 
hiyal (legal stratagems) to engage in prohibited activities may exist in the Islamic 
banking industry. As explained in chapter three, engaging in hila (legal stratagems) in 
order to ultimately engage in a prohibited activity is prohibited according to Shari’a 
(Islamic law) (Al-Qaradhāwï, 1978 and Al-Enezi, 2015). The interviewees opinion 
indicate that a number of Islamic banks may have been engaging in prohibited 
activities without the knowledge of their Shari’a Supervisory Boards. A number of 
accomplished scholars such as Ibn Taymiyah (2005) regard this type of hila (legal 
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stratagems) as more prohibited and harmful than solely engaging in the prohibited 
activity. He argues that hiyal (legal stratagems) to engage in a prohibited activity are 
prohibited, in addition to having an element of deception (Ibn Taymiyah, 2005).  
However, it is apparent that the above two quotes are from investment managers who 
are willing to express their perspective regarding Shari’a compliance flaws within 
their investment team. It may be useful to note that biasness may exist within such 
interviews, or that the investment teammates the quotes refer to may have different 
opinions or rationales. However, the quotes may also be revealing a sense of a reality 
that exists within the Islamic banking industry, since the arguments put forth by these 
interviewees are in conformity with the claims made by the Central Bank of Bahrain 
and a senior Shari’a scholar (as included in chapter one), who claim that evidence 
exists where special purpose vehicle abuse exist within the Islamic banking industry 
(CBB 2013 and Umar 2013).  
 
Due to the above analysis, it may be imperative to note that a methodology to tackle 
special purpose vehicle (or other) similar abuses may need to be created/initiated. 
This is because it may be non-comprehendible to have an Islamic banking industry, 
whose essence is largely based on the prohibition of interest (Ayub 2007, Khan 1986, 
Choudhury and Malik 1992), to freely engage in interest-based transactions through 
the use of special purpose vehicles. This argument may be further encouraged since 
evidence previously in this chapter suggests that special purpose vehicles are used by 
the majority of Islamic banks in approximately 90-100% of their investment 
transactions. Also, since the Shari’a Supervisory Boards are not made aware of 
similar violations except by the internal Shari’a reviewer, the importance and 
significance that is placed on the internal Shari’a reviewers needs to be emphasized.  
 
“They use SPVs to obtain conventional financing, but this is prohibited – it’s 
misleading. They obtain investors, show them that it’s (the structure) is Islamic 
(without the investors knowing the underlying economic realities, who are 
shown the Islamic version of the transaction). The bank does not promote it, the 
bank does not entertain it” – Shari’a Manager 
 
“Some deceptive banks use them (SPVs) as a means to obtain conventional 
finance” – Shari’a Manager 
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The above quotes indicate that a number of internal Shari’a reviewers may be aware 
of such violations. The question is, do they report it? Are the Shari’a Supervisory 
Boards being made aware of such violations? Is it mentioned in the publicised Shari’a 
Supervisory Board annual reports or are they mentioned in the confidential internal 
Shari’a review reports? Since chapter seven analyses secondary data, which Shari’a 
Supervisory Board annual reports are a part of, the question of whether similar 
violations are mentioned in such reports will be analysed.  
 
However, it may be important to note that one Shari’a auditor hinted during a side 
talk after an official interview, that their (Shari’a auditors) jobs would be at stake if 
they consider reporting such findings. Although it was not a part of the interview 
questions, this statement initiated side talks with other interviewees conducted after 
this interview. As a result, during side talks with four other interviewees, two other 
Shari’a auditors and two investment managers either reiterated or confirmed this 
statement, all of which collectively represent five banks. This indicates that at least in 
five Islamic banks, the internal Shari’a reviewer may feel pressured to officially 
report special purpose vehicle violations in internal Shari’a audit reports. On a 
separate note, another investment manager stated that internal Shari’a reviewers 
might not report findings due to lack of awareness or lack of evidence, rather than 
solely management pressure. This may indicate that a considerable number of internal 
Shari’a reviewers may not officially report special purpose vehicle violations due to 
lack of awareness, lack of evidence, or management pressure. This also indicated to 
the researcher that the proper or deserved protection of internal Shari’a reviewers 
might not be applicable in all Islamic banks.  
 
From a risk management perspective, the following quote displays a more technical 
methodology of engaging in interest-based conventional transactions through the use 
of special purpose vehicles: 
 
“SPVs are also used to reduce a banks ownership in an asset from a high 
amount to 33% or less. You’re basically manipulating your ownership, in order 
to be able to: (1) buy non-Shari’a compliant investments, and (2) hide existing 
conventional loans from buyers, investors, regulator, Shari’a supervisory board 
and the Shari’a auditor…Actually, you either reduce the ownership to 33% or 
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less, or create a new structure that allocates the bank 33% or less to engage in 
non-Shari’a compliant activities. You mean obtaining conventional loans? Not 
necessarily, whatever [any non-Shari’a compliant transaction]. It’s 33% or less 
because our Shari’a board say it’s permissible if the ownership is less than a 
third” - Former Risk Manager, Islamic Investment Bank. 	  
When tax avoidance was being discussed earlier in this chapter, a question that was 
raised was whether it was morally acceptable to legally avoid/decrease taxation 
through legal tools. This seems to be a similar case, however from a Shari’a (Islamic 
law) perspective rather than taxation. It is apparent from the above quotation that 
Islamic banks may orchestrate shareholding structures of newly established special 
purpose vehicles in a way that enables them to engage in prohibited activities, or 
manipulate a shareholding structure of an existing special purpose vehicle to engage 
in non-Shari’a compliant activities. Is it a type of special purpose vehicle abuse based 
on hiyal (legal stratagems) to engage in prohibited activities, or are they acceptable 
since legally they fit within the rules provided by the Shari’a Supervisory Board? 
 
The Shari’a rulings pronounced by Shari’a Supervisory Boards regarding banking 
transactions seem to be based on Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings and the fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) relating to sharikāt (companies). The challenge that arises is that 
special purpose vehicles are legal companies, however do not necessarily actually 
have physical operational office or employees, but are rather managed by trustees 
(Topno 2005, Gorton and Souleles 2007). According to Shari’a (Islamic law), should 
these types of companies be treated equally with normal companies, with normal 
offices and employees? Furthermore, as argued by many authors, a special purpose 
vehicle is usually established for a special, specific, or limited purpose (Amoruso and 
Duchac 2014, Abdulla and Chee 2010, Gorton and Souleles 2007, Topno 2005, 
Hartgraves and Benston 2002) and therefore, could it be logically claimed that the 
“special purpose” for an Islamic bank to establish a special purpose vehicle, was to 
engage in non-Shari’a compliant activities? The following two examples may clarify 
this argument further: 
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Example 1:  
Originator: Islamic Bank One 
Establishment: Special Purpose Vehicle One 
Location: Bahamas 
Reason for Establishment: To deposit investors’ cash and allocate shares according to 
amounts received from each investor to invest collectively.  
 
Example 2: 
Originator: Islamic Bank Two 
Establishment: Special Purpose Vehicle Two 
Location: Cayman Islands 
Reason for Establishment: To allow a fiduciary relationship and obtain a conventional 
loan to purchase an asset for lease and investment purposes. 
 
The first example may be understood, but is the second example apprehensible? How 
can the special or specific purpose of an Islamic bank, which is the initial originator 
of a special purpose vehicle, be to engage in non-Shari’a compliant activities? Is this 
conceivable? Or are there understandable explanations? 
 
If Islamic banks are able to engage in non-Shari’a compliant transactions through the 
use of special purpose vehicles, does this mean special purpose vehicles may be used 
specifically to go against maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law)? If Shari’a 
(Islamic law) prohibits interest due to multiple negative impacts, does the Islamic 
banking practice of engaging in interest-based activities through special purpose 
vehicles serve maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law)? Does the insertion of a 
legally separated special purpose vehicle, inserted by the Islamic bank, make it 
sufficient enough to engage indirectly in interest-bearing activities? 
 
On the other hand and the other end of the spectrum, four out of the ten interviewees 
explained this practice as being a solution when no Islamic financing exists for a 
specific investment. They explained that when Islamic financing exists, this structure 
is no longer approved or considered acceptable by the Shari’a body of the Islamic 
bank. The following two quotes are examples for this point of view: 	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“If no Islamic financings exist for a Western company, we can use an SPV to 
take a conventional finance. This is only out of necessity. It happened only once 
in the USA… if Islamic financing exists, this is not permissible. The excuse 
must be mentioned in the Shari’a resolution why an approval was granted for a 
conventional [loan included in an] SPV [structure]” – Shari’a Manager 
 
“[SPVs are used] to make it Shari’a compliant. We bought two buildings in 
Australia with debt and equity, and there’s no Islamic financing in Australia (so 
the debt was conventional-based indirectly through an SPV)”. – Islamic Bank 
Investment Manager 
 
It seems from the perception of these interviewees, that an Islamic special purpose 
vehicle structure with conventional activities is a solution only if no Islamic substitute 
exists. Does this indicate that if Islamic financing existed, this structure would not be 
deemed acceptable in the least, or are there more exceptions to this? Also, the internal 
Shari’a reviewer quoted above mentioned an interesting perception when he stated, 
“this is only out of necessity”. This is because it raises questions such as, what 
determines the conditions of a dharūra (necessity)? Is it the Shari’a Supervisory 
Board? What if Islamic financings were available, however the profit rate of the 
Islamic financing was higher than the interest rate on the conventional loan, can this 
be considered a dharūra (necessity) and approved as an exception? Or is it only when 
the fundamental necessities are involved such as food, clothing, shelter, peace, can the 
concept of dharūra (necessity) be applied and approved as an exception? It may be 
useful to officially clarify the concept of dharūra (necessity) through Shari’a standard 
setting bodies to enable practitioners and the public to understand the concept of 
dharūra (necessity).  
 
The last interviewee explained that special purpose vehicles are used because it is 
easier to engage in Shari’a compliant activities. This is because the Articles of 
Association (AOAs) and establishing contracts of the special purpose vehicle (i.e. 
Cayman islands or elsewhere) requires Shari’a compliance for the activities the entity 
will engage in.  
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“They (SPVs) have standard Shari’a AOAs (Articles of Associations). All [of 
the] establishing contracts are in line with Shari’a. See… they also have 
‘Shari’a committee’ (having a Shari’a committee for the SPV as a requirement 
in the Articles of Association of the SPV)”. – Islamic Bank Manager 
 
Therefore, the interviewees who mentioned Shari’a compliance as a reason for 
Islamic banks establishing special purpose vehicles are divided into three categories: 
(1) those who view it is a misleading practice, (2) those who explained it is a 
temporary solution when no Islamic financing exists, and (3) that special purpose 
vehicles have Shari’a compliance requirements in its Articles of Association. This is 
illustrated below:  
 
Figure 27 Interviewee opinions of SPV Shari'a Compliance  
 
Interviewee perceptions regarding Islamic banking practices of engaging in 
conventional transactions through the use of special purpose vehicles is further 
elaborated in section 6.2.3. However, a general but main question that needs to be 
asked, is whether Shari’a Supervisory Boards are aware of the hiyal-based practices 
or not, and if so, what actions are being undertaken to stop similar loopholes from 
being abused? 
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6.2.2.7 Confidentiality Purposes	  
 
Since special purpose vehicles are separate legal entities, its legal owners are persons 
other than the initial originator or establishing bank. Therefore, an entity established 
in a jurisdiction (e.g. Cayman Islands) with an unfamiliar name legally owning it, 
would make it difficult for the public to track down the person who initially owns (or 
indirectly manages) the special purpose vehicle (although regulatory bodies may be 
able to do so). According to two interviewees, when Islamic banks want to be 
confidential in their dealings, special purpose vehicles help them achieve this 
objective.  
 
“If you (a bank) wants confidentiality, you set up an SPV with a random name 
in the Caymans. This way you are able to hide… or make discrete… your 
ownership. Regulators will inevitably be able to track who owns what, but when 
the general public see an XYZ company in the Cayman, it is difficult for them 
to track the real owners of this company” – Risk Manager 
 
“Some [banks] are not using SPVs in good faith. They are being established in 
secrecy jurisdictions because: 
Ø No access to financials 
Ø Purposely hiding information 
Ø No disclosure requirements or share information with external parties 
SPVs [are] not regulated… Banks are obviously regulated, but the SPVs they 
establish are not” - Compliance Officer 
 
6.2.2.8 Easier Transfer of Funds	  
 
Two out of thirty-five interviewees mentioned that it is easier to transfer funds locally 
(for example, a special purpose vehicle in the United States of America to an Islamic 
bank’s investment also in the United States of America), rather than internationally 
transferring money (for example, from the Islamic bank in the Kingdom of Bahrain to 
its investment in the United States of America). Special purpose vehicles therefore 
ease the process of funds transfers between Islamic banks and its investments. In this 
regard, special purpose vehicles may be seen as serving maqāsid al-shari’a 
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(objectives of Islamic law) as it provides solutions, removes hardships and facilitates 
ease (Ash-Shubailī, 2015) with regards to these transactions and transfer of funds.  
 
One interviewee mentioned that it is easier to transfer debts (rather than funds) to the 
special purpose vehicle to enhance the Islamic bank’s balance sheet and financial 
statements. This comment raises many issues that may need to be addressed. Chapter 
two explained that one of the main reasons that led a large corporation, the Enron 
Corporation, which had a market capitalisation of USD 60 billion in the beginning of 
2001 to being bankrupt by the end of 2001, was off-balance sheet debts partially 
incurred through the use of special purpose vehicles (Amoruso and Duchac 2014, 
SEC 2005, and Dharan 2002). Does this mean Islamic banks are engaging in similar 
activities to those like Enron Corporation as well as other corporations that hide debt 
through special purpose vehicles? Or has the accounting rules changed to a level 
where consolidation requirements in the Kingdom of Bahrain disables Islamic banks 
to hide or transfer debt? According to one interviewee who is a lawyer and a previous 
regulator, explained that despite the rules being changed or enhanced by the regulator, 
his perception is that practitioners are always one step ahead of regulators, where they 
aim at benefitting from other legal loopholes. He mentioned: 
 
“They’re [practitioners] always one step ahead [of regulators]” – Islamic 
Finance Lawyer  
6.2.2.9 Sukūk (Commonly referred to as Islamic Bonds) and Syndication	  
 
Three out of thirty-five interviewees indicated that special purpose vehicles are used 
for sukūk (Islamic securitization) structures. The concept of sukūk (Islamic 
securitization) was explained in chapter four (Islamic financial products chapter). One 
interviewee mentioned that special purpose vehicles are required for syndication 
financings.  
6.2.2.10 Strategic Reasons	  
 
One interviewee mentioned that investment companies (which may apply to Islamic 
banks) might prefer placing several investments under one brand. Therefore, a special 
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purpose vehicle with a specified brand is created in order to act as the mother brand, 
which houses a set of chosen investments.  
6.2.2.11 Summary of Main Reasons 	  
 
The below graph summarises the main reasons mentioned by the interviewees for 
why special purpose vehicles are used by Islamic banks, from highest to lowest, in 
chronological order: 
 
Figure 28 Reasons for using SPVs: Bar Graph  	  
6.2.3 Special Purpose Vehicles and Conventional Financings 	  	  
The practice and debate of Islamic banks indirectly engaging in conventional 
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However, pursuant to the fifth interview question displayed in the research 
methodology chapter, the researcher specifically asked the interviewees whether their 
respective Islamic banks engage in interest-based financings indirectly through 
special purpose vehicles. Therefore, this section discusses this practice in more detail. 
The question did not apply to four out of the thirty-five interviewees, while the 
remaining thirty-one interviewees replied with the following:  
 
• Islamic Banks obtaining conventional loans through special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs): Twenty-four interviewees indicated that the Islamic banks they represent, 
or the Islamic banks they previously worked for, or the Islamic banks they regulate 
(or regulated) obtain conventional financings through special purpose vehicles. 
The explanation for this practice differed depending on the interviewees: 
 
o Thirteen out of the twenty-four interviewees indicated that this practice 
exists because there are certain jurisdictions where Islamic financing is not 
available. Islamic banks use this structure (obtaining conventional financing 
through special purpose vehicles) only when no Islamic financings exist. 
This structure is used as a makhraj (Shari’a solution) when no alternative 
financings are in the market. The special purpose vehicle borrowing the 
conventional funds would legally be separated from the Islamic bank. 
However, if Islamic financing exists, the Islamic banks’ Shari’a Supervisory 
Board would not approve this structure. The following quotes elaborates on 
this issue: 
 
“You say you take conventional loans whenever you want (through SPVs). How 
do you reconcile this with Islamic finance, since Islamic finance’s main 
principal is the prohibition of interest? This is normal. This is a standard 
practice at least within the past ten years. Because when you invest in ships, 
plane, rigs, etc., no Islamic banks in the region is willing to finance them… I 
mean there are but they are very limited and take so much time. Bank [X]48 for 
example took them five months just to reply to us. The only sector the region 
(Islamic Banks in the Gulf or MENA region) offers is real estate. We used to 
use this conventional SPV structure for the real estate sector in the past, in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The real name of the Islamic bank the interviewee is referring to has been removed. The interviewee referred to 
an Islamic retail bank in the Kingdom of Bahrain. 
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U.K. for example. But when [Islamic Bank name]49 came, we started dealing 
with them and obtain Islamic financing.” – Chief Investment Officer  
 
“How do you reconcile Islamic banks obtaining conventional financings freely, 
all they need is an SPV, with the fact that the main prohibition in Islamic 
banking is the prohibition of interest? It’s (the SPV) is a complete separate 
entity. See, if you get an alternative, fine. But if not, why should I complicate it? 
This is only acceptable because an alternative doesn’t exist. If an alternative 
exists, we’ll leave SPVs and conventional financings. Our bank invests in the 
energy and oil sectors, etc. there are no Islamic banks (to finance them). So if 
we don’t use [the] SPV [conventional] structure, the bank will shut down […] 
So [the acceptability of using SPVs] is a case-by-case basis per bank. But our 
bank must […] SPVs is a good makhraj (Shari’a solution) for now, but one may 
find an alternative. […] It’s not a standard practice (conventional SPV 
financing), but it’s the only tool available now. […] Let me be clear – if an 
Islamic financing substitute exists, this SPV conventional structure is not 
allowed, at all, no way” – Shari’a Manager	  
 
o Two interviewees indicated that although the Islamic banks they represent 
had obtained and lent conventional loans through special purpose vehicles, 
they had done so without the Shari’a Supervisory Board’s approval. They 
represented round 2% - 4% of the Islamic banks investments.  
o Three interviewees representing the regulatory industry (either current or 
previous employees) explained that they had come across countless of 
transactions with this sort of structure. Abuse exists in the market where 
Islamic banks obtain conventional loans through special purpose vehicles 
without portraying the full true picture to the Shari’a Supervisory Board of 
the Islamic bank. The regulator explained that it had placed a new set of rules 
in the Central Bank of Bahrain’s rulebook because of this practice, but the 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards have a major role to play in the near future 
regarding this matter. Examples of quotations regarding this category 
includes the following: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The interviewee names an Islamic retail bank based in the United Kingdom	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“Many Islamic banks obtained conventional loans deceptively, it happened with 
many banks. But the CBB (Central Bank of Bahrain) prohibited this in the 
PCD50 module. There are major changes in the rulebook for SPVs”  
- Compliance Officer 
 
“…No, we don’t take conventional financings. But I know of another Islamic 
bank who deceived their Shari’a board and maybe CBB (Central Bank of 
Bahrain), I’m not sure, but maybe CBB as well. But they were caught in the 
end. What did they do? They established two SPVs, one they own, which they 
show the Shari’a Supervisory Board for approval. The other one they indirectly 
own, but showed in the structure that they were only a partner to the first SPV. 
And that second SPV (not owned by the Islamic bank) obtained conventional 
financing, and they entered into a transaction. The Shari’a board found out that 
the Islamic bank was negotiating on behalf of the second SPV (not owned by 
the Islamic bank) for obtaining the conventional loan. […] Besides, the 
conventional bank would not give a conventional loan to an SPV owned by no 
one, they must feel satisfied or had a guarantee from the Islamic bank. The CBB 
found out as well and… (Interviewee paused) … something happened (there 
was a problem)” – Compliance Officer 	  
“Yes… I’ve seen a lot. They do haram (engage in prohibited activities) and they 
say ‘we don’t know who’s the owner [of the SPV]’ (sarcastically). But they 
(Islamic banks) are the owners” – Islamic Finance Lawyer 	  
 
o Three interviewees explained that their respective banks have obtained 
conventional loans through special purpose vehicles by engaging in 
misleading practices. However, it is unclear whether these employees were 
disgruntled or about to resign from the banks they represented, who may 
have provided a negative point of view, or were merely stating their opinions 
sincerely.  
o One interviewee explained that the respective banks he represents obtained 
conventional loans through special purpose vehicles when the bank was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The interviewee is referring to the Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements (PCD) Module of the 
Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) Rulebook for Islamic Financial Institutions, Volume II. Changes in the PCD 
module relating to SPVs was related transferred to the Reporting Requirements (BR) Module of the Central Bank 
of Bahrain Rulebook, Volume II. These changes will later be analyzed in the secondary data analysis section.  
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conventional investment (wholesale) bank, prior to its conversion to an 
Islamic retail bank.  
o Two interviewees explained that this happens only in exceptional cases. The 
Islamic bank does not prefer to take business or legal risks that would end up 
being scrutinized by its Shari’a Supervisory Board or Shari’a auditor.  
 
• Islamic Banks that do not obtain conventional loans through special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs): Seven out of thirty-one interviewees mentioned that the Islamic 
banks they represent do not obtain conventional loans through special purpose 
vehicles. However, four of the interviewees work in the same Islamic bank where 
previous interviewees mentioned that their respective Islamic banks did obtain 
conventional loans through special purpose vehicles, which indicates an 
inconsistency in the interviewee responses. The below bar graph summarises these 
opinions:	  	  
Interviewee Responses on whether their Islamic Banks obtain Conventional 
Financings through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)  
 
Figure 29 Islamic banks obtaining conventional financing(s) through SPVs: Interviewee responses  
 
0	  
5	  
10	  
15	  
20	  
25	  
Islamic	  banks	  that	  do	  not	  obtain	  conventional	  loans	  through	  SPVs	   Islamic	  banks	  obtaining	  conventional	  loans	  through	  SPVs	  Genuine	  Practices	   Hiyal	  (Legal	  Stratagems)	  Practices	   Exceptional	  Cases	  
	   145 
It may be useful to note that the thirty-one interviewees this question applied to, 
represent nine Islamic banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain 51 . Furthermore, the 
interviewee responses reveal that eight out of the nine Islamic banks obtain 
conventional financing through special purpose vehicles52. Out of these eight Islamic 
banks, evidence was submitted indicating that at least three of the Islamic banks that 
obtained conventional loans have done so through hiyal (legal stratagems) non-
genuinely, while the remaining five Islamic banks might have done so out of genuine 
causes. An example for a hiyal-based practice is the investment department 
confirming to a Shari’a Supervisory Board that no legal powers were granted to the 
Islamic bank over the conventional special purpose vehicle. However, it was later 
revealed in an audit report that the investment team knowingly obtained legal powers 
to control the conventional special purpose vehicle, prior to providing the 
confirmation to the Shari’a Supervisory Board. Multiple similar scenarios exist, and 
therefore may indicate a sort of an abuse of special purpose vehicles in the industry. 
Below summarises the interviewee perceptions regarding this matter: 
 
Islamic Banks obtaining Conventional Loans through Special Purpose Vehicles 
(Per Islamic Bank) 
 
Figure 30 Islamic banks obtaining conventional financing(s) through SPVs: Per Bank 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 This is because a tenth Islamic bank was solely a retail bank that did not engage in investment activities. Also, 
this excludes the regulator and Islamic infrastructure organisations.	  52	  The exception was an Islamic retail bank who invests locally using depositor funds, which is comparatively a 
rare or unique investment model	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Regarding the genuine practices, this means that no evidence for abuse existed in 
structuring and executing a special purpose vehicle transaction. This means that the 
Islamic bank had transparently conveyed to the Shari’a Supervisory Board their 
structures and information, and obtained an approval prior to executing the 
transaction. This indicated that no misleading practices were taking place and 
therefore was considered genuine. However, a considerably major finding revealed 
when analysing documents throughout the interview process, was that most, if not all, 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards stipulated necessary conditions for the special purpose 
vehicle transaction to be Shari’a compliant. These conditions partially included the 
Islamic bank not paying for the establishment costs, not having control (while other 
resolutions indicated not having ‘legal’ control), not manage, nor influence the 
conventional special purpose vehicle. The considerable major finding relates to the 
reality that most of these Islamic banks negate at least one of these conditions to 
sustain the transaction as Shari’a compliant. A number of interviewees provided 
documented evidence that openly displayed how Islamic banks, in reality and most 
commonly, do control these separately created special purpose entities. An example 
of the documented evidence was that the special purpose vehicles would not pursue 
an action without receiving a written request from the Islamic bank. 
 
The researcher asked an interviewee who represented an Islamic infrastructure 
organisation for his thoughts on this issue, who mentioned:  
 
“If it’s haram (prohibited) to take conventional loan financing, then if an SPV 
takes a conventional financing it doesn’t change the (Islamic) ruling. This is 
tahayul (engaging in legal stratagems). It’s haram (prohibited) to take 
conventional financing whether directly or through SPVs, because there is no 
dharūra (necessity). For example, the country will not fall if they don’t take 
conventional financing” – General Secretary, Islamic Infrastructure 
Organization  
 
Lastly, when an elite interviewee, a senior Shari’a scholar, was asked if conventional 
financings existed within Islamic special purpose vehicle structures, his response was: 
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“Yes. There are conventional financings within a structure where Islamic banks 
are included as investors, but it happens with conditions. For Example:	  
Ø The Islamic bank can’t give the SPV a tawarruq, in order for the SPV to 
lend a conventional loan. But the opposite is okay, because sometimes, 
Islamic banks are in need (necessity) of liquidity. The only exception to 
this is with the big banks, such as H.S.B.C., who are not in need of us but 
we are in need of them, we can invest with them this way.  
Ø Each Shari’a Supervisory Board (of the Islamic bank) checks, if this 
(submitted structure) is a genuine investment, or hila wadhiha (clear legal 
stratagems to engage in prohibited activities)? 
Ø Also, the [Islamic] bank can’t pay for the SPV’s establishment, it doesn’t 
have Board seats, no management, no decision, nothing. They may only 
have an observing member in the Board with veto power to protect the 
banks rights. 
… I saw an Islamic bank that gave a tawarruq to an SPV established by an 
external party. Then that SPV bought a conventional debt from a conventional 
bank that was owned by a different SPV - No that never happened - but I saw 
it? - Not in any of the banks I’ve seen…” – Shari’a Scholar 
 
The second condition mentioned above indicates that Shari’a Supervisory Boards 
may be aware that hila (legal stratagem) practices may exist. It also suggests that a 
number of Shari’a Supervisory Boards may consider the possibility of hiyal (legal 
stratagems) prior to issuing a fatwa (Shari’a legal opinion).  	  
6.2.4 Accounting of Special Purpose Vehicles	  
 
Nine out of thirty-five interviewees responded to the question regarding the 
accounting treatment of special purpose vehicles by Islamic banks. Two interviewees 
mentioned that special purpose vehicle have an “off-balance sheet treatment”, similar 
to statements made by Amoruso and Duchac (2014) and Gorton and Souleles (2007).  
Another two interviewees indicated that special purpose vehicle assets were fully 
consolidated with the Islamic banks financials. A fifth interviewee indicated that 
special purpose vehicles have their own independent financials, accountants, and 
auditors.  
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The remaining four interviewees provided a more detailed response explaining that 
the accounting treatment of special purpose vehicles is dependent on several factors, 
thereafter concluding whether the special purpose vehicle financials should be 
consolidated with the Banks financials or not. These factors include the Islamic 
banks: (1) percentage of ownership in the special purpose vehicle (2) Banks 
representatives as members of the board of directors in the special purpose vehicle (3) 
Banks influence (or veto power) over the special purpose vehicle, and (4) Ability or 
control over the special purpose vehicles management. Depending on these factors, 
the special purpose vehicle will either be consolidated with the Islamic bank or not. 
The higher the ownership, board seats, influence, or power the bank has over a special 
purpose vehicle, the more likely it will be consolidated, and vice versa.  
 
6.2.5 Difference between Islamic and Conventional Banks Practice towards 
Special Purpose Vehicle	  
 
When asked what the difference was between Islamic banking practices with special 
purpose vehicles and conventional banking practices, fifteen out of thirty-five 
interviewees did not answer the question because they either did not know the answer, 
abstained from answering, or the question was not applicable to them. 	  
Out of the remaining twenty interviewees, twelve responded explaining that the 
concept of special purpose vehicles with Islamic banks, including its advantages and 
disadvantages, does not differ from conventional banks, except for the Shari’a aspect 
of the transaction. Conventional banks use special purpose vehicles to benefit from 
the entire benefits special purpose vehicles offer, with the exception of Shari’a 
compliance. Two out of these twelve interviewees reiterated that the difference is in 
the Articles of Association (AOA) of the special purpose vehicle, where adhering to 
Shari’a rules and principles is a requirement in the establishing documents of the 
Islamic banks established special purpose vehicle. 
 
Four out of twenty interviewees explained that Islamic banking practices does not 
differ from conventional banking practices, where they both largely engage in 
interest-based activities. The only difference is that an Islamic bank establishes a 
special purpose vehicle to engage in the conventional aspect of the transaction. Two 
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of the four interviewees mentioned this as obviously being misleading, a hila (legal 
stratagem) to engage in a prohibited activity, while one explained that this is done 
because no Islamic financing is available in certain jurisdictions. The following 
quotes are examples: 
 
“Islamic banks and conventional banks is exactly the same. However, Islamic 
banks always add more steps to a transaction. For example, if the conventional 
bank goes from A to B, the Islamic bank will go from A to Z to C to B” – 
Islamic Bank Investment Manager 
  
“It’s only different when Islamic banks want to play around – Shari’a Manager 
 
It may be beneficial to note that both of the above are quotations from full-time 
practitioners. When senior Shari’a scholars who serve on Shari’a Supervisory Boards 
were asked the same question, they had an opposite view as displayed below:  
 
“It is not at all the same. Islamic banks follow Shari’a (Islamic law) principles 
by mandate and order in the annual general meeting (AGM).” - Shari’a Scholar  
  
“It is not the same. Islamic banks do not want to have any sort of relationship 
with the interest-bearing loans in the transactions.” - Shari’a Scholar  
 
There seems to be a difference of opinion between practitioners and Shari’a 
Supervisory Board members regarding this issue. The above quotes suggest that 
Shari’a scholars are convinced that there is a major difference between Islamic 
special purpose vehicle transactions and conventional special purpose vehicle 
structures. Their main point of argument is that even though both structures may 
include interest-bearing transactions, the Islamic structure completely legally 
segregates the Islamic bank from the prohibited activities. The practitioners on the 
other hand, find so much similarities and resemblance that they believe investment 
teams may only alter the structure slightly to make it seem Shari’a compliant. Is there 
a misunderstanding on behalf of the practitioners or Shari’a scholars? Or is it the 
same practice with different views or opinions?  
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Another considerably significant point to be addressed is the separation between 
Islamic banks and the conventional special purpose vehicles in a single structure that 
Shari’a scholars usually refer to. It seems that this separation may solely refer to a 
legal separation, which raises the following question: according to Shari’a (Islamic 
law), is an Islamic bank allowed to initiate the establishment of a special purpose 
vehicle that engages in prohibited transactions or activities, if it was solely a 
beneficiary and did not legally own the special purpose vehicle? Is it solely the legal 
aspect the Shari’a Supervisory Boards are concerned with? Or are there other rules or 
concerns?  
 
Later in this chapter, section 6.4 analyses responses obtained from Shari’a 
Supervisory Board interviewees who were asked these types of questions. Therefore, 
details of the conditions for approving Islamic special purpose vehicle structures with 
prohibited activities are displayed in more detail in section 6.4. 
 
6.2.6 Difference between Special Purpose Vehicle practices in the Islamic 
Banking Industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain relative to the 
International Islamic Banking Industry	  
 
When asked about the differences between special purpose vehicle practices in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain’s Islamic banking industry relative to the international Islamic 
finance industry, twenty out of thirty-five interviewees either: (1) Did not know the 
answer, (2) could not judge, (3) or the question was not applicable to them.  
 
Fourteen of the remaining fifteen interviewees mentioned that the special purpose 
vehicle practices were either the same, or almost the same. Three of them indicated 
that the differences that exist are due to local laws, while one added that Islamic 
banks out of the Kingdom of Bahrain will try to engage in hiyal (legal stratagems or 
ruse) differently due to the local law of the Islamic bank. One of the thirteen 
interviewees also mentioned that the only difference he has witnessed is the choice of 
jurisdiction, “for example, an Islamic bank in Malaysia may prefer to establish a 
special purpose vehicle in Langkawi53 rather than the Cayman islands”. The below 
figure illustrates this matter: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Langkawi is an archipelago made up of 99 islands on the west coast of Malaysia (Langkawi-Info, 2016).	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Figure 31 Difference between Bahraini and international SPV practices  	  
As witnessed above, the majority of Islamic banking practitioners in the Kingdom of 
Bahrain are either not aware or not in a position to judge whether the international 
Islamic banking special purpose vehicle practice is similar or different than that of the 
Islamic banking industry of the Kingdom of Bahrain. This may indicate a limitation 
on conducting interviews as a data collection method when using a single case study 
design as a methodology. 
6.2.7 Summary of Industry Feedback: Special Purpose Vehicle Practices	  	  
The industry feedback obtained from interviewees indicates that the majority of 
Islamic banks that engage in investment transactions use special purpose vehicles in 
their investment transactions. On the other hand, Islamic banking retail activities do 
not require special purpose vehicles. Out of the 31 interviewees who represented 
Islamic banks that use special purpose vehicles in their investment transactions, 
90.3%54 indicated that special purpose vehicles are used in around 90% - 100% of 
their investment transactions. These figures indicate that the practice of using special 
purpose vehicles in Islamic investment transactions may be widely spread.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 28 / 31 = 0.903 x 100 = 90.3% 
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Different reasons were obtained from interviewees relating to the reason(s) for why 
special purpose vehicles are used in Islamic investment transactions. These include 
creating a desired shareholding structure, risk management, limiting the liability of a 
bank, creating what is known as a bankruptcy-remote structure, taxation benefits, 
Shari’a compliance reasons, meeting regulatory requirements, amongst others. The 
reasons mentioned by interviewees were similar to those mentioned in the review of 
literature, except that the empirical work was linked to the case study jurisdiction 
(Kingdom of Bahrain), and Shari’a compliance as a reason was not mentioned the 
literature probably due to the fact that most of the literature relating to special purpose 
vehicles are from a conventional viewpoint. Minimal literature relating to special 
purpose vehicles in Islamic banking and the reasons for them being established were 
located.  
 
The diversity of the interviewees proved beneficial since similarities in answers 
indicated a common understanding amongst different positions and sectors within the 
Islamic banking industry, while differences indicated that specific positions had 
similar understandings that were contrary to other positions (e.g. Investment 
managers’ understanding differed from Shari’a scholars). It appears that the nature 
and type of a position of an individual may impact his/her understanding and 
formulated his/her perceptions. Limitations may have existed since biasness may have 
existed and, by using a single case study design as a methodology, the majority of 
interviewees have similar backgrounds or experiences where responses may have 
lacked diversifications in some aspects.  
 
Twenty-four interviewees that represented eight banks indicated that the Islamic 
banks they represent obtain conventional financings through special purpose vehicles. 
The answers relating to the reasons for why this practice exists varied. The interview 
analysis summarises that out of these eight Islamic banks, the interviewee responses 
tend to reveal that five of the Islamic banks engage in this sort of practice out of 
genuine causes, while the other three Islamic banks engage in hiyal (legal stratagems) 
to engage in prohibited activities and obtain conventional financings through the use 
of special purpose vehicles. These hiyal-based practices include investment teams not 
being fully transparent with the banks Shari’a body, in order to try and obtain a 
Shari’a approval for a special purpose vehicle structure that does not reflect the 
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reality underlying the transaction. Another hiyal-based practice witnessed includes the 
investment team obtaining an approval for a special purpose vehicle structure, 
thereafter changing the structure after the transaction has been executed and seeking a 
second Shari’a approval from the Shari’a Supervisory Board explaining that this 
alteration was out of necessity – while the whole process of these two approvals was 
pre-planned prior to the first approval. This was revealed by an Islamic investment 
manager who works as part of the investment team of an Islamic investment bank. 
Also, another considerable finding revealed in this chapter is that in reality, most 
Islamic banks, including those considered to have genuinely engaged in special 
purpose vehicle transactions, may have been commonly negating at least one major 
condition stipulated by their Shari’a Supervisory Board to sustain the transaction as 
Shari’a compliant.  
 
It is unclear whether the Shari’a Supervisory Boards are unaware of the misleading 
practices, or are aware but report them internally. What may be suggested is that 
generally, Shari’a Supervisory Boards are not aware of these violations unless 
informed by the full-time in house internal Shari’a reviewers. This indicates a heavy 
and significant responsibility on the role and positions of internal Shari’a reviewers, 
especially in relation to the overall Shari’a compliance of Islamic banks. Yet, 
evidence suggested that a considerable number of internal Shari’a reviewers do not 
report such findings due to lack of awareness, lack of evidence, or management 
pressure. This may partially explain why Shari’a Supervisory Boards may not be 
officially and formally aware of hiyal (legal stratagems) practices taking place. 
Therefore, it may be important to further investigate if this crucial control function is 
properly protected? Who protects internal Shari’a reviewers? Is it the regulator or the 
backing of the Shari’a Supervisory Board? Can management influence internal 
Shari’a reviewers? Who decides whom to hire or whom to release from internal 
Shari’a review functions?  
 
The secondary data analysis in chapter seven addresses a number of the above 
questions by analysing regulatory consultations regarding conventional special 
purpose vehicle practices by Islamic banks and management control functions, 
including the internal Shari’a review function.  
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6.2.8 Shari’a Approval Structure 	  	  
The question of when the Islamic bank would submit a special purpose vehicle 
transaction to the Shari’a Supervisory Board for approval did not apply to fifteen out 
of thirty-five interviewees.55 The remaining twenty interviewees, without exception, 
all replied with almost identical answers. They explained that there are generally two 
phases of when the Shari’a Supervisory Board is exposed to a transaction: the initial 
stage, and the final stage.  
 
The initial stage is when the concept (i.e. through a concept paper), an idea, initial 
proposal, or initial memo is submitted to the in-house Shari’a auditor for review. 
After reviewing the documentation, the internal Shari’a reviewer submits the initial 
documentation either to the Shari’a Supervisory Board (or executive members of the 
Shari’a Supervisory Board) for initial approval. Thereafter, after formalising the 
documentation (transaction structure, private placement memorandums, contracts, 
etc.), they are submitted to the Shari’a Supervisory Board for final approval.  
 
Two of the twenty interviewees explained that although the Shari’a Supervisory 
Board approving a transaction in the initial and final stage is the policy of the bank, 
the reality is (1) Interviewee one: it is in the middle stages rather than the initial stages 
(2) Interviewee two: the investment department persists on not adhering to the process 
and are supported by the chief executive officer which “worsens” the actual process.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This is because: Three interviewees represented Islamic retail banks not engaging in special purpose vehicle 
transactions. Two interviewees represented Islamic infrastructure organizations. Three interviewees represented 
external law firms. One interview represented a sovereign investment company (not an Islamic bank). One 
interviewee represented a conventional wholesale bank. One interviewee was a Board member and therefore this 
question is applicable to on-the-job practitioners. Two interviewees represented the regulator. Two Shari’a 
scholars are aware of when the transaction is revealed to them, but are not necessarily aware when the initial 
investment concept was initiated in the Islamic bank.  	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When is the Shari’a Supervisory Board (or SSB) exposed to a (SPV) structure 
or a transaction, and when do they approve/disapprove it? 
 
 
Figure 32 Shari'a approval structure  
 
One interviewee, who was a former chief executive officer of an Islamic investment 
bank, stated:  
 
“I wanted to see the Shari’a comments from the beginning…I did not even ask 
for commercial comments. I was keen to get a solution from the start. If it was 
doable, we went ahead. If not, we killed it right there and then [in the initial 
stage]”. – Former Chief Executive Officer 
 
The adoption of this sort of model where the chief executive officer is keen on 
obtaining a solution from the start annihilates the possibility of future complications 
or disputes (i.e. between the investment and Shari’a departments). This may also be 
indicatively evident since another interviewee revealed that a chief executive of an 
Islamic bank who did not adopt a similar method (who secretively supported the 
investment team to exhort pressure on the internal Shari’a reviewer to obtain 
approvals on non-Shari’a compliant structures) led to a situation where the chief 
executive officer was almost removed from his job due to mismanagement. This is 
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because this mismanagement led the bank to falling into a dilemma. The interviewee 
who discussed this matter explained that:  
 
“Imagine, the sole reason for these unneeded events where the CEO stressed 
himself was only because he was persistent on supporting investment [the 
investment team] to deceive the Shari’a board and ‘bully’ the Shari’a auditor”. 
– Islamic Bank Manager 
 
Chief executive officers may need to take internal Shari’a matters seriously, who 
otherwise may find themselves in loopholes needing to utilise their time in rectifying 
approval processes and other operational work that may have been accomplished by 
subordinate employees. This as a result may also lead to ineffective management that 
may negatively affect the management capabilities of these chief executive officers.  
Regulators may also need to take these matters seriously, by implementing programs 
to educate chief executive officers of Islamic banks regarding these crucial Shari’a 
and corporate governance requirements that may not necessary exist in conventional 
banks. This is mainly due to the fact that the chief executive officer is the ultimate 
decision maker in an Islamic bank, who has the ultimate internal responsibility. The 
lack of a proficient chief executive officer may place the Islamic bank in unwanted 
situations. Also, if numerous Islamic banks were mismanaged, this would affect the 
industry in terms of practice and reputation, which may place the authenticity and 
Islamic banking industry at risk.  
  
6.2.9 Non-Existence of a Shari’a-Approved Islamic Special Purpose Vehicle 
“Mother-Structure”	  	  
The question of whether an “Islamic SPV mother-structure” exists did not apply to 
fifteen interviewees, either because the question is related to an approval process and 
they were not full-time employees, or because they represent retail banks with no 
investment transactions.  
 
Out of the remaining twenty interviewees who responded to this question, eighteen 
replied that a special purpose vehicle mother structure does not exist, and that the 
Shari’a approval for special purpose vehicle transactions was on a case-by-case basis. 
	   157 
Two of the eighteen interviewees added that they believe a special purpose vehicle 
mother structure should exist.  
 
“For an SPV, new or existing, the approvals are on a case-by-case basis. The 
SSB (Shari’a supervisory board) must approve. Because there was major SPV 
abuses… For example, the Bank fully owned an SPV that gave a conventional 
loan to a (country) company. It is very difficult to follow SPVs because [they 
are] large in quantity. But then after [these] SPV abuses the SSB (Shari’a 
Supervisory Board) required all SPV (and wakala) transactions to be on a case-
by-case basis in a written resolution” – Shari’a Manager 
 
“It’s [the approvals for SPVs] a case-by-case basis, but I believe there should be 
a mother structure. Anyway…” – Islamic Bank Manager 
 
“It’s on a case-by-case basis. The mother structures only exist for murābaha 
transactions, not SPVs.” – Shari’a Scholar 	  
 
On the other hand, the two interviewees who mentioned that a mother structure did 
exist, explained that the in house Shari’a auditor would have to verify the structure 
prior to the transaction, and the Shari’a Supervisory Board would be notified after the 
transaction takes place. The below diagram illustrates these responses: 
 
 
Figure 33 Interviewee responses on whether a Shari'a-approved mother structure exists 
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6.2.10 Perceptions of Regulatory Circular regarding Shari’a Compliance and 
Special Purpose Vehicle  	  
This research started with a quote from a Central Bank circular stating: “Following a 
round table discussion with the Waqf Fund involving several notable Shari’a scholars, 
it was observed that some SPVs associated with locally incorporated Islamic banks 
were not subject to Shari’a compliance review which has resulted in some SPVs to 
undertake activities that were not Shari’a compliant, or at least their activities had not 
been reviewed as Shari’a compliant.” (CBB Circular, 2013). This circular was issued 
in order to circulate a consultation paper to review possible amendments to the 
regulatory rules relating to special purpose vehicles. It is analysed in more detail as 
secondary data analysis in chapter seven.  
 
Interviewees were asked what they thought of the circular extract. Eleven 
interviewees agreed with the statement and mentioned that the regulatory behaviour, 
indicating that this is part of the duties and responsibilities of the regulator, which is 
protecting stakeholders. The quotation below is an example: 
 
“[The] CBB[‘s action] is perfect. The problem is with managements. The 
Shari’a supervisory boards gave them a solution (to use SPVs when necessary), 
but managements started to abuse them (SPVs). So this (Shari’a Supervisory 
Boards solution) opened the door for managements to [be able to] abuse them 
(SPVs). The CBB is excellent for having done this” – Shari’a Manager 
 
Two interviewees however mentioned that this action comes quite late, shown below: 
 
“They’re (Central Bank of Bahrain) late, but being late is better than doing 
nothing” - Compliance Officer  
 
One of the interviewees elaborated, stating that the regulator changing a regulatory 
rules relating to wrongful Shari’a practices may not be sufficient. Rather, the 
regulator qualifying these types of amendments by allowing the Central Shari’a 
Board to comment on Shari’a matters would give it more credibility, as witnessed 
below:  
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“The CBB (Central Bank of Bahrain) is a regulator, if they see wrong 
implementations, they act. But changing the rulebook is not enough. The change 
must come as a direction from the Central Shari’a Board… But initiatives are 
being taken to establish a Central Shari’a Board and the rulebook change is 
clear - Yes, but you must qualify it with the Central Shari’a Board” – Shari’a 
Scholar  	  
6.3 Opinions of Chief Executive Officers 	  
The opinions of chief executive officers reflect the responses obtained from the third 
segment of interviews.  	  
“First, we took [the] investment structure from the lawyers, they [the lawyers] 
said the IDB [Islamic Development Bank] used this, it was approved by their 
[Shari’a] board, including [Name of Shari’a Supervisory Board member of the 
Islamic Development Bank] and the rest… it all turned out to be wrong [the 
structure was not Shari’a compliant]. – Chief Executive Officer 
 
During the analysis stages of the research, it was analysed that a common reason for 
Islamic banks falling into erroneous or non-Shari’a compliant transactions is due to 
them listening to lawyers, who confirm that the same structure was approved by 
another Islamic bank of banks. The following issues arise: 
 
1. The lawyers are not aware of the specific details or conditions set out by the 
Shari’a Supervisory Board for approving a structure and transaction. An 
approved structure by one Islamic bank may be completely non-Shari’a 
compliant with another Islamic bank due to the details involved. The lawyers are 
not aware of this yet continue to provide Islamic banks with structures approved 
by other Islamic banks. For example and as displayed previously, an Islamic 
special purpose vehicle structure may include special purpose vehicles not legally 
owned by the Islamic bank that continuously engages in prohibited transactions 
or activities. This structure may be approved by one Shari’a Supervisory Board, 
because as a result of the conditions set out by the Shari’a Supervisory Board for 
this structure, the Shari’a Supervisory Board were provided evidential assurances 
that not only was the Islamic bank legally separated from the conventional 
	   160 
special purpose vehicles, but rather the Islamic bank had no indirect control, legal 
control, proxies, or any type influence on the conventional special purpose 
vehicles that engage in prohibited activities.  
 
The law firm involved in this transaction would then be appointed by another 
Islamic bank. As a result, the law firm would provide the new client (Islamic 
bank) with the same structure, explaining that the Shari’a Supervisory Board of 
another Islamic bank approved it. This new Islamic bank would adopt this 
structure; replicate it, which would violate all the conditions set out by the 
Shari’a Supervisory Board of the previous bank. Therefore, two identical 
structures had the opposite Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings. Minimally, this new 
Islamic bank would have legal control and influence on the conventional special 
purpose vehicles that engage in prohibited transactions, which violates Shari’a 
(Islamic law). The next point discusses that part of the problem, was Islamic 
banks depending on other Shari’a Supervisory Boards rather than their own.  
 
2. There were Islamic banks that executed a transaction based on the Shari’a 
approval of a Shari’a Supervisory Board of another Islamic bank. The Islamic 
investment managers revealed these structures to their Shari’a Supervisory Board 
after executing the transaction. According to an interviewee, and the annual 
reports of the Islamic bank the interviewee was referring to, at least one Islamic 
bank remained in a dilemma for five years trying to exit the investment due to it 
not being Shari’a compliant and simultaneously non-profitable.  
 
A concept that seems to be difficult to understand may actually be very simplistic in 
nature. In order for Islamic investment managers to execute a transaction, they need 
the opinion and approval of their Shari’a Supervisory Board. As discussed in section 
6.2.9, special purpose vehicle structures/transactions need to be approved by Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards on a case-by-case basis. For some reason and according to a chief 
executive officer, many Islamic investment managers fail to realise this. Another 
possibility is that it may be intentional. This leads to clashes between the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board and managements.  
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“Who told you? When I first became CEO of this bank, there were 4 or 5 
aircrafts with conventional financings. When I first asked the investment team 
to start obtaining Islamic financings, they explained to me that the jurisdiction 
does not offer Islamic financings, and it was difficult to take Islamic financings. 
When I asked them [external financing party], it happened [external financing 
part started offering Islamic financing], keeping in mind that the party providing 
the finance is a Canadian company who may not have previously provided 
Islamic financings. Go to [employee name] and he’ll show you all the papers” - 
Chief Executive Officer 
 
Whether an Islamic bank indirectly obtains conventional financings through special 
purpose vehicles, rather than obtain available Islamic financings may be dependent on 
the chief executive officer (CEO). As the ultimate decision maker within an 
organisation, the chief executive officer may instruct the investment team to find 
viable Islamic financing solutions. The researcher has witnessed an Islamic financial 
institution where the chief executive officer needed to retain the investment team (for 
certain purposes), and therefore may have been weak in terms of being the ultimate 
power or decision maker within the Islamic bank. When it came to the investment 
team not wanting to convert conventional financings to Islamic ones, the chief 
executive officer exhorted effort not to obtain Islamic financings and obtain 
conventional financings through special purposes vehicles. The amount of debates 
and arguments exhorted by the chief executive officer with the Shari’a Supervisory 
Board (that consisted of well-versed professors and scholars), trying to convince them 
that a certain special purpose vehicle (discreetly controlled by the Islamic bank) 
transaction with conventional financings should be deemed Shari’a compliant, raises 
questions about the roles or influence that chief executive officers may have on 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards and their fatwas (Shari’a legal opinions). In this regard, 
Shakir Ullah (2012) conducted a study regarding a hidden struggle between Islamic 
banking managers (which includes chief executive officers) and Shari’a managers 
(which includes Shari’a Supervisory Boards), suggesting that both may influence 
each other at times using certain methods. Shakir Ullah (2012) explains that Shari’a 
scholars want to issue rulings to attain the highest level of Shari’a compliance, while 
management want to influence the fatwas (Shari’a legal opinions) of the Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards to suit the business interests of the Islamic bank. But why do 
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managements influence Shari’a Supervisory Board decisions? Shari’a Supervisory 
Boards should have authoritative powers to exercise their rights and issuing opinions 
based on Shari’a (Islamic law) without the influence of management. More 
importantly, how do managements influence Shari’a Supervisory Boards? Does their 
compensation play a role in this regard? Shakir Ullah (2012) mentions that: 
 
“…there are minor chances that Shari’a scholars would actually compromise on 
Shari’a compliance purely for their personal gains because of their strong 
sensitivity to eternal pressure. The majority of the Shari’a scholars are 
committed to the development of the industry and presenting it as an alternative 
to the conventional banking system so some of them work for Islamic banks 
even without compensation” (Shakir Ullah, 2012, p.69-70).  
 
6.4 Opinions of Shari’a Supervisory Board Members 	  
 
The opinions of Shari’a Supervisory Board members reflect the responses obtained 
from the third segment of interviews.  
 
As discussed in section 6.2.5, a main question to be asked is whether an Islamic bank 
obtaining or providing conventional loans through separate legal entities, such as 
special purpose vehicles, was Shari’a compliant or not. Although the opinions of 
Shari’a scholars were almost unanimous and similar in nature, below are three 
detailed opinions of three Shari’a scholars pertaining to this matter (in order to 
understand the nature of their opinions): 
 
Shari’a Scholar One: If, within an Islamic investment structure, a special purpose 
vehicle exists and engages in interest-based activities, then it may be acceptable if: 
 
a) The Islamic bank is legally separated from the special purpose vehicle 
b) The Islamic bank may not legally control the special purpose vehicle 
c) The Islamic bank does not pay for the establishment costs of the special 
purpose vehicle 
d) The Islamic bank does not contribute to the capital of the special purpose 
vehicle 
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e) The Islamic bank does not have any sort of control56 over the special purpose 
vehicle 
f) The Islamic bank may not manage the special purpose vehicle in any way 
 
In other words, if the special purpose vehicle was actually owned by an external 
party, rather than legally structured in such a manner for hiyal (legal stratagems) 
purposes, then the Islamic bank literally has nothing to do with the special purpose 
vehicle.  
 
Shari’a Scholar Two: If, within an Islamic investment structure, a special purpose 
vehicle exists and engages in interest-based activities, then it may be acceptable if: 
 
a) The Islamic bank actually does not own the special purpose vehicle 
b) The Islamic bank actually did not pay for the establishment of the special 
purpose vehicle 
c) There are no legal documents indicating that special purpose vehicle is linked 
to the Islamic bank by forms of power, control, ownership, and name.   
 
Shari’a Scholar Three: If, within an Islamic investment structure, a special purpose 
vehicle exists and engages in interest-based activities, then it may be acceptable if: 
 
a) The special purpose vehicle has an actual physical presence 
b) The Islamic bank may not request the establishment of a special purpose 
vehicle (or any entity) to engage in riba-based transactions, even if the Islamic 
bank does not own the special purpose vehicle or control it.  
c) The Islamic bank may not manage the special purpose vehicle in any form.  
d) The Islamic bank may not pay or be involved in the establishment of the 
special purpose vehicle.  
 
All responses obtained from Shari’a scholars were similar to the above opinions. This 
indicates that this opinion may be common amongst Shari’a scholars. Furthermore, 
although not conducted through official interviews or included within the study, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For the term “control” the Shari’a scholar used an Arabic term, called “saytara”, which the researcher translated 
as control.  
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above opinions were further verified by at least twelve other Shari’a scholars serving 
on numerous Shari’a Supervisory Boards of Islamic banks, central banks, and 
international Islamic infrastructure organisations. It appears that there may be an 
ijma’ (consensus) relating to the essence of the above opinions by Shari’a scholars 
pertaining to special purpose vehicles. It would be useful to pose this question to the 
Shari’a scholars at Majma’ Al-Fiqh (International Islamic Fiqh Academy) to obtain a 
Shari’a ruling on this issue on an institutional level, which may also determine 
whether an ijma’ (consensus) exists relating to the essence of the above opinions, and 
if not, to find out what the other opinions are. 
 
As witnessed in the above Shari’a scholar opinions, common traits exist between all 
Shari’a scholar conditions for a special purpose vehicle transaction to be Shari’a 
compliant. Firstly and as mentioned earlier, it appears that there may be an ijma’ 
(consensus) amongst Shari’a scholars that Islamic banks engaging in conventional 
loans indirectly through special purpose vehicles are prohibited in Shari’a (Islamic 
law). Minimally however, evidence tends to suggest the vast majority of Shari’a 
scholars believe that Islamic banks indirectly engaging in interest-based activities 
through special purpose vehicles are not Shari’a compliant. Second, all Shari’a 
scholar opinions indicate that if the special purpose vehicle was “actually” an external 
party, and not legally structured by the Islamic bank for hiyal (legal stratagem) 
purposes, then the activities of the special purpose vehicle does not affect the Shari’a 
compliance of the Islamic bank. However, if the special purpose vehicle was partly 
established, influenced, managed, or controlled by the Islamic bank, then it is not 
Shari’a compliant. Interestingly and probably more strictly, the third Shari’a scholar 
opinion above, a highly qualified Shari’a scholar, who serves on countless of Shari’a 
boards and acts as the Shari’a Board chairman of major Islamic infrastructure 
organisations, mentioned that it is prohibited for Islamic banks to even “request” 
external parties to establish entities or special purpose vehicles to engage in interest-
based activities. To emphasize, the condition was repeated three times by this scholar. 
This indicates that according to one of the most respected senior Shari’a scholars, it is 
strictly prohibited for an Islamic bank to solely “request” an external party to establish 
special purpose vehicles that engage in prohibited transactions such as interest-based 
activities. According to the same scholar, he mentions “Allah [God] curses the one 
who engages in riba?” - indicating, is it not obvious?  
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It was previously in section 6.3, that one of the misconceptions managements tend to 
have is that there is an approved “Islamic SPV structure with a conventional loan” as 
a mother structure, where such transactions do not need to be approved on a case-by-
case basis. This may be due to the excessive amount of executed special purpose 
vehicle transaction with conventional loans, where investment managers believed that 
this was an approved mother-structure. Although this may understandably be difficult 
for investment managers to understand, evidence tends to suggest that there is not an 
approved mother-structure that includes special purpose vehicles and conventional 
financings.  
 
However, according to one interviewee, this confusion seems to have spread out to a 
minority of Shari’a Supervisory Board members themselves. Due to the countless 
replications of the same structure, these members may have started to believe that if a 
special purpose vehicle were solely legally separated from the Islamic bank, it may 
engage in prohibited activities without affecting the permissibility of the transaction. 
Therefore, information relating to the Islamic bank requesting the establishment of 
these prohibited special purpose vehicles (and at times paying the establishment 
costs), amount of control, influence, or management, the Islamic bank has on the 
conventional special purpose vehicles may not have been asked for. The assumption 
of obtaining a structure that includes a “legally” separate entity may have inaccurately 
indicated there were no control-based relationships between the Islamic bank and 
conventional special purpose vehicles.  
 
Although, when details relating to establishment costs, managerial influences, or other 
Islamic banks indirect relationships with these conventional special purpose vehicles 
were revealed to these Shari’a scholars, none of them approved the slightest 
relationship between an Islamic bank and the conventional special purpose vehicle. 
The most lenient opinion given in this relationship regard was that the Islamic bank 
may have a representative on the board of directors of the conventional special 
purpose vehicle as an observer, without any control, say, or power. This was in order 
for the Islamic bank to be aware of the activities of the special purpose vehicles.  
 
 
	   166 
6.5 Conclusion	  	  
A total of forty-four interviewees were interviewed for this research. All interviews 
were face-to-face interviews. The interviewees included internal Shari’a reviewers, 
investment managers, compliance managers, Shari’a Supervisory Board members, 
chief executive officers, members of boards of directors, lawyers, the regulator, 
amongst others.  
 
According to the study conducted in this chapter, evidence tends to suggest that 
special purpose vehicles are used in almost 90% - 100% of Islamic investment 
transactions. Special purpose vehicles are used for a number of reasons, including 
designing the shareholder structure, creating bankruptcy-remote structures, limiting 
the liabilities of Islamic banks, taxation purposes, Shari’a compliance purposes, 
engaging in hiyal (legal stratagems) to ultimately engage in prohibited activities, or 
using special purpose vehicles as a makhraj (Shari’a solution to a current problem).  
 
A main challenge that exists within the Islamic banking industry may be the 
engagement of hiyal (legal stratagems) by investment managers, through special 
purpose vehicles, to ultimately engage in prohibited activities. Evidence tends to 
suggest that to a certain extent, some investment managers at Islamic banks engage in 
hiyal (legal stratagems) practices with Shari’a Supervisory Board members by 
structuring transactions in a manner portraying it as Shari’a compliant, by not 
revealing the reality underlying the structure and transaction process. The underlying 
reality of the structures and transactions reveals that some Islamic banks engage in 
interest-based transactions through special purpose vehicles by violating Shari’a 
conditions stipulated by Shari’a Supervisory Boards. The continuity of such actions, 
and the ability of its continuation, indicates that there may be a weakness within 
internal Shari’a reviewers in the Islamic banking industry. 
 
In support of this argument, many Shari’a Supervisory Board fatwas (legal opinion) 
and resolutions shown to the researcher during the course of the interview process 
revealed that Shari’a Supervisory Boards have approved structures and transactions 
that have not been executed in the same manner explained to the Shari’a Supervisory 
Board when their approval was sought. This may serve as a further indication that a 
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weakness exists within internal Shari’a reviewers in the Islamic banking industry, 
which needs to be strengthened. For example, many Islamic banks, whether having 
engaged in conventional financings through genuine or hiyal (legal stratagems) 
practices, have either: 
 
1. Some sort of control, whether legal or otherwise, over the conventional special 
purpose vehicle. 
2. Partly or fully paid for its establishment cost. 
3. Hidden proxies obtained by the Islamic bank from the special purpose vehicle 
providing them full control.  
4. Fully or partly manage the special purpose vehicle. 
5. Influence the special purpose vehicle, for example, through board 
representatives. 
6. Negotiate conventional deals on behalf of the separately legal special purpose 
vehicle.  
7. Requested an external part to establish the special purpose vehicle (this was 
not acceptable to only one Shari’a scholar, however many of the Islamic 
banks he represents have requested external parties to establish special 
purpose vehicles to engage in interest-based activities).  
8. Some or all of the above 
 
Although Shari’a Supervisory Boards issued fatwas (Shari’a legal opinions) 
approving many special purpose vehicle structures that include conventional 
financings, evidence tends to suggest that the information they based their opinions on 
may not be totally accurate. Also, many Islamic banks commonly violate at least one 
necessary condition placed by these Shari’a boards to sustain the transaction as 
Shari’a compliant. Based on this information, it appears that many Shari’a 
Supervisory Board fatwas (Shari’a legal opinions) relating to special purpose vehicle 
transactions may need to be revised, in order to address loopholes that may have 
enabled investment managers to exploit or take advantage of. Minimally, Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards and the regulator may want to consider new methodologies to 
strengthen and protect internal Shari’a reviewers, since they are the main component 
responsible to conducting internal Shari’a audits and informing Shari’a Supervisory 
Boards of the realistic practices taking place.  
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7. Chapter Seven: Practice and Behaviour of the Islamic 
Banking Industry towards Special Purpose Vehicles 	  	  
The below figure highlights the position of chapter seven in light of the research 
outline:  
 
Figure 34 Chapter Seven Position 
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7.1 Introduction	  	  
Since this thesis aims to investigate the practice of special purpose vehicles within the 
Islamic banking industry, it was explained in the research methodology chapter that 
this would be done through the analysis of primary data, which was done in chapter 
six, and the analysis of secondary data, which is included in this chapter. The main 
selected secondary data used for analysis in this chapter are: 	  
1. Annual reports, which includes financial and Shari’a Supervisory Board annual 
reports. 
2. Publicised regulatory consultations with the Islamic banking industry, especially 
those relating to special purpose vehicle practices and Shari’a compliance.  3. A contemporary executed special purpose vehicle transaction structure executed 
by an Islamic bank, a structure that is widely used by Islamic banks. 	  
7.2 Special Purpose Vehicle usage by the Islamic Banking Industry	  	  
One of the key secondary data related to Islamic banks are the annual and financial 
reports. A review of secondary data for a sample of nine Islamic banks (displayed in 
Appendix V) revealed that all of these Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles, 
which indicated that the majority of Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles. In 
chapter six, the analysis of interviews also revealed that the majority of Islamic banks 
use special purpose vehicles in their investment transactions. Therefore, the results of 
both the primary and secondary data analysis are in conformity with each other. This 
may also support the notion that special purpose vehicles are widely spread in the 
Islamic banking industry, and are merely tools used in investment transactions.  
7.3 Behaviour of Shari’a Supervisory Boards towards Special Purpose 
Vehicle Abuse 	  	  
According to the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), Shari’a Supervisory Boards are required to issue an annual 
Shari’a Supervisory Board report (AAOIFI, 2015g). Shari’a Supervisory Board 
annual reports usually have a standard format, adhering to the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) requirements 
AAOIFI, 2015g). General statements are made in the report relating to their review 
and where necessary, specific statements are made by the Shari’a Supervisory Boards 
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if they feel the need to inform the shareholders regarding specific issues or 
transactions within an Islamic bank. Furthermore, most of the Shari’a audits 
conducted by the internal Shari’a review function result in the issuance of Shari’a 
audit reports that are circulated to the management and Shari’a Supervisory Board of 
the respective Islamic bank57. These reports remain confidential due to the sensitivity 
of the information, such as internal audit or any other internal report. Therefore, it 
may be imperative to note that detailed internal Shari’a audits would not generally be 
publicised.  
 
A review of Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports of nine Islamic banks 
evidences that Shari’a Supervisory Boards referring to specific special purpose 
vehicle transactions in their annual reports was minimal. However, since Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards may refer to specific transactions in its annual reports if they feel 
the need to do so, the Shari’a Supervisory Board of one Islamic bank in the Kingdom 
of Bahrain chose to reveal in its annual report that it did not deem a special purpose 
vehicle transaction(s) executed by the Islamic bank they represent to be Shari’a 
compliant. The Shari’a Supervisory Board annual report mentioned two points that 
the internal Shari’a audit of the bank revealed, one of them being the following: 
 
“…2. The Bank reviewed a ‘draft’ agreement between SPV’s and the 
conventional lenders without taking prior approval from Shari’a Board to 
review such agreements. The Shari’a Supervisory Board considered this to be a 
violation of its pronouncements in this regard and therefore requested that any 
profits on the financing be waived to regularize the matter which was agreed by 
the Bank’s Management.” (2013 Annual Report, Islamic Bank) 
 
In analysing the rhetoric in the above statement, since the Shari’a Supervisory Board 
considered the Islamic bank reviewing conventional agreements between special 
purpose vehicles and conventional lenders as a violation to its pronouncement, 
indicates that the Shari’a Supervisory Board had a pronouncement that included the 
prohibition of the Islamic bank reviewing these conventional agreements. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Shari’a Supervisory Board chose to reveal this in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The parties internal Shari’a audits are circulated to may differ depending on the policy and procedure of an 
Islamic bank. Regardless, internal Shari’a audit reports are confidential reports that are generally not publicised.  
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annual report rather than solely being mentioned in the internal Shari’a audit report 
reveals a sense of importance to the violation. According to the financial reports of 
this Islamic bank, the abovementioned violation refers to its aviation portfolio.  
 
The Shari’a Supervisory Board annual report further mentioned that this finding was 
revealed by the internal Shari’a audit function. Therefore and as suggested in chapter 
six, since the Shari’a Supervisory Board became aware of such violations from the 
internal Shari’a audit report(s), this reveals the significance of the internal Shari’a 
audit practice. The lack of efficient internal Shari’a auditing or control would not 
have revealed this point to the Shari’a Supervisory Board, where transparency may 
not have been practiced towards the Shari’a Supervisory Board. In turn, the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board may not have revealed the violation in its annual report that was 
publicised to shareholders. This may strengthen the argument that the internal Shari’a 
control function is key to adequate transparency for an Islamic bank. The lack of a 
strong internal Shari’a control function may weaken the bank in terms of Shari’a 
compliance, even if the bank has a superb Shari’a Supervisory Board. This is simply 
because the Shari’a body involved in the day-to-day transactions of an Islamic bank is 
the internal Shari’a control function under the guidance of the Shari’a Supervisory 
Board, rather than the Shari’a Supervisory Board itself.  
 
To reiterate, this analysis supports the suggestions claimed in chapter six, where the 
internal Shari’a audit control function may be a crucial and integral part of the 
Shari’a governance framework of an Islamic bank. An efficient internal Shari’a 
control framework is crucial in order for Shari’a Supervisory Boards to be aware of 
the banks activities and to issue efficient pronouncements reflect the underlying 
banking realities.  
 
Another evidence that may indicate the significance of the internal Shari’a control 
function is that the same Shari’a Supervisory Board reiterated in its annual report of 
the following two years (2014 and 2015), that the same non-Shari’a compliant 
activity had continued and therefore asked management to disclose it in the annual 
general meeting (AGM) to shareholders. This may suggest that the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board was aware of what transactions to specifically consider for review 
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due to the internal Shari’a audit report of the previous year. The statement mentioned 
by the Shari’a Supervisory Board in its 2014 and 2015 annual report is as follows: 
 
“An audit of the Bank’s activities brought attention to the continuation of the 
2013 Shari’a audit observation that the Bank renewed a conventional financing 
facility associated with leased aircrafts.” (2014 and 2015 Annual Report, 
Islamic Bank) 
 
The 2014 annual report of the Islamic bank also revealed that as a result of the 
aviation portfolio of the Islamic bank (in which the special purpose violations existed, 
according to the financial reports), the Islamic bank reported a loss of $52.3 million in 
the following year. This is evidenced in the statement of the chief executive officer 
when he stated “[Bank name] has reported a loss of $52.3 million (consolidated loss 
of $58.9 million) for the year ended 31st December 2014” (2014 Annual Report of the 
Islamic Bank), as well as the consolidated financial statements for the year ended 31 
December 2014. This evidences that despite the bank entering into non-Shari’a 
compliant special purpose vehicle violations as determined by the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board in its annual report, the bank nevertheless ended up encountering a 
massive loss. This implies that the conventional financings obtained were not 
necessarily needed, where the investment did not positively commercialize. Also, the 
investment did not protect the māl (wealth) of the shareholders, which means the 
transaction was against maqāsid al-shari’a (objectives of Islamic law) (Al-Ghazālï 
2008 and Al-Būtï 2009). 
 
Since evidence suggests that the abovementioned Islamic bank violated Shari’a 
(Islamic law), does this mean that this bank should not be considered Islamic? The 
researcher argues that the above evidences only prove the opposite. This is because, 
since Islamic banks are managed by humans (who by nature are creatures of error), 
the Shari’a governance framework installed enables the internal Shari’a reviewer to 
report similar observations, where the Shari’a Supervisory Boards are made aware 
and act/decide accordingly. In other words, if an Islamic bank were perfect, would it 
need an internal Shari’a reviewer or a Shari’a Supervisory Board? 
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The challenge may be those Islamic banks that have engaged in similar violations, but 
have not reported in internal Shari’a audit reports or Shari’a Supervisory Board 
annual reports. This is simply because these Islamic banks are able to repeatedly 
engage in similar violations without being spotted. Many reasons may exist pertaining 
to why similar violations are/were not reported. For example and as suggested in 
chapter six, the internal Shari’a reviewer may not be aware such violations, or may be 
subject to management pressure that makes it very difficult to report these types of 
observations.   
 
7.3.1 Comparing Industry Feedback and Shari’a Supervisory Board Annual 
Reports 	  
 
The evidence from the primary data analysis in chapter six indicates that out of eight 
Islamic banks that engage in conventional financings, five of them do so through 
genuine causes, while three Islamic banks use hiyal (legal stratagems and ruses) 
against the Shari’a body of the Islamic bank. However, the review of Shari’a 
Supervisory Board annual reports in this chapter reveals that only one Shari’a 
Supervisory Board mentioned special purpose vehicle violations in its annual report. 
The following summarises a number of possibilities for this finding:  
 
1. Shari’a Supervisory Boards are not aware of certain special purpose vehicle 
violations; or 
2. The violations were solely internally mentioned in internal Shari’a audit 
reports where the Shari’a Supervisory Board decided not to disclose such 
violations; or 
3. The violations were not spotted or not mentioned by the internal Shari’a 
function 
 
Regarding the third point above, it may be important to reiterate that evidence in 
chapter six suggested that a considerable amount of internal Shari’a reviewers may 
not officially report special purpose vehicle violations in internal Shari’a audit reports 
due to lack of awareness, lack of evidence, or management pressure. To elaborate on 
management pressure, if internal Shari’a reviewers do not feel protected, the freedom 
to conduct their jobs truthfully may be difficult since their jobs may be jeopardized. 
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The exception to this may be internal Shari’a reviewers who are willing to place the 
sincerity of conducting their jobs over their job interests. As the evidence in this 
chapter (along with chapter six) indicates the significance of internal Shari’a control 
functions, and that Shari’a Supervisory Boards are not aware of the Islamic banking 
practices except through these internal Shari’a control functions, the lack of 
protection for internal Shari’a reviewers may lead to weaknesses in the Islamic 
banking industry. The Central Bank and the Shari’a Supervisory Board may need to 
ensure that proper protections are in place to protect internal Shari’a reviewers.  
 
Imagine an internal Shari’a reviewer with a mortgage, being cornered into a situation 
where revealing a Shari’a audit finding may jeopardize his job. However, concealing 
the finding would protect his job.  Does this not suggest that managements may 
influence internal Shari’a audit observations if internal Shari’a reviewers feared the 
risk of losing their jobs? How many would actually risk their jobs to sustain Shari’a 
compliance? 
 
Since the evidence in chapter six suggests that a considerable number of internal 
Shari’a reviewers may not officially report special purpose vehicle violations in 
internal Shari’a audit reports, this may serve as a partial explanation as to why the 
mentioning of special purpose vehicle violations in Shari’a Supervisory Board annual 
reports may be minimal.  
 
7.4 Regulator Behaviour towards Special Purpose Vehicle Abuse	  	  
Numerical data relating to the amount of special purpose vehicles established by 
Islamic banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain published by the regulatory body in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain was not available during the course of the research. Secondary 
data relating to the regulatory behaviour towards special purpose vehicles may be 
witnessed through a circular proposing change to the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) 
Rulebook sections relating to special purpose vehicles. The below extract is from a 
circular circulated proposing the changes: 
 
“Following a round table discussion with the Waqf Fund involving several 
notable Shari’a scholars, it was observed that some SPVs associated with 
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locally incorporated Islamic banks were not subject to Shari’a compliance 
review which has resulted in some SPVs [special purpose vehicles] to undertake 
activities that were not Shari’a compliant, or at least their activities had not been 
reviewed as Shari’a compliant.58 
 
The suggestion was made that such SPVs [special purpose vehicles] should be 
monitored by the Shari’a Supervisory Board(s) of the concerned bank(s). This 
would provide reassurance to stakeholders in the concerned SPVs [special 
purpose vehicles] and banks that the principle of Shari’a compliance was being 
upheld by Bahraini banks in all of their activities and associated entities.  
 
As a result of the feedback presented at the meeting and in subsequent 
discussion and correspondence, the Central Bank of Bahrain is proposing 
changes to module PCD (Prudential Consolidation and Deduction 
Requirements)59 for Volume 260 of the CBB Rulebook61. Shari’a compliance is 
at the heart of Islamic banking and these proposals represent specific comments 
and thoughts on best practice relating to Shari’a. These changes should apply 
not only to new activities and SPVs [special purpose vehicles] but also to 
existing and legacy SPVs [special purpose vehicles] and their associated assets, 
liabilities, and transactions.  
 
[…] recipients should also address how to deal with transitional arrangements 
for existing SPVs [special purpose vehicles] which may not be fully compliant 
or which have not been reviewed for Shari’a compliance.” (CBB Circular, 
2013, p.1) 
 
Along with the interviewee responses analysed in chapter six, the first paragraph in 
the above circular further suggests that some special purpose vehicles associated with 
Islamic banks were undertaking activities that were not Shari’a compliant. 
Furthermore, after providing a suggestion, a statement read, “This would provide 
reassurance to stakeholders in the concerned SPVs [special purpose vehicles] and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 This paragraph extract was used in the introduction chapter and as part of the interview questions 
59 Although the circular mentions the PCD (Prudential Consolidation and Deduction Requirements), the finalized 
changes was later transferred (as of January 2016) to the BR (CBB Reporting Requirements) Module, (CBB, 
2016)	  
60 Volume 2 of the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) Rulebook is the volume related to Islamic banks. 
61 The CBB Rulebook is the set of regulatory rules banks (and financial institutions) in the Kingdom of Bahrain are 
obliged to abide by.	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banks that the principle of Shari’a compliance was being upheld by Bahraini banks in 
all of their activities and associated entities”. This implies that the behaviour of the 
Central Bank of Bahrain involves exhorting effort to reassure stakeholders of the 
Shari’a compliance authenticity of the special purpose vehicles, and that regulatory 
procedures are taking place. This may also indicate that the regulatory behaviour is 
that of a reacting one, where it approaches challenges by responding with action.  
 
The statement “Shari’a compliance is at the heart of Islamic banking…” suggests that 
the Bahraini regulator believes that Shari’a compliance should be upheld by banks 
claiming to be Islamic, or in other words, licensed Islamic banks. The fact that the 
circular was circulated, and effort was exhorted in proposing regulatory changes to 
special purpose vehicle practices by Islamic banks may confirm this point. However, 
many interviewees in the second segment of interviews in chapter six believed that 
although this action was a positive response by the regulator, it nevertheless comes at 
an excessively late timing.  
7.5 Islamic Banking Industry Reaction to Regulatory Changes	  
 
The Islamic industry feedback regarding special purpose vehicle Rulebook changes 
were obtained from the regulator and are analysed in this section. The analysis 
includes industry feedback obtained from five Islamic banks. 
 
According to the regulatory proposed changes (displayed in Appendix VI), it is 
evident that the regulatory behaviour is that which is concerned regarding the discrete 
nature of special purpose vehicles, by making it mandatory for Islamic banks to 
provide additional information, before the Central Bank could issue an approval to 
establish a special purpose vehicle. This additional information includes: 
 
“PCD-4.1.3 The CBB requires any locally incorporated bank associated with an 
SPV to confirm the following points in any request for approval under 
Paragraph PCD 4.1.2: 
(a) The purpose of the SPV; (b) The nature of the relationship between the bank 
and the SPV (e.g. originator, sponsor, manager, investor, controller etc.); (c) 
The bank management’s proposed consolidation/accounting treatment of the 
SPV in relation to the concerned bank both for PIR and audited financial 
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statements’ purposes and the bank should agree the treatment of the SPV with 
its external auditor and confirm the same to the CBB; (d) The availability of 
financial and other information relevant to the SPV and access to its business 
premises and records; and (e) Whether the bank is providing any guarantees, 
warranties or financial/liquidity support of any kind to the SPV. (f) That the 
Shari'a Supervisory Board of the Bank has approved the whole investment 
structure involving the use of the concerned SPV(s) and a written copy of such 
SSB approval must be submitted with the notification.” (CBB, 2014, p.1-3) 
 
The above also evidences the regulator proposing a requirement for Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards to issue an approval prior to issuing the regulatory approval. 
However, the researcher argues that with the a possible lack of a strong internal 
Shari’a control function, the Shari’a Supervisory Board approvals are easy to obtain 
through the use of hiyal (legal stratagems).  
 
As part of the feedback obtained regarding the abovementioned proposed change, an 
Islamic wholesale bank mentioned that:  
 
“It is not practical to acquire the SSB [Shari’a Supervisory Board] approval on 
the Structure & the use of the SPV and overlook the later practices or changes 
in the SPV, as some changes might have Sharia implications. The recommended 
rectification will condition acquiring the SSB approval on any changes that 
request CBB approval” (CBB, 2014, p.2-3).  
 
The impracticality of acquiring the Shari’a Supervisory Board approvals for future 
changes in executed special purpose vehicle transactions must be addressed, rather 
than relaxing the rule. During the interview analysis in chapter six (section 6.2.2.6), 
evidence tended to suggest that a minority of investment managers seek an approval 
by the Shari’a Supervisory Board for specific special purpose vehicle structures, with 
a hidden intention to alter the structure later on, which was revealed by an investment 
manager interviewee within the investment team. The reason why their actions were 
in such a way may probably be due to their prior knowledge that if their preferred 
structure were applied to the Shari’a Supervisory Board from the start, it would not 
have been approved due to obvious non-Shari’a compliant factors. However, the 
alteration of an already executed structure may be Shari’a-approved due to exceptions 
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or necessities to save the transaction from having major negative financial 
implications. This method may serve as one example of how hila (legal stratagem) 
may be practiced by Islamic banks.   
 
The second proposed change by the regulator was as follows:  
 
“PCD-4.1.3A In addition to the points noted in PCD-4.1.3 above, banks which 
are involved with SPVs in any of the relationships described in PCD-4.1.2 must 
not allow such SPVs to obtain any conventional financing to fund themselves or 
any transactions that they enter into. Shari'a compliance must be written into the 
memorandum and articles of association of such SPVs so that entry into 
structures or transactions that are not Shari'a compliant is ultra vires.” (CBB, 
2014, p.3-4) 
 
Another indication that the Bahraini regulator is keen to ensure Shari’a compliance 
may be since it directly stated that Islamic banks “must not allow such SPVs [special 
purpose vehicles] to obtain any conventional financing to fund themselves or any 
transactions that they enter into. Shari'a compliance must be written into the 
memorandum and articles of association of such SPVs so that entry into structures or 
transactions that are not Shari'a compliant is ultra vires” (CBB, 2014, p.3). One 
investment manager mentioned during an interview: “who are the CBB [Central Bank 
of Bahrain] to issue such a statement? We have a Shari’a board to tell us what is 
Shari’a compliant or not. They are interfering with the work [meaning duties] of the 
Shari’a board”. Although this statement may have been harshly expressed, it 
nevertheless may rightfully imply that the proposed changes (or any Shari’a related 
changes for that matter) for special purpose vehicles and Shari’a compliance must be 
qualified by the Central Shari’a Board, which did not exist during the consultation 
period, but was appointed in 2016.  
 
The regulator further proposed that the Shari’a Supervisory Board of the Islamic bank 
must monitor the ongoing Shari’a compliance of special purpose vehicles on a 
continuing basis, as displayed below:  
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“PCD-4.1.3C The Shari'a Supervisory Board of the Bank must monitor on an 
ongoing basis the Shari’a compliance of the SPVs and must oversee the 
conduct of the annual Shari'a compliance review of transactions, assets, 
liabilities and other commitments and relationships entered into by all SPVs 
with which the concerned bank is involved (by way of the relationships 
described in PCD 4.1.2 above). The Shari'a compliance function of the bank 
would be required to perform such reviews.” (CBB, 2014, p.4) 
 
However, some Islamic banks believe that such directives puts heavy responsibility 
and trust on Shari’a Supervisory Boards (CBB, 2014). Regarding the above proposed 
change, a bank noted that “the clause is putting heavy responsibility & Trust on the 
SSB, Such responsibility on the SSB and the Sharia function must be parallel to a 
sufficient power of & proper reporting system” (CBB, 2014, p.4).  	  
Although the publicised industry comments for the Islamic wholesale banking 
industry were specific comments relating to each draft directive, the regulator 
publicised both general and specific comments on the proposed CBB Rulebook 
changes for the Islamic retail banking industry (CBB, 2014a). An example of a 
general Islamic banking industry feedback is as follows:  
 
“A bank noted that they humbly submit that additional regulations imposed will 
put Islamic Banks operating in the Kingdom at a further disadvantage compared 
to their conventional peers. They are concerned that having to seek Shari’a 
Supervisory Board (“SSB”) approval on new SPVs prior to seeking CBB 
written approval will result in longer turnaround times leading to Islamic banks 
being less competitive in the market place. Therefore, they urge the CBB to 
consider providing conditional approval for establishing new SPVs parallel to 
obtaining SSB approval” (CBB, 2014a, p.1). 
 
The above statement indicates that the secondary data related to industry feedback 
and the interview analysis in chapter six is in conformity with each other. Both sets of 
feedback suggest that the Islamic banking industry expresses concern relating to 
additional Shari’a compliant regulations, where they believe places them in a 
disadvantageous situation relative to their conventional peers. Another Islamic bank 
held the view that existing regulatory rules sufficed, as displayed below: 
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“A bank noted that CBB is assured that it has adequate procedures in place to 
ensure Shari’a compliance in all its activities including establishing SPVs to 
hold Bank’s investments. While they recognize the need to uphold Shari’a 
compliance at all levels in the conduct of Islamic Banks, non-compliance may 
be the exception and not the rule. Therefore, they believe that currently there are 
sufficient regulations to govern Islamic banks and further regulation will only 
make the industry less competitive” (CBB, 2014a, p.2)  
 
An interesting point raised by this Islamic bank is that “non-compliance may be the 
exception and not the rule” (CBB, 2014a, p.2). This point is imperative to understand 
because; it implies that non-compliance, as a rule is obviously problematic. This 
research is concerned with these types of non-compliance, where it is as if non-
Shari’a compliance is a policy or procedure. Exceptions may exist in all arenas or 
industries. It may be suggested that the only way Islamic banks may continue to 
practice non-Shari’a compliance on a repetitive continuous basis is if its internal 
Shari’a control function does not report violations in its findings within internal 
Shari’a audit reports, or if their Shari’a Supervisory Boards are weak, or lastly, if 
managements simply do not listen or adhere to Shari’a requirements. Regarding the 
last possibility, management continuously ignoring Shari’a requests may only arise if 
the chief executive officer has either set a system in place that allows the practice to 
continue, or did not rectify an existing flaw that enables ignoring Shari’a 
requirements. This may indicate that the chief executive officer plays a significant 
role, and is partially responsible for maintaining Shari’a compliance, since the chief 
executive officer has the ultimate authority and power internally in an Islamic bank.  
 
As suggested in chapter six and earlier in this chapter, internal Shari’a reviewers may 
play a crucial role in attaining Shari’a compliance. This is because the Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards are not aware of violations except through the internal Shari’a 
reviewers. Also, since chapter six (section 6.3) and the analysis in this section 
highlights the crucial role of chief executive officers in maintaining Shari’a 
compliance as the ultimate authority or decision makers, it may be suggested that 
attaining and maintaining Shari’a compliance is a responsibility upon both the 
Shari’a body and senior managements. This suggestion may lead to the importance of 
understanding the relationship between Shari’a managers (Shari’a Supervisory 
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Boards and internal Shari’a reviewers) and managements. As suggested by Shakir 
Ullah (2012), a hidden struggle to maintaining Shari’a compliance already exists 
within Islamic banks between these two bodies, where the Shari’a body continuously 
tries to issue rulings to adhere with Shari’a (Islamic law), while managers exhort 
efforts to influence these Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings to meet their business 
objectives. But can management influence Shari’a Supervisory Board rulings? This 
re-raises a similar question posed in section 6.3, which was, how could managements 
influence Shari’a Supervisory Board rulings?  
7.6 Regulator Action to Protect Control Functions at Islamic Banks	  	  
The analysis of secondary data in previous sections emphasized on the significance of 
internal Shari’a control functions of Islamic banks. Therefore, the protection of 
persons in this (and other) control functions is thus vital. Regarding this topic, in 
2014, the Central Bank of Bahrain circulated a consultation paper for the banking 
industry proposing to require Islamic (and conventional) banks to obtain prior 
approval if they were to dismiss persons in control functions, such as internal audit, 
risk management, compliance, anti-money laundering, and Shari’a compliance (CBB, 
2014b). The following was the proposed rule: 
 
“Where a person occupies a position in an internal audit, risk management, 
AML, compliance function or internal Shari’a review, of the bank [financing 
company], and the bank [financing company] wishes to dismiss or suspend the 
subject person, the bank [financing company] must seek the CBB’s prior written 
approval before the proposed dismissal or suspension takes place and 
communicated to the person involved” (CBB, 2014b, p.1)  
 
A total of twenty-four sets of feedback were obtained from the Islamic banking 
industry. Due to many feedbacks received from the banking industry that may be 
considered reasonable, the Central Bank of Bahrain decided that a notification after 
the dismissal will apply, and did not implement the requirement of prior approval 
before dismissal. An example of reasonable feedback is that employees who exercise 
fraudulent activities must be terminated immediately, since retaining such employees 
until obtaining the approval of the regulator may cause further damage or risk to the 
bank.  
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Although the action of the regulator to modify the proposal removing the requirement 
for banks to obtain prior approvals before dismissing personnel in control functions 
may be reasonable, the researcher believes that the internal Shari’a review function 
should be distinguished from the remaining control functions. This is due to the 
significance of protecting internal Shari’a review functions, as suggested in this 
research. The data collected in this research, in addition to the analysis, indicates that 
managements may influence internal Shari’a reviewers to suit their interests. This in 
turn may affect the authenticity of the Shari’a compliance of the industry. Also, 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards may not be aware of Shari’a findings except through 
internal Shari’a reviewers. It may be beneficial to require a prior approval from the 
regulator if an Islamic bank chooses to dismiss an internal Shari’a reviewer. The 
corporate governance protection and prior approvals for dismissing persons in internal 
Shari’a review functions may need to be reconsidered in order to protect the 
authenticity of the Shari’a compliance of the Islamic banking industry. A possible 
suggestion would be to introduce new laws, rather than rules, to protect internal 
Shari’a reviewers.  
 
The feedbacks further included Islamic banks alerting the regulator that employees in 
control functions may sometimes be cornered into forced resignations, which is 
technically not a dismissal, by stating “on the down side, the ‘unwanted’ employee 
could be cornered into a resignation situation, which is technically not a dismissal 
(CBB, 2014b, p.1). These types of comments may need to be taken into account if the 
requirement for Islamic banks to obtain prior regulatory approval for dismissing 
personnel in internal Shari’a review functions was considered, since hiyal (legal 
stratagems) may be practices in this regard as well.   
 
7.7 Case Study: XYZ Islamic Bank 	  
 
In order to understand a realistic investment structure adopted by Islamic banks, it 
may be imperative to illustrate a real life special purpose vehicle investment 
structures that was executed by an Islamic bank in the past. The interview process 
revealed many structures to the researcher, in which a common special purpose 
vehicle transaction structure existed. Therefore, the researcher obtained a structure 
commonly used, from an interviewee who agreed to display the investment structure 
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in this thesis. For confidentiality purposes however, the name of the Islamic bank has 
been altered to XYZ Islamic Bank. The structure will be explained and analysed in 
this section.  
 
Case No. 1 – Aircraft Leasing Structure of XYZ Islamic Bank  
 
 
n  Special Purpose Vehicles 
Figure 35 Case No. 1 - Aircraft Leasing Structure of XYZ Islamic Bank 
 
The above structure is a contemporary structure that has been executed by an Islamic 
bank in the Kingdom of Bahrain. According to the lawyers appointed for this 
transaction, the above structure was designed to split between the Aircraft’s legal and 
economic benefits to satisfy commercial, legal, tax, and Shari’a requisites.   Although 
the above may be a complex structure, from a Shari’a (Islamic law) perspective, the 
main issue would be to look at the conventional debt. As explained in chapter three, 
this is because in the Qur’an, Allah (God) has not only condemned riba, which 
interest is a part of62, but waged war against those who engage in such a malignant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The concept of riba and interest was explained in chapter three. Although, it may be important to note that there 
are two types of riba: riba al-fadhl and riba al-nasee’a. The riba that exists in interest-based loans is riba al-
nasee’a (Ishaq, 2016) 
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act. There is no question about the impermissibility of a conventional interest-based 
loan in the Qur’an and sunna (Prophetic traditions and sayings). In addition and as 
detailed in chapter three, there is an ijma’ (consensus) on the prohibition of interest-
based loans.  
 
As illustrated in the above structure, the conventional debt that exists is from two 
banks (as senior lenders), offering a conventional loan to a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV) in the Bahamas, named “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd”. This special purpose vehicle 
is owned by another special purpose vehicle, called “The Novus Foundation 
(Bahamas)”. Since both special purpose vehicles (SPVs), are owned by external 
parties and not XYZ Islamic bank, XYZ Islamic bank is legally separated from these 
special purpose vehicles. The conventional section of this structure is therefore 
displayed below: 
 
Conventional / Non-Shari’a Compliant Section of the Structure 
 
n  Special Purpose Vehicles 
Figure 36 Conventional / Non-Shari'a Compliant Section of XYZ Islamic Bank Investment Structure 
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The above structure displays that the conventional loan was obtained by a different 
legal entity, “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas), and not the Islamic bank. This 
special purpose vehicle used the funds obtained from the conventional loan to 
purchase an Aircraft, where the title deed was transferred to “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd 
(Bahamas)”.  
 
After concluding this part of the transaction, where Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas) 
now owns the aircraft, “XYZ Leasing 5 Ltd (Bahamas)” - the special purpose vehicle 
that is partially owned by the XYZ Islamic Investment Bank and its Islamic investors, 
leases the Aircraft from its owners “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)”. As far as the 
Islamic bank is concerned, it is leasing an Aircraft from its original owners. XYZ 
Islamic Investment Bank is legally separated from the conventional loan. Thereafter, 
once the Aircraft is in the possession of “XYZ Leasing 5 Ltd (Bahamas)”, this special 
purpose vehicle partially owned by XYZ Islamic bank then leases (or sub-leases) the 
Aircraft to an airline company (e.g. Emirates, Gulf Air, British Airways, etc.). 
Therefore, the Islamic bank solely leased an Aircraft, thereafter legally sub-leased it 
to an airline company. So far, this is Shari’a compliant, because the Islamic bank is 
entering into Shari’a compliant ijāra (lease) agreements and investing in a Shari’a 
compliant (airline) industry. This is one of the key reasons why the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board of XYZ Islamic Investment Bank approved this structure. The 
Islamic / Shari’a compliant section of this structure is displayed below: 
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Islamic / Shari’a Compliant Section of the Transaction Structure 
 
 
n  Special Purpose Vehicles 
Figure 37 Islamic / Shari'a Compliant Section of XYZ Islamic Bank Investment Structure 
 
To summarise and as seen in figures 36 and 37, the transaction structure of XYZ 
Islamic Bank includes two sections: (1) A conventional and non-Shari’a compliant 
section with conventional loans, transacted by external parties and not the Islamic 
bank, and (2) an Islamic and Shari’a compliant section that includes ijāra (leasing) an 
aircraft to an airline industry, transacted by a special purpose vehicle partially owned 
by the Islamic bank and its Islamic investors. The below figure re-displays the full 
transaction structure, and clearly differentiates between the Islamic / Shari’a 
compliant section of the transaction and the conventional / non-Shari’a compliant 
section of the structure: 
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Displaying the Conventional / Non-Shari’a Compliant Section and the Islamic / 
Shari’a Compliant Section of the Transaction Structure 
 
 
n  Special Purpose Vehicles 
Figure 38 Displaying Conventional and Shari'a Compliant Sections of XYZ Islamic Bank investment 
Structure 
 
Up until this point and based on the diagrams plus the explanations provided in this 
section, it is now clear that XYZ Islamic bank has nothing to do with the conventional 
loan, and solely engages in Shari’a compliant transactions and activities. This is why 
the Shari’a Supervisory Board approved the transaction structure. The Shari’a 
Supervisory Board set a number of conditions for this transaction. Some of these 
conditions are summarised below: 
 
1. The three legal entities associated with the Islamic Bank, namely XYZ Islamic 
Bank, XYZ Leasing Company (Cayman), and XYZ Leasing 5 Ltd (Bahamas), 
should not bare the establishment cost of “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)”, 
the external legal entity borrowing an interest-based loan.  
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2. The three legal entities associated with the Islamic Bank, namely XYZ Islamic 
Bank, XYZ Leasing Company (Cayman), and XYZ Leasing 5 Ltd (Bahamas), 
should not have control over “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)”. 
3. The three legal entities associated with the Islamic Bank, namely XYZ Islamic 
Bank, XYZ Leasing Company (Cayman), and XYZ Leasing 5 Ltd (Bahamas), 
should not have legal control or influence on “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd 
(Bahamas)”. 
4. The three legal entities associated with the Islamic Bank, namely XYZ Islamic 
Bank, XYZ Leasing Company (Cayman), and XYZ Leasing 5 Ltd (Bahamas), 
may not bargain or negotiate the interest-bearing loan deals on behalf of 
“Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)”.63 
5. The three legal entities associated with the Islamic Bank, namely XYZ Islamic 
Bank, XYZ Leasing Company (Cayman), and XYZ Leasing 5 Ltd (Bahamas), 
may not manage “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)” in any form, way, or 
method.  
 
It is apparent from the above-summarised conditions, that the Shari’a Supervisory 
Board approved the structure, if “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)” was actually an 
external party, with no influence by the Islamic bank. This is where the challenge or 
the following questions arises: Who actually manages the conventional special 
purpose vehicles?  Who actually paid for its establishment cost? Does the Islamic 
bank not have board representatives? Who ordered or initiated the establishment of 
the conventional special purpose vehicles? Would the conventional special purpose 
vehicle have been established if the Islamic bank did not ask for it? Who negotiated 
the rates for the conventional interest-based loans? And lastly, who controls this 
conventional special purpose vehicle? The same investment manager explained to the 
researcher: 
 
“Yes, we’re [Islamic bank] not supposed to control them [Novus XYZ FIN 5 
Ltd (Bahamas)]. But who do you think controls them? Who? Of course we’re 
controlling them” – Investment Manager, Islamic Bank 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 More leniently, in a condition stipulated by a Shari’a Supervisory Board of another Islamic bank for a similar 
structure, the Shari’a Supervisory Board mentioned that the respective Islamic bank they represent could not 
“legally” bargain the interest-bearing loan transactions. In other words, if the Islamic bank did so, it may be out of 
the hands of the Shari’a Supervisory Board. However, the Shari’a Supervisory Board tried to ensure that the 
Islamic bank did not have the legal authority to do so.  
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The investment manager explained the following realities: 
 
1. The conventional special purpose vehicle (SPV) “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd 
(Bahamas)” as a result of a request by the XYZ Islamic bank, through 
discussions with lawyers.  
2. The conventional special purpose vehicle (SPV)  “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd 
(Bahamas)” is controlled by XYZ Islamic bank.  
3. XYZ Islamic bank approaches conventional lenders, on behalf of “Novus 
XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)”, handpicks attractive interest rates, and negotiates 
the conventional deals.  
4. “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)” does not execute a transaction, such as 
obtaining the conventional loan from a conventional lender, except with a 
“written” request by the Islamic bank.  
5. According to the investment manager, the conventional special purpose 
vehicle, Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas), “does nothing without our 
[Islamic bank’s] request”. 
 
Based on the above information, it appears that XYZ Islamic bank may have violated 
some, if not the majority of conditions set out by the Shari’a Supervisory Board to 
make the transaction Shari’a compliant. Although the structure may theoretically be 
considered Shari’a compliant due to the legal separation of the conventional special 
purpose vehicle and the Islamic bank, the practice conflicts with the conditions set by 
the Shari’a Supervisory Board to sustain the transaction as Shari’a compliant. This 
case study (unit of analysis) may act as an example and further support the argument 
put forth in section 6.2.364, which stated that the challenge is that many Islamic banks 
with similar structures violate similar conditions.   
 
Evidence in this chapter along with chapter six unfortunately suggests that many 
Islamic banks, whether practicing genuinely, unknowingly, or misleadingly, control 
the conventional special purpose vehicles (SPVs) actions. According to an investment 
officer of a different Islamic bank, not only did the Islamic banks he was employed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Please refer to page 146 
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with65 have control over the conventional special purpose vehicles, he mentioned “we 
[Islamic bank] even negotiate the [financial] compensation for the board of directors 
of the [conventional] SPV [special purpose vehicle]”. This statement indicates that 
although the conventional special purpose vehicle is legally owned and controlled by 
an external party and not the Islamic bank, it is almost as if the Islamic bank fully 
owns and controls the conventional separated special purpose vehicles.  
 
It was also observed when witnessing multiple contemporary executed transaction 
structures during the interview phase that were similar in nature, that Islamic banks 
might not have paid for the establishment costs, however provided financing to the 
mother company of the conventional special purpose vehicle in order to establish the 
conventional special purpose vehicles. Other Islamic banks directly established the 
conventional special purpose vehicles discretely through the lawyers. In many cases 
witnessed, at least one major condition to sustain the transaction structure to remain 
Shari’a compliant was being violated. This indicated to the researcher that this might 
be a reality that needs to be addressed.  
 
The line between the Shari’a compliance and non-Shari’a compliance in the 
abovementioned case study structure may be considered thin. It may be Shari’a 
compliant since the Islamic bank has solely leased an aircraft and sub-leased it. 
However, it may be considered not Shari’a compliant not because of the structure, but 
rather because of the practice, where the “Aircraft Owner” is an external special 
purpose vehicle obtaining a conventional loan that is – in reality - managed and 
controlled by the Islamic bank. If the conventional special purpose vehicle was 
actually an external party, owned and managed by the external party, then the 
transaction structure may be considered Shari’a compliant.  
 
When an entity buys a Shari’a compliant product, the method of how the seller 
originally purchased the product (whether through an advanced payment or a 
conventional loan) may not concern the buyer. As far as the buyer is concerned, he is 
buying a Shari’a compliant product from its legal owner. This is the basis for why 
most Shari’a Supervisory Boards approve similar structures.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The interviewee referred to here was the Head of Investment of at least three major Islamic investment banks in 
the Kingdom of Bahrain.  
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To conclude this section, the researcher came across similar transaction structures 
where the conventional special purpose vehicles were actually owned and controlled 
by an external party. An example of this is a computer company, who established a 
special purpose vehicle, transacted conventionally with external parties, thereafter 
executed transactions with other special purpose vehicles owned by an Islamic bank. 
The Islamic bank did not establish, control, nor influence the conventional special 
purpose vehicle. This means that the same structure that meets the Shari’a conditions 
may have no impact on Shari’a compliance. Therefore, it is often nearly impossible to 
tell whether a transaction is Shari’a compliant solely by looking at the structure. 
Rather, the transaction should be Shari’a audited to observe whether necessary 
Shari’a conditions have been met.  
 
7.7.1 Applying the Developed Qualitative Criterion on the Case Study 	  
The previous section illustrated, displayed, and holistically analysed a contemporary 
case study of a special purpose vehicle transaction executed by an Islamic bank in the 
Kingdom of Bahrain. In the research methodology chapter, a qualitative criterion was 
created in order to determine whether a special purpose vehicle transaction structure 
is Shari’a compliant or not.  This section applies the created qualitative criterion to 
determine whether the transaction structure of XYZ Islamic bank is Shari’a compliant 
or not. 
 A. Application of Qualitative Criterion on XYZ Islamic Bank Transaction 
Structure	  
 
I. Test Question One: Is the business the Islamic bank is investing in Shari’a 
compliant? 
 
Yes. XYZ Islamic Bank is investing in the airline industry offering 
international transportation services to the public. There is nothing in Shari’a 
(Islamic law) that prohibits individuals or entities to invest in the airline or 
transportation industry offering international transportation services. In fact, 
this may be encouraged due to its masālih (benefits) on the economy and 
society. 
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II. Test Question Two: Is there a Special Purpose Vehicle in the structure that 
will engage in non-Shari’a compliant activities or transactions? 
 
Yes. There is a special purpose vehicle named “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd 
(Bahamas)”, that engaged in a conventional based transaction, by obtaining a 
conventional interest-based loan.   	  
III. Test Question Three: Does the Islamic Bank legally own the Special Purpose 
Vehicle that will engage in a conventional/non-Shari’a compliant 
transaction(s)? 
 
No. The special purpose vehicle that obtained a conventional interest-based 
loan is “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd (Bahamas)”, which is owned by “The Novus 
Foundation (Bahamas)” and legally separated from XYZ Islamic Bank.  
 
IV. Test Question Four: Does the Islamic bank have any sort of control, whether 
direct or indirect, through proxies for example, on the non-Shari’a compliant 
separately owned Special Purpose Vehicle? 
 
Legally, the answer is No. In the specific case of XYZ Islamic bank and 
during the approval-seeking stage from the Shari’a Supervisory Board, XYZ 
Islamic bank did not have legal control over the non-Shari’a compliant 
separately owned special purpose vehicle, namely “Novus XYZ FIN 5 Ltd 
(Bahamas)”. However, the investment manager later revealed to the researcher 
that in reality, XYZ Islamic bank does have control over the conventional 
separately owned special purpose vehicle, by receiving a proxy for example, 
in addition to other legal methods to gain control. This was pre-agreed 
between XYZ Islamic bank, the lawyers, and “The Novus Foundation 
(Bahamas)”. Therefore, although the Shari’a compliance analysis first 
mentioned No as the answer; this information indicates that the real answer is 
Yes. This raises the following question: Is the investment considered a 
dharūra (necessity)? The answer may be “no” as the transaction does not 
appear to have elements of dharūra (necessity), such as affecting food, 
clothing, housing, or other necessities.  
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V. Test Question Five: Is there evidence for hiyal (legal stratagems) taken place 
by an Islamic bank after executing the special purpose vehicle structure or 
transaction? 
 
If one were to look at the documents outwardly, without revelations from the 
investment manager, the answer would be No. The investment manager also 
believes that it is up to the internal Shari’a reviewer to audit the investment 
transactions, observe non-Shari’a compliant findings (including XYZ Islamic 
Bank having control, indirectly establishing, continuously request in writing, 
and other non-Shari’a compliant actions with the conventional separately 
owned special purpose vehicle). The investment manager elaborated that these 
findings are supposed to be noted down in the internal Shari’a audit reports 
where corrective actions by the management should be taken. Hiyal (legal 
stratagems) may be considered practiced if the investment team hides 
necessary information requested by the Shari’a body.66  
 
As a result of the answers to the above qualitative criterion, the following may be 
possible Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings to the transaction:  
 
1. If XYZ Islamic bank has no legal control over the conventional SPV, then the 
transaction may be considered Shari’a compliant.  
2. If XYZ Islamic bank obtained legal control over conventional SPV, then the 
transaction is not Shari’a compliant.  
3. If XYZ Islamic bank does not have legal control over the conventional SPV, 
but in reality does control the SPV through other methods, then may depend 
on the interpretation of the Shari’a Supervisory Board. However, the 
researcher argues that if it was considered Shari’a compliant, the reality of the 
transaction must be displayed to the Shari’a Supervisory Board, regulators, 
and “others with the right to know” (Stewart, 2005, p.23). Engaging in a 
similar transaction through non-transparent practices negates the Shari’a 
compliance of the transaction.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 It may be argued that since the investment team is aware of the violations, it may need to be considered as hiyal 
(legal stratagems) even if the internal Shari’a reviewer did not note down the violations. This issue may be subject 
to different interpretations. 
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In theory, the researcher concludes that the structure may be Shari’a compliant due to 
the legal separation between the Islamic bank and conventional special purpose 
vehicles, provided that Shari’a conditions are met. However, in practice, this structure 
may be considered misleading, which Shari’a Supervisory Boards may unknowingly 
continue to approve. This is because the reality pertaining to the practice of the 
transaction was revealed by investment managers, such as: (1) the Islamic bank 
ordering the establishment of the conventional special purpose vehicle, (2) Islamic 
bank paying for its establishment costs indirectly, (3) Islamic bank negotiating the 
conventional loans on behalf of the conventional special purpose vehicle, (4) Islamic 
bank managing the conventional special purpose vehicle, and  (5) Islamic bank 
controlling the special purpose vehicle, amongst others.  
 
Therefore, although in theory this structure may be Shari’a compliant, Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards may need to reconsider their approvals for similar structures due 
to the common reality of the practices that underlie these structures. Evidence tends to 
suggest that the practice commonly largely conflicts with conditions set out by 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards.  
7.8 Conclusion 	  	  
A review of annual reports for a sample of nine Islamic banks revealed that all of 
them use special purpose vehicles. This indicates that the majority of Islamic banks 
may use special purpose vehicles. This review also revealed that only one Shari’a 
Supervisory Board mentioned in their annual report that conventional financings with 
special purpose vehicle violations existed. Since chapter six suggested that more than 
one Islamic bank may have misused special purpose vehicles, this finding may 
suggest that the Shari’a Supervisory Boards of other Islamic banks are either not 
aware of special purpose vehicle violations or chose not to report them.  
 
The findings also suggest that the regulator has exhorted effort to combat special 
purpose vehicle abuse by the minority of Islamic banks. However, it seems that the 
Central Bank of Bahrain rulebook changes may not be sufficient enough, where the 
newly appointed Central Shari’a Board may need to issue new rulings as the ultimate 
Shari’a authority in the Islamic banking industry. The findings emphasize on the 
importance of protecting internal Shari’a functions, since it is the only channel that 
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provides Shari’a review information to the Shari’a Supervisory Boards. Therefore, 
the regulator may need to protect the internal Shari’a control functions by introducing 
new legislation (rather than rules) that protects internal Shari’a reviewers. This may 
be true since Islamic banks may not specifically adhere to all rules, but would they 
risk not adhering to the law?  
 
Lastly, an analysis of a real-life executed special purpose vehicle transaction suggests 
that the special purpose vehicle structure approved by the Shari’a Supervisory Board 
may be in theory, Shari’a compliant. This is because special purpose vehicles that 
engage in prohibited interest-based loans were legally separated from the Islamic 
bank. In practice however, the analysis revealed that the execution of the transaction 
structure by the Islamic bank might not be Shari’a compliant due to violating 
necessary Shari’a conditions. For example, the Islamic bank manages, influences, and 
controls the conventional special purpose vehicle, which negates the Shari’a 
compliance of the transaction structure.  
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8. Chapter Eight: Conclusion  	  
The below figure highlights the position of chapter eight in light of the research 
outline: 
	  
Figure 39 Chapter Eight Position  
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8.1. Introduction 	  	  
This chapter first explains the contribution to knowledge this research may have 
provided. Thereafter, it provides a summary of the research, followed by its main 
findings. The possible different types of Islamic banks relating to special purpose 
vehicle practices are explained. The chapter then discusses potential future work, 
followed by possible limitations that may have existed on this research. Finally, the 
concluding remarks include final testimonies made by the researcher.  
 
8.2. Contribution to knowledge	  	  
This research may have acted as one of the first doctoral researches focusing on 
special purpose vehicles in Islamic banking, without solely focusing on one Islamic 
product such as sukūk (commonly referred to as Islamic bonds). Also, it focuses on 
special purpose vehicle Shari’a compliance factors, which appears that it may not 
largely exist in literature. Furthermore, since the researcher was unable to locate a 
doctoral research pertaining to special purpose vehicles in Islamic banking, and 
therefore has further not located a similar doctoral research that uses the Kingdom of 
Bahrain as a case study, this indicates that its existence may be minimal in the 
research arena. Therefore, the jurisdiction used as a case study relating to the research 
topic may be considered as another contribution to knowledge. 	  
8.3. Summary of the Research 
After the 2008 global financial crisis, special purpose vehicles received extra scrutiny 
and negative publicity from the regulators and the public, respectively (Amoruso and 
Duchac, 2014). Institutions are able to hide debt from shareholders through the use of 
special purpose vehicles (Amoruso and Duchac, 2014). The establishment of special 
purpose vehicles “...very easily develops in to a sustained policy of deceiving or 
depriving those with a right to know…which have to compound their deceit in order 
to remain intact and to sustain the lie” (Stewart, 2005, p.23). However, the term 
“special purpose vehicle” does not intrinsically indicate that it is negative, such as 
being illegal or a scam (Stewart, 2005). Special purpose vehicles, as a legal tool, may 
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remain a perfectly designated tool that may be used for legitimate business 
advantages.  
Islamic finance is a system of finance that follows the rules and principles of Shari’a 
(Islamic law). One of the main prohibitions of Islamic finance is engaging in interest-
based activities. An exception may exist if the transaction(s) was considered a 
dharūra (necessity). An example of a dharūra (necessity) would be the need to buy 
shelter, food, or clothes. If the only way to attain shelter or food was through 
obtaining an interest-based loan, this is acceptable in Shari’a (Islamic law) and 
considered as a dharūra (necessity). However, most of the Islamic banking 
transactions in the Islamic banking industry appear that they do not include an 
element of dharūra (necessity). Yet, the Islamic banking investment industry seems, 
in certain circumstances, to be based on interest-based activities. By interviewing 
forty-four stakeholders and analysing a real special purpose vehicle transaction 
structure, this research confirms a point iterated by Al-Enezi (2015), which is that 
some Islamic banks engage in hila (legal stratagems) to engage in prohibited (i.e. 
interest-based activities). Based on this study, a sizeable minority of the Islamic 
banking industry engages in hila (legal stratagems) through the use of special purpose 
vehicles to engage in interest-based activities.  
It may be important to understand the history underlying the initiation of using 
Islamic banking special purpose vehicle structures that included interest-based 
activities. The establishments of Islamic investment structures were mainly initiated 
around mid to late 1990s (McMillen, 2013). This started when a group of Middle 
Eastern investors and their Shari’a Supervisory Boards were trying to invest in the 
United States of America in a Shari’a compliant manner, but where the existing laws 
of the United States of America made it difficult to do so (McMillen, 2013). The 
Shari’a Supervisory Boards and United States lawyers exhorted respectable efforts to 
come up with Shari’a compliant solutions to what were then modern challenges. 
These efforts led to the establishment of special purpose vehicle structures where the 
Islamic banks or investors were able to distance themselves from conventional 
financings or any non-Shari’a compliant activities through the use of special purpose 
vehicles. Islamic banks had literally no relationship with the conventional special 
purpose vehicles.  
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However, the Islamic banking industry is now faced with a challenge due to the use of 
hiyal (legal stratagems) and special purpose vehicles. Islamic banks are able to engage 
indirectly in interest-based activities by not revealing the realistic transaction 
information to the Shari’a Supervisory Board. This challenge becomes greater if the 
internal Shari’a review function was weak or not protected. The continuity of non-
Shari’a compliant special purpose vehicle practices and/or violations indicates that 
there may be a flaw in the system that needs to be rectified. Evidence tends to suggest 
that a considerable number of internal Shari’a reviewers do not report these violations 
due to unawareness, lack of evidence, or to avoid disrupting their relationships with 
their management. Shari’a Supervisory Boards and the regulator are encouraged to 
take possible steps to protect, enhance, and strengthen this function.  
 
Another challenge revealed in this research is that whether through hiyal (legal 
stratagems) or genuinely, evidence suggests that a significant amount of Islamic 
banking special purpose vehicle transactions violate at least one major condition by 
either having: (1) control over a conventional purpose vehicle, (2) partly or fully paid 
for its establishment cost (3) hidden proxies obtained by the Islamic bank from the 
conventional special purpose vehicle providing them full control, (4) fully or partly 
manage the special purpose vehicle, (5) negotiating conventional deals on behalf of 
the conventional special purpose vehicle, amongst others.  
 
Due to this information, the research may pose the following questions: Will these 
practices continue despite the violation(s) being clarified through suggested evidence? 
Are not Islamic banks largely about realistically abstaining from interest-based 
activities? Or is it sufficient for Islamic banks to legally find ways to distance itself 
from interest-based activities, but in reality partly establish, manage, pay, and control 
separately legal entities that engage in prohibited activities? Are Shari’a Supervisory 
Boards not aware of these actions? Or are Shari’a Supervisory Boards aware of these 
actions but are unable to stop it? Is the Central Bank allowing this to happen by 
witnessing Shari’a approvals? Is there a flaw within the system? Is it a matter of 
different opinions? Or are managements able to sideline Shari’a Supervisory Boards 
or regulators by approaching an elite class, such as individuals with high political 
power, to influence approvals? What is the issue?  
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At the start of this research, evidence indicated that one Shari’a Supervisory Board 
member officially and publicly denounced these Islamic banking practices. Are the 
others not aware or do they disagree?  
 
Furthermore, this research suggests that one of the key factors to sustain Shari’a 
compliance in the Islamic banking industry is to have a strong internal Shari’a control 
function. This is simply because Shari’a Supervisory Boards may not be aware of the 
reality of transactions or violations except through the internal Shari’a reviewers. As 
mentioned earlier, the regulator may consider finding ways to provide adequate 
protection for internal Shari’a reviewers, such as introducing new laws (rather than 
rules) that protect internal Shari’a reviewers. This is because Islamic banks may not 
tend to adhere to all Shari’a rules or requirements, but would they risk not obeying 
the law? Introducing a law to protect internal Shari’a reviewers may be a key aspect 
to protect the Islamic banking industry.   
 
The secondary data analysis revealed that the regulator was aware of similar 
violations taking place in the Islamic banking industry. The analysis revealed that the 
regulator, through a reactionary measure, was taking measures to ensure Shari’a 
compliance in special purpose vehicle transactions. This is particularly true through 
the proposal of new changes to the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB) rulebook 
pertaining to special purpose vehicles and Shari’a compliance. The implication of 
these changes may require further research. This action is well noted. One must ask 
however, is this action enough? 
 
8.4. Main Findings 
 
The empirical analysis indicates that the majority of Islamic banks use special 
purpose vehicles in their investment transactions. Furthermore, it also indicates that 
these Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles in the majority of their investment 
transactions.  
 
Evidence tends to suggest that there may be a discrepancy between Islamic banking 
theory and practice. The theory mentions that one of the main prohibitions in Islamic 
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banking is the engagement in interest-based transactions. Furthermore, all the Shari’a 
Supervisory Board interviewees mentioned that Islamic banks engaging in 
conventional loans indirectly through special purpose vehicles are prohibited in 
Shari’a (Islamic law). Evidence in this research suggests that there may be an ijma’ 
(consensus) between Shari’a Supervisory Board scholars, that it is prohibited for an 
Islamic bank to establish, manage, control, or influence a special purpose vehicle that 
engages in prohibited or interest-based activities. Minimally, evidence suggests that 
the majority of Shari’a scholars hold this view. Yet, the practice suggests that the 
Islamic banking investment industry may commonly be based on interest-based 
transactions through the use of special purpose vehicles. Also, evidence suggests that 
in many cases (whether practicing genuinely or through hiyal (legal stratagems)), 
Islamic banks engaging in these structures are establishing, managing, controlling, 
and/or influencing these conventional special purpose vehicles. Therefore, this may 
indicate that there is discrepancy between Islamic banking theory and practice. It also 
indicates that there may be a discrepancy between the opinion of the majority of 
Shari’a Supervisory Board scholars and Islamic banking practices.  
 
If Islamic Bank A is prohibited from engaging in interest-based transactions, can 
Islamic Bank A engage in interest-based transactions under the realm of a separate 
legal entity? To simplify this example, if “John” finds it unlawful to trade in alcohol, 
could he lend money to “Mark” for Mark to engage in alcohol? Even more so, can 
John now act on behalf of Mark to trade in alcohol? So that when Mark obtains his 
profit, he returns it to John as a debt repayment? Even more so, John returns it to 
himself on behalf of Mark. What was Mark’s role? John, through Mark, engaged in a 
prohibited transaction under the name of a separate individual.  
 
Now assuming Mark was a legal entity rather than a human being. An Islamic bank is 
operating through a separate legal entity that they do not legally own, and are free to 
engage in any transaction they wish, under a different name. Has Islamic banking 
become solely about legal arguments? For example, has Islamic banking become 
solely about legally separating itself from an entity, which then are able to act freely 
through that entity? Or has Islamic banking become about using legal tools, hiyal 
(legal stratagems), to engage in the very same manner conventional banks do? Is a 
legal separation sufficient? What about the special purpose vehicle establishment, 
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control, management, decision-making, and influence? How is it possible for the 
findings in this research to suggest that although it is impermissible, a significant 
amount of conventional separately legal entities are partly established, managed, 
controlled, and/or influenced by Islamic banks, while on the other hand, evidence 
suggests that there may be an ijma’ (consensus) between Shari’a Supervisory Board 
scholars that this practice is not lawful according to Shari’a (Islamic law)? How then 
did this practice spread? Are internal Shari’a reviewers not conducting their jobs? Is 
there a flaw or weakness in the system? Are regulators not providing feedback 
regarding these violations to Shari’a Supervisory Boards through inspection reports? 
Or does the regulator solely depend on Shari’a Supervisory Board approvals without 
realising that Islamic banks are violating a major condition(s) that negates the Shari’a 
compliance of the transaction? Are there certain stakeholders who are trying to turn a 
blind eye on this practice? If so, who are they? 
 
It was previously mentioned that the findings suggests that a considerable number of 
internal Shari’a auditors/reviewers do not report this in internal Shari’a audit reports 
either because they are not aware of the violation taking place, lack of evidence, or 
they fear this would disrupt their relationship with management that would end up in 
risking their jobs. As a result, many Shari’a Supervisory Boards may not be officially 
aware of these violations. Therefore, most Islamic banks would not have these major 
violations included in Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports. Out of nine Islamic 
banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain in which Shari’a Supervisory Board annual reports 
were analysed, only one Shari’a Supervisory Board clearly mentioned that 
conventional transactions/special purpose vehicles violations existed. But is it really 
possible that all the remaining Shari’a Supervisory Boards are not aware of these 
violations? Is this conceivable, or do they firmly believe that Islamic banks do not 
engage in hiyal (legal stratagems) nor establish, manage, control, and/or influence 
legally separated conventional special purpose vehicles?  
 
What about sad al-tharā’i (prohibition of evasive legal devices)? It may be argued 
that due to frequent special purpose vehicle violations being witnessed, whether 
unintentionally or through abuse, a new fatwa (Shari’a legal opinion) may need to be 
issued stating that a legal separation on its own may not suffice to make a transaction 
structure Shari’a compliant. This is because special purpose vehicles include many 
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legal forms that by definition, means an individual legally owns the special purpose 
vehicle for a different party to benefit from. Can companies own special purpose 
vehicles that deals in conventional activities, initially established for and managed by 
Islamic banks? As mentioned in chapter seven and according to one investment 
manager interviewee, the Islamic bank even negotiates the compensation for the 
board members in the separately legal special purpose vehicle. Due to this knowledge 
and updates, should the fatwas (Shari’a legal opinions) regarding special purpose 
vehicles, in the least, need to be revised? It may also be altered in a manner that 
disables loopholes or abuse by the minority of Islamic banks.  
 
A lot of literature relating to Islamic finance criticisms refer to Islamic banking 
mistakes, and then claim that Islamic banks are not truly Islamic. The researcher 
disavows this view, because by nature, humans are creatures of error. Islamic banks, 
which are run by humans, may be bound to make mistakes. If Islamic banks were 
infallible, they may not require Shari’a Supervisory Boards and/or internal Shari’a 
reviewers. However, the researcher believes that what makes an Islamic bank 
“Islamic”, may be a governance system that enables Shari’a (Islamic law) 
mistakes/violations to be spotted, noted, or rectified. The researcher argues that a lack 
of a proper/strong Shari’a governance system may allow Islamic banks not to adhere 
to Shari’a (Islamic law) requirements. The continuity of this non-Shari’a adherence 
may then lead Islamic banks to not being truly “Islamic”. Therefore, a strong and 
adequate Shari’a governance framework may be needed in order to sustain an Islamic 
bank as being truly Islamic, especially in light of the findings that indicate non-
Shari’a compliant practices may spread throughout the industry.   	  
8.5. Types of Islamic Banks relating to Special Purpose Vehicle Practices 
 
It may be suggested that there are generally three types of Islamic banks that deal with 
special purpose vehicles and conventional financings: 
 
Islamic Bank Type One: These are Islamic banks that entered into special purpose 
vehicle transactions for genuine causes or investments and are transparent with their 
Shari’a Supervisory Board and the regulator. For example, this includes Islamic 
banks that want to invest in a jurisdiction where Islamic financings do not exist, or 
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where its laws do not allow banks to buy and sell (which is the essence of Islamic 
banking products). If Islamic banks want to invest in these jurisdictions, the only 
option available is through special purpose vehicle structures that may include 
interest-based financings.  
 
Islamic Bank Type Two: These are Islamic banks that intentionally engage in hiyal 
(legal stratagems) to obtain a Shari’a Supervisory Board approval on a non-Shari’a 
compliant transaction by not revealing all the relevant information to its Shari’a 
Supervisory Board. For example, this includes Islamic banks confirming they have no 
control over a special purpose vehicle engaging in conventional activities, however it 
later gets revealed that the Islamic bank managers concealed proxies that grant them 
full legal control, amongst other violations.  
 
Islamic Bank Type Three: These are Islamic banks that may engage in non-Shari’a 
compliant special purpose vehicle transactions, by obtaining previously Shari’a-
approved special purpose vehicle structures of another Islamic bank from the lawyers. 
The transaction lawyers may not be aware of the Shari’a conditions to sustain the 
transaction as Shari’a compliant, and therefore, the Islamic banks may violate the 
majority of the conditions stipulated by the respective Shari’a Supervisory Board to 
sustain the transaction as being Shari’a compliant (such as establishing the 
conventional special purpose vehicle, controlling and directing it, managing it, 
amongst others).  
 
Since Islamic banks are generally supervised by Shari’a Supervisory Boards, it may 
useful to note down the possible types of Shari’a Supervisory Boards, which may be 
divided into the following three categories:  
 
Type One – Strong and Efficient Shari’a Supervisory Boards: This category 
includes Shari’a Supervisory Boards that consist of members who are highly 
qualified, deeply knowledgeable in Shari’a (Islamic law) and fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence). In addition, at least one or two members are simultaneously 
knowledgeable in legal studies and legal requirements of different jurisdictions, 
commercial law, accounting standards and internationally accepted accounting 
standards, taxation, and more. They are mainly multidisciplinary individuals who are 
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highly educated in a number of fields. Furthermore, these Shari’a Supervisory Boards 
include at least one member who is fluently bilingual in Arabic and English, who is 
able to understand all Shari’a (in Arabic) and banking (in English) requirements and 
translates what is needed from the Shari’a Supervisory Board to investment managers 
in an efficient manner. Members in these Shari’a Supervisory Boards include many 
highly prestigious Shari’a scholars. 
 
Type Two – Weak Shari’a Supervisory Boards: This category includes Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards who may be well versed in Shari’a (Islamic law) and fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence), but who may lack a member who either is also well-versed in 
modern commercial law and transaction knowledge, or lacks at least one member who 
is fluently bilingual. These boards are either not able to comprehend a structure fully, 
where investment managers may easily engage in hiyal (legal stratagems) and obtain 
Shari’a approvals on transactions that are not Shari’a compliant. No accounting 
experts exist within the board to annually review the financial statements of Islamic 
bank or detect Shari’a compliant violations. These Shari’a Supervisory Boards may 
also include one member who has previously experienced being released by an 
Islamic bank, who may not want to be released again. 
 
Type Three – Shari’a Supervisory Boards that Focus on Transactions 
Outwardly: These Shari’a Supervisory Board members have one common trait. They 
all issue a fatwa (Shari’a legal opinion) on what was presented to them in terms of 
structure, details, and transactions. Although they are aware that many discrepancies 
or violations may exist, they go with a narrated hadith (Prophetic saying) that 
mentions: “nahnu nahkumu bil dhaher, w’Allahu yatawalla al-sara’ir”67, which may 
be translated as “we judge based on what was provided to us (outwardly), and Allah 
[God] will take care of the secrets/intentions”.  
 
Chapter six, seven, and this chapter, collectively suggest that Islamic banks engaging 
in conventional transactions through special purpose vehicles may generally fall into 
the following four categories:  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 This saying is also reported in a dha’if (weakly narrated) hadith.	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1. Islamic banks who have a strong internal Shari’a control function and whose 
management engage in genuine special purpose vehicle practices. 
2. Islamic banks who have a strong internal Shari’a control function but whose 
management engage in special purpose vehicle practices through hiyal (legal 
stratagems). 
3. Islamic banks who have a weak internal Shari’a control function whose 
management engage in genuine special purpose vehicle practices.  
4. Islamic banks who have a weak internal Shari’a control function and whose 
management engage in special purpose vehicle practices through hiyal (legal 
stratagems).   
 
These above four categories are illustrated in the following diagram: 
 
Categories of Islamic Banks Engaging in non-Shari’a Compliant Activities 
through SPVs 
Figure 40 Categories of Islamic banks engaging in non-Shari'a compliant activities (Author's Theory)  	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SPV)prac<ces)through)hiyal)
(legal)stratagems))
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8.6. Potential Studies	  	  
Future research may include studying the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) Shari’a standard relating to special purpose 
vehicles. Future research may also include the Central Bank of Bahrain law pertaining 
to special purpose vehicles. Both of these documents were not readily available 
during the course of this research. An analysis of these documents, and their impact 
on the Islamic financial industry may prove to be useful. Furthermore, these two 
documents may also be used as secondary data in similar research areas once they 
become available. The availability of these documents may have an impact on future 
Islamic banking special purpose vehicle practices and/or findings.  
 
With regards to Shari’a Supervisory Board fatwas (Shari’a legal opinions), Shakir 
Ullah (2012) suggests that that these fatwas may be repositioned from high levels of 
Shari’a compliance, to the lowest levels of Shari’a compliance, categorized into the 
following five categories: (1) deep Shari’a compliance, (2) reasonable Shari’a 
compliance, (3) minimum Shari’a compliance, (4) superficial Shari’a compliance, 
and (5) no Shari’a compliance. Therefore, a new potential future study may lead to 
distinguishing fatwas (legal opinions) relating to special purpose vehicles in the 
abovementioned categorical levels of Shari’a compliance.  
 
Also, similar research may be conducted using different jurisdictions as case studies. 
For example, a similar study that uses the United Arab Emirates or Malaysia as a case 
study may reveal further or different findings, and may also be used in cross-
comparison with this study. Furthermore, a similar study that uses the Kingdom of 
Bahrain as a case study may also be researched, however, by using different research 
methodologies and/or methods conducted by researchers with different philosophical 
epistemologies or paradigms. For example, different paradigms and methodologies 
may include positivists who solely use quantitative methodologies to derive results.  
 
Lastly, the concept of a special purpose vehicle as a company, where the legal owners 
are not the beneficiaries, may also be studied from a Shari’a (Islamic law) 
perspective. Cattan (1955) did explain that the concept of trust, which special purpose 
vehicles were derived from, is similar and probably derived from the Islamic 
	   208 
institution of “waqf”. However, special purpose vehicles may have different 
characteristics and traits that distinguishes it from a trust and, Shari’a related studies 
under the realm of fiqh al-sharikāt (Islamic jurisprudence of companies) may 
theoretically be examined to position the theoretical concept of special purpose 
vehicles under Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings.  
 
8.7. Limitations	  
 
1. At the time of the research, there was not much literature relating to Shari’a 
compliance and special purpose vehicles. This provided a limitation on the 
research with regards to the accessibility of literature-related information relating 
to the topic of the research.  
 
2. Confidentiality was another limitation on the research. For example, similar to 
internal audit reports, internal Shari’a audit reports are confidential and not 
publicised. Therefore, it was not possible to obtain this possibly informative type 
of data to be analysed. Also, countless documentation was obtained revealing the 
methods of how Islamic banks were able to mislead the Shari’a Supervisory 
Boards to obtain approvals. These could not be included or formally analysed due 
to the request of interviewees to keep them confidential due to the sensitivity of 
the information.  
 
3. The case study methodology uses a “single/holistic” design. It may be argued that 
this provides a limitation on this research, since a “single/embedded” case study 
design may be more informative due to having more units of analysis as case 
studies. Even if this were considered true, most special purpose vehicle structures 
obtained were from practitioners who requested the information to be 
confidential.  
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8.8. Concluding Remarks	  	  
The research concludes that the challenge posed by special purpose vehicles may not 
be the existence or the “use” of special purpose vehicles in the Islamic banking 
industry. The research further concludes that the challenge may not be the 
inclusiveness of conventional loans in an Islamic special purpose vehicle structure, 
where the conventional loan(s) is not obtained nor controlled by the Islamic bank. 
This means that the conventional loans are actually obtained by external parties 
having nothing to do with the Islamic bank, where the Islamic banks are truthful and 
transparent with Shari’a Supervisory Boards. In fact, the researcher argues that this 
may be beneficial, as it enables and broadens the scope of Islamic finance instead of 
limiting it.  
 
However, the research concludes that the challenge pertaining to special purpose 
vehicles may be the “abuse” of special purpose vehicles by a sizeable minority of 
Islamic banks. These actions may negatively impact and discredit the Islamic banking 
industry if no corrective action is taken. The negative affects of riba (commonly 
referred to as usury or interest) may still impact the Islamic banking industry, even if 
these riba-based transactions were executed indirectly through special purpose 
vehicles. Also, public awareness may increase where it realizes that a sizeable 
minority of Islamic banks may be engaging in interest-based transactions through 
special purpose vehicles, contrary to Islamic banking theories and claims publicised 
to them. Another example of a special purpose vehicle abuse may relate to one of the 
traits of special purpose vehicles, which is a lack of transparency. Islamic banks are 
able to engage in non-transparent transactions where regulators or Shari’a 
Supervisory Boards are unaware of the realistic practices taking place.  
 
The chief executive officer is the ultimate internal decision making power. If he/she 
supports investment managers to mislead the Shari’a body, investment managers may 
continue to do so. On the other hand, if the chief executive officer instructs them to 
genuinely try to adhere to Shari’a Supervisory Board requirements, they would have 
no choice but to do so. Therefore, regulators should ensure that chief executive 
officers are genuine who do not support special purpose vehicle non-transparent 
practices. If it was proven that a chief executive officer supported hiyal-based special 
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purpose vehicle practices on a continual basis, then the regulator may want to note 
down the possible affects these actions may have on the industry and take corrective 
actions. This is because the regulator may not afford for unworthy reasons for the 
Islamic banking industry to be discredited.  
 
The research suggests that although Shari’a Supervisory Boards may have issued 
valid Shari’a (Islamic law) rulings based on the theory and fiqhi (jurisprudential) 
rulings, it may be useful to revisit their Shari’a rulings based on the new updates and 
practices arising in the industry. For example, if a sizeable minority of Islamic banks 
use Shari’a Supervisory Board previous fatwas (legal opinions) as the means to be 
able to abuse the Islamic banking special purpose vehicle market and engage in 
interest-based activities indirectly, this indicates that the fatwas (legal opinions), 
along with certain legislations, may have been providing Islamic banks with 
loopholes to engage in non-Shari’a compliant practices. Otherwise, the abuse of 
special purpose vehicle may continue and be as Ibn Al-Qayyim (1991) described:  
 
“…Rather, the mafsada [harm] which because of it, riba was prohibited, itself 
[still] exists, in addition to hiyal [legal stratagems], or more [worse] than that, and 
it [riba] increased by engaging in hiyal [legal stratagems] and did not fade away 
nor decrease; it is impossible for the Shari’a [Islamic law] of the Wisest of Rulers 
[God] to prohibit what has a mafsada [harm, referring to riba] and curses who 
engages in it [riba] and declare a war alongside His Messenger against him and 
promises him the harshest promise, but then [He, God] makes [it] permissible to 
engage in hiyal [legal stratagems] to engage in it [riba] clearly, just because this 
mafsada [harm, referring to riba] was done through additional fatigue [extra 
effort or work] of engaging in hiyal [legal stratagems] to sin and deceive Allah 
and His Messenger. No law proposes this; riba on the ground [a normal riba-
based loan] is easier and has less mafsada [harm] than a riba [executed] through a 
longer process [engaging in riba through hila (legal stratagems)]…”  
(Ibn Al-Qayyim, 1991, p.91-92) 
 
Ibn Al-Qayyim (1991) continued to question: 
 
“…Astonishingly, which mafsada [harm] of the mafāsid [harms] of riba was 
eradicated by engaging in this ihtiyal [engaging in hila, legal stratagems] and 
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khida’ [deception]? So did this great sin [riba] to Allah [God] which is from the 
greatest of sins, become a righteous deed and worship by khida’ [deception] and 
ihtiyal [engaging in hila, legal stratagems]? … How did khida’ [deception] and 
ihtiyal [legal stratagems] convert what is actually malignant to pure? And from a 
mafsada [harm] to a maslaha [interest/benefit]? And made it [riba] loved by the 
Lord AlMighty after it was discontented by Him [Allah/God]? ...”  
(Ibn Al-Qayyim, 1991, p.91-92) 
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Appendices  	  
Appendix I: Pilot Study Extract 
 
This pilot study is a qualitative analysis of responses received from five interviewees 
conducted during the empirical and data collection phase for this research. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted with various stakeholders of Islamic banks in 
the Kingdom of Bahrain. The first five interviewees have been selected for this pilot 
study in order to initially understand the industry’s response and reaction to the study. 
The five interviewees represent five Islamic investment banks, three of whom are 
current employees at three Islamic investment banks, and two ex-employees of 
another two Islamic investment banks (although one of these banks recently changed 
license to become an investment company). The roles of the interviewees include two 
Shari’a officers, two investment managers, and one risk manager.  
 
A. Special Purpose Vehicles Market Share 
 
All five interviewees indicated that their respective banks use special purpose vehicles 
in their investment transactions. As a result, this study reveals that the sample selected 
of Islamic investment banks in the Kingdom of Bahrain all use special purpose 
vehicles in their transactions. Also, three interviewees explained that special purpose 
vehicles were used in all of their investment structures without exception. The other 
two interviewees, both of whom were the Shari’a officers, replied that special purpose 
vehicles were used in (1) Funds and Real Estate (2) Most of investments and 
financings. However, the Islamic investment banks these interviewees represent 
majorly (and perhaps solely) deal in Funds and Real Estate / investments and 
financings. This implies that it may be safely said that special purpose vehicles are 
used in the vast majority of investments used by the five Islamic investment banks the 
interviewees represent.  
 
B. Reasons for using Special Purpose Vehicles 
 
The reasons mentioned by the interviewees for their respective banks using the 
special purpose vehicles are the following: 
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• Shareholding Structure: The Islamic investment banks may be required to 
allocate voting and other decision-making powers to certain investors, such 
as placing them as members of the Board of Directors. The Islamic 
investment bank may not take the risk to place investors for one investment 
on the board of directors of the bank with board power, and therefore 
creates a separate legal entity structured in a pre-agreed manner in terms of 
Board representation, distribution of control of power and decision making 
(veto) for that specific investment. This reason was mentioned by two of 
the five interviewees.  
 
• Risk Management: Interviewees indicated that their respective Islamic 
investment banks legally structure their investments in a manner where the 
bank will not be held liable for any default or damages. Rather, the special 
purpose vehicle is the sole entity that would be responsible for liabilities. 
This enables banks to manage their risk of loss effectively that are able to 
enter into investments without putting the Islamic bank at risk. Two out of 
the five interviewees mentioned this reason.  
 
• Taxation: special purpose vehicles are usually established in “tax havens”. 
Therefore, Islamic banks prefer using special purpose vehicles in certain 
jurisdictions to benefit from their taxation laws and in turn are used as a 
strategy to enhance their investment performance. Three out of the five 
interviewees mentioned this reason.  
 
• Compliance: Through the use of special purpose vehicles, the Islamic 
banks would have less reporting requirements. This encourages banks to 
use special purpose vehicles since more compliance/legal requirements are 
considered a hassle for investment managers. Two out of the five 
interviewees mentioned this as a reason.  
 
• Legal: Establishing special purpose vehicles means there will be less legal 
requirements for the Islamic investment banks. Also, it is much quicker to 
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incorporate a special purpose vehicle in the known tax-haven jurisdictions 
(e.g. Cayman Islands, Jersey), while incorporating a special purpose vehicle 
in the Kingdom of Bahrain requires a long and complicated process. One 
out of five interviewees mentioned this as a reason.  
 
• Shari’a: Since Islamic banks are prohibited from engaging in interest-
based activities, the Islamic banks sometimes use special purpose vehicles 
in order to indirectly engage in interest-based activities. The Islamic bank 
would execute a Shari’a compliant deal with the special purpose vehicle, 
where the special purpose vehicle would then engage in a transaction that 
would have otherwise been prohibited for the Islamic bank to do so 
directly. This practice may give rise to many debatable issues and will be 
discussed in seven. In light of the context of this chapter, three out of the 
five interviewees mentioned this reason: two of which explained it as being 
a manipulative and practice, while one explained it as being a solution in 
times of necessity.  
 
One of the three interviewees further mentioned that sometimes their 
respective banks are allowed to invest in companies with conventional or 
non-Shari’a compliant dealings, if the Islamic bank’s ownership as an 
investor will not exceed 33% (a third). Therefore the Islamic bank would 
create a special purpose vehicle to: (1) buy non-Shari’a compliant 
investments – through reducing its ownership from a percentage exceeding 
33% to a percentage lower than 33% (the amount of ownership percentage 
reduced is transferred to a separately created special purpose vehicle), and 
(2) hide existing conventional loans from buyers, investors, regulators, 
Shari’a supervisory boards and the Shari’a auditor. This also obviously 
raises Shari’a compliant questions with regards to special purpose vehicle 
practices in the Islamic banking industry that will further be discussed in 
chapter seven. However, these interviewee responses may act as a 
clarification to the Central Bank of Bahrain circular mentioned in chapter 
one (CBB Circular, 2013).  
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A fourth interviewee mentioned Shari’a compliance as being a reason for 
using special purpose vehicles, who explained that special purpose 
vehicles are used because it is easier to engage in Shari’a compliant 
activities. This is due to the Articles of Association (AOAs) and 
establishing contracts of the special purpose vehicle requiring Shari’a 
compliance for the entity’s activities.  
 
• Confidentiality: Since special purpose vehicles are separate legal entities, 
its legal owners are persons other than the initial originator or establishing 
bank. Therefore, an entity established in a jurisdiction (e.g. Cayman 
Islands) with an unfamiliar name legally owning it, it is difficult for the 
public to track down who initially owns (or indirectly manages) the special 
purpose vehicle (although regulatory bodies are able to do so). According 
to one interviewee, when Islamic banks want to be confidential in their 
dealings, special purpose vehicles help them achieve this objective.  
 
• Regulatory Requirements: Islamic banks use special purpose vehicles as 
a tool to adhere to regulatory requirements. For example, the Central Bank 
of Bahrain requires a minimum of 12% Capital-Adequacy Ratio (CAR). 
The Capital Adequacy Ratio is = Equity / Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA). 
The percentage of this ratio should not be less than 12%.  
 
Therefore, some Islamic banks create special purpose vehicles, and transfer 
selected Risk-Weighted Assets to the special purpose vehicle (it is removed 
from the banks balance sheet and transferred to the special purpose vehicle 
balance sheet). This in turn reduces the banks Risk-Weighted Assets 
(RWA), which in turn would increase the Banks Capital Adequacy Ratio 
(CAR).  
 
To further clarify the above example, Risk-Weighted Assets (RWA) are 
assets that are not easily liquidated. For example, cash holds a zero risk-
weight, while the risk-weight on real estate is 200%. Therefore, if a bank 
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owns real estate assets worth $ 5m, the risk-weight is $ 10m, used for 
calculation purposes.  
 
One out of five interviewees mentioned this reason. Islamic banks use 
special purpose vehicles to adhere to regulatory requirements with other 
similar practices as well.  
 
C. Significance of Special Purpose Vehicles 
 
When asked whether the interviewees believed that special purpose vehicles were 
essential to use as a bank, all five interviewees indicated that special purpose vehicles 
are essential. One interviewee emphasized that it is “currently” essential, while a 
second interviewee mentioned that it depends on the project, however the current 
practice reveals that it is essential. The reasons for special purpose vehicles being 
essential are the same as section (number above).  
 
D. Special Purpose Vehicles and Conventional Financings 
 
All five interviewees responded differently when asked which of their (Islamic) 
banks’ investments included conventional financings: 
 
Interviewee One (Shari’a Manager): One investment structure included the Islamic 
bank obtaining conventional financing through a special purpose vehicle, however 
this was done without the approval of the Shari’a Supervisory Board. This investment 
represents around 2 – 4 % of the banks investments.  
 
Interviewee Two (Investment Manager): This Islamic bank never took conventional 
financing. The business model this bank adopts is raising money through equity rather 
than financing. Therefore, when special purpose vehicles are established, it is to raise 
equity and distribute shares to the equity holders. In rare cases when the business 
model is altered to obtain financing, the Islamic bank will obtain Islamic financing. 
The interviewee further clarified that even when the Islamic bank approaches a 
conventional bank for financing, it still obtains Islamic financing through the 
conventional banks Islamic branch/window. Obtaining conventional financing 
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through a special purpose vehicle was out of the question and, the interviewee did not 
even understand how the question was possible. 
 
Interviewee Three (Risk Manager): The interviewee was not aware of any 
conventional financings through special purpose vehicles (however, it was later 
revealed through interviews with other employees in the same bank and not included 
in this pilot study, that conventional loans through special purpose vehicles existed, 
with the reasons and analysis explained in chapter seven. 
 
Interviewee Four (Investment Manager): This interviewee responded mentioning that 
Islamic banks’ obtaining conventional loans through special purpose vehicles is a 
normal and standard practice, for at least the past 10 years. This is because most 
companies Islamic banks purchase or invest in investments such as the aircraft or 
shipping industry, which do not have Islamic banks within those regions to finance 
them (or, the Islamic financing options are very limited and take a long time to 
approve e.g. one Islamic bank took 5 months to approve a financing transaction). 
According to this interviewee, the only industry Islamic financiers readily finance is 
the real estate sector. Also, the interview indicated that the profit rate of Islamic banks 
are usually higher than conventional ones, which makes the conventional financiers 
more attractive. The interviewee lastly indicated as an example that Islamic banks 
used to purchase property in the United Kingdom through special purpose vehicles 
and conventional financing. However, when an Islamic bank in the United Kingdom 
became available, the switched to Islamic financing. Therefore, this indicates that it 
depends on the availability in the market.  
 
Interviewee Five (Shari’a Manager): This interviewee indicated that the Islamic bank 
does obtain conventional financings of various forms through special purpose 
vehicles. This is for two main reasons: (1) special purpose vehicles are separate legal 
entities, therefore the Islamic bank legally does not have any relationship with 
conventional financing (2) this is only acceptable because an alternative has not been 
found in the industry. Once an acceptable alternative is available, Islamic banks 
should discard this practice. This interviewee also mentioned (similar to Interviewee 
Four) that most industries the Islamic banks invest in lack Islamic financiers, and 
therefore the Islamic bank is left with no option other than to obtaining conventional 
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financing (through special purpose vehicles). However, if an Islamic financing option 
that is similar to the conventional options is available, this practice would 
immediately be disapproved by the banks Shari’a body. 
 
E. Accounting of Special Purpose Vehicles  
 
One interviewee mentioned that special purpose vehicles have their own independent 
financials, accountants, and auditors. A second interview explained that the assets that 
the special purpose vehicles “house” are included in the Islamic banks balance sheet.  
 
The remaining three interviewees explained that the accounting treatment of special 
purpose vehicles is dependent on several factors, thereafter concluding whether the 
special purpose vehicle financials should be consolidated with the Banks financials or 
not. There factors include the Islamic banks: (1) percentage of ownership in the 
special purpose vehicle (2) Banks representatives as members of the board of 
directors in the special purpose vehicle (3) Banks influence (or veto power) over the 
special purpose vehicle, and (4) Ability or control over the special purpose vehicles 
management. Depending on these factors, the special purpose vehicle will either be 
consolidated with the Islamic bank or not. The higher the ownership, board seats, 
influence, or power the bank has over a special purpose vehicle, the more likely it will 
be consolidated, and vice versa.  
 
F. Difference between Islamic and Conventional Banks Practice towards 
Special Purpose Vehicle  
 
All five interviewees indicated that the concept of special purpose vehicles, including 
its advantages and disadvantages, does not differ from conventional banks, except for 
the Shari’a aspect of the transaction. Conventional banks use special purpose vehicles 
to benefit from the entire benefits special purpose vehicles offer, with the exception of 
Shari’a. None of the five interviewees further elaborated on this concept, except for 
one interviewee who indicated that the only difference is adding a Shari’a clause in 
the Articles of Association of the established special purpose vehicle. 
 
  
